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How a company structures its capital greatly affects its strategic options and its 
strategic decisions according to contemporary thinking. However, while there is ample 
literature on how publicly held companies’ capital should be structured, less is known 
about private companies. Additionally, one or more members of a single family typically 
own the majority of private companies, and unlike public companies, family dynamics 
influence these firms’ non-financial and financial goals and strategic decisions. This 
overlap of family dynamics into the business arena complicates conventional approaches 
or at least makes conventional approaches more difficult to apply.  
This dissertation focuses on privately held, family-owned companies, and on how 
family dynamics challenge or make conventional approaches inapplicable or, at least, 
more complicated to apply. Utilizing a grounded theory-influenced approach on a sample 
of 11 family companies with different capital structures, the study explores the effects of 
family influence and family dynamics on capital structure decisions and vice versa in 
family owned companies. The qualitative inquiry took place in the South American 
country of Colombia, because this country is a representative capital market in Latin 
America from the financial development perspective, where the foreign investment 
growth has been high in the last years. The findings of this study advance the research of 
family dynamics and its effect on family business, and will be of help to family boards, 
managers, advisors, and family shareholders when making decisions on capital structure. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Increasing competition in markets puts stress on family businesses to finance 
entrepreneurship, technological renewal, and growth, and an inability to fund these 
endeavors appropriately could cause family firms to battle to defend market share, to face 
hostile takeovers, to sell the business, or even to become insolvent (De Visscher, 
Aronoff, & Ward, 1995). Furthermore, a critical question for an owner family is how to 
best finance its business, and how the chosen method to finance the business influences 
the owner’s family and vice versa. Financing of capital ventures, growth, and strategic 
pursuits of a family company can be achieved in several ways, including: internally 
generated cash flows; traditional bank debt; extended terms from vendors; quicker 
payments and prepayments from customers; additional capital inflows from current 
shareholders; equity and debt capital from external shareholders (employees, directors, 
investment institutions, independent directors, private equity funds); loans from family 
members or third parties; or by selling parts of the business that will not affect the 
company’s core activities (asset shedding) (Claessens, 2012; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 
2003).  
Research indicates that a company’s capital structure, or how a company finances its 
ventures and strategic growth, greatly affects its strategic options and its strategic 
decisions. Examples of research on how capital structures influence a company’s 





shareholder value as a method to measure performance (Sharma & Kumar, 2010). EVA 
also helps reduce agency conflict (aligning managers’ and shareholders’ interests) and 
improve decision making (Lovata & Costigan, 2002);  
 Goal setting (Adams, Manners, Astrachan, & Mazzola, 2004) to examine the 
financial return of firms, and to answer the question if the return to the 
company in the short and long terms is over the cost of capital depending on 
shareholders’ interests;  
 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) based on expected utility theory, its 
criticisms, and defenses. Behavioral economists suggest using prospect theory 
instead of CAPM, to be consistent with people’s choices (Black & Scholes, 
1973; Cox, Ross, & Rubinstein, 1979; Levy, 2010; Lintner, 1965; Merton, 
1976; Modigliani & Miller, 1958); 
 Capital Allocation to study and understand how capital is allocated among 
different divisions of a conglomerate, how decision making is delegated, what 
is the use of net present value for making decisions, and the influence of 
manager’s reputation within firms when making financing decisions 
(Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2011; Graham, Harvey, & Puri, 2011);  
 Mergers and Acquisitions studies made with private and public companies, the 
imprecision of sample sizes of mergers and acquisitions research, and certainty 
of studies made on these topics, junk bonds to finance acquisitions, financial 
and behavioral impact of mergers and acquisitions on the different 





combine corporations and leverage buyouts (Auerbach, 2008; Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1988; Netter, Stegemoller, & Wintoki, 2011);  
 Asset shedding and deleveraging in times of crisis (Claessens, 2012; El-Erian, 
2010); and optimal levels of debt (Biais & Casamata, 1999; Bradley, Jarrell, & 
Kim, 1984; Korteweg, 2010).  
 The Terminal Value of Investment vis-a-vis Net Present Value is a best 
estimate of the reinvestment rate to find whether a project provides the 
required risk adjusted return (Manners & Louderback, 1979).  
In other words, and for practical application, there is a relationship between capital 
structure, types, and sources of financing, and corporate strategy of businesses (Kochhar 
& Hitt, 1998). 
There is also evidence that sources of capital affect future outcomes and vice 
versa. For instance, Astrachan and McConaughy (2001) found that using professional 
private equity prior to a public offering increased listed stock performance post listing. 
On the other hand, Berger and Bonaccorsi (2006) identified a reversed causality from 
performance to capital structure. For practical application, these findings might offer 
informed advice for managers on how to craft capital structure to pursue certain 
strategies, and how desired outcomes require certain capital structures.  
Prior research has produced a great deal of theoretical and empirical insights on 
how publicly held companies’ capital is structured in different geographies and 
depending on cultures, governance codes, or investors’ protection (Chen, 2004); how 
decisions are made to structure the capital of a company; and how strategies to grow and 





different kinds of equity (Pagano, Randl, Röell, & Zechner, 2001). Less is known about 
capital structure in private companies, because most of the research on capital structure 
has been conducted using samples of listed companies (Graham, Leary, & Roberts, 
2013). Research utilizing listed companies is consistent with an increase in the use of 
secondary data in strategic research (Astrachan, 2010), as secondary data are almost 
always derived from listed companies (particularly in the USA), and are therefore widely 
available (Phelan, Ferreira, & Salvador, 2002). However, using data from listed 
companies to understand small and mostly private family businesses is controversial, and 
its results are often ultimately inapplicable (Astrachan, 2010). 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how family influence and family 
dynamics affect capital structure decisions, focusing explicitly on sources and levels of 
equity and debt financing. Secondarily, this research explores the reciprocal effects of 
capital structure decisions on family dynamics. To my knowledge, none of the existing 
research takes into account the influence of family dynamics on levels and proportions of 
debt and equity financing and vice-versa. 
Family companies are different from listed companies in that they often pursue 
goals that meet the personal needs of owners which may be at odds with business 
performance as defined in scholarly research on publicly held non-family companies such 
as:  
 Tobin’s Q (a ratio of the listed firm’s market value to book value) in family 






 Astrachan and Jaskiewicz, (2008) offer an explanation of what “value” is for a 
family business owner, arguing that family companies have emotional values 
and emotional costs different from financial issues and that those emotional 
issues can add or subtract to the value of the company from the family business 
owner’s perspective;  
 How family business owners make decisions protecting their socio-emotional 
wealth or all the elements family business associates with belonging, trust, 
altruism, etc. (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Gomez-
Mejia, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007) and family 
involvement in ownership, governance and management (Klein, Astrachan, & 
Smyrnios, 2005).  
Modern theory of capital structure is based on the seminal work of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958), whose theory assumed perfect markets and competition with the 
necessary information made available (Romano, Tanewski, & Smyrnios, 2000). 
Furthermore, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) model assumes that the cost of capital is 
equal to the rate of interest on bonds, regardless of whether the funds are acquired 
through debt instruments or through new issues of common stock. For these authors, the 
distinction between debt and equity funds reduces to one of terminology. Besides, they 
state that profit maximization is the only goal of a firm. While the Modigliani and Miller 
seminal work acquires relevance for public companies (Romano et al., 2000), these 
concepts have little application to family companies (Chaganti, DeCarolis, & Deeds, 
1995) because family firms often have other (non-financial) goals for their businesses 





options are framed, as a choice of potential gains or as a choice among potential losses. 
Behavioral theory predicts that decision makers, particularly family firms, prefer to avoid 
a loss even if this means accepting a higher risk or underperformance (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2007). Because there are non-financial goals at stake, family firms are not indifferent 
to choosing debt or equity to finance their projects. Propensity to use debt as a source of 
financing is also related to the interests of the different generations. As the number of 
generations increases, family members are less “overinvested” in the firm and are more 
willing to use debt and bear the attendant risk to their individual wealth. Thus, the use of 
debt will be favored by ownership dispersion across generations (Schulze et al., 2003). 
Most of the research on capital structure falls short given that the studies utilize 
public companies’ information when most economies around the world are made up of 
more private than public companies (Durand & Vargas, 2003), and the majority of 
private companies are family businesses (owned by one or more members of a single 
family) (IFERA, 2003). This is also problematic since the dynamics of family life affect 
strategic decisions (Brunninge, Nordqvist, & Wiklund, 2007; Craig & Lindsay, 2002; 
Dyer & Handler, 1994; Van Auken & Werbel, 2006). Additionally, Harris, Martinez, and 
Ward (1994) posit that the dynamics of the family may affect the relevance of the non-
financial (e.g., independence, employment for family members, prestige) and financial 
goals. Over time, performance of the company along financial (dividends, salaries, perks) 
and non-financial (quality products, archives, corporate social responsibility) dimensions 
may affect family emotional and financial cohesion dynamics as well (Pieper, 2007; 





It is clear that most of the research on capital structure has been focused on public 
companies with models not always applicable to family companies, and given that family 
companies are dominant in the economics of the world, a need exists to go deeper into 
the research of capital structures of family companies. More specifically, because family 
influence and/or family dynamics play little to no role in public company capital structure 
or funding decisions, little is known about family dynamics factors that influence funding 
decisions, or how funding decisions are influenced by family dynamics in family firms. 
As a consequence, despite a wide range of studies on the capital structure of firms, a fresh 
look from the ground through this qualitative study accounts for the insufficiencies of the 
current theories for the case of family firms. 
For these reasons, and in order to make a practical contribution to academic 
researchers and practitioners, my research focuses on family companies by exploring the 
influence of family firm dynamic specificities on capital structure decisions. The findings 
of this examination are useful to academics and practitioners for understanding family 
business decisions when financing family firms and how these decisions affect family 
and firm behaviors and strategic decision-making. For instance, if certain internal factors 
such as family dynamics, family values or different generations within the family 
promote capital structures that facilitate the business leader’s growth desires, focusing on 
those dynamics could be a preferred course of action. Likewise, if certain types of capital 
structures (and sources of capital) might harm family cohesion and if the family has a 
highly salient goal of cohesion, then such capital structures can be avoided until 
processes and mechanisms to counteract their pernicious effects are created and 





some family companies in the sample, issues worth discussing were how family values 
were represented in management risk, debt levels, liquidity, and the desirability of IPOs. 
In some other companies of the sample, boards or families decided to choose a strategic 
partner that modified the capital structure of the company in order to prevent family 
conflicts and facilitate cohesion. In other words, family companies are different from 
non-family companies even in the way they choose the capital structure of their 
companies. Furthermore, capital structures affect in positive or negative ways their 
family dynamics as well. An awareness of these differences and their effects is useful for 
families, researchers, and practitioners to know when studying financial structures and 
making financial decisions in family companies. 
Finally, I chose the grounded theory-influenced qualitative approach (Gioia, 
Corley, & Hamilton, 2013) to be conducted with 11 selected family-owned companies 
(purposeful sampling) of different sizes and from different industries in Colombia, as the 
best fit for this project, taking into account the type and scope of the research. To collect 
the data, I relied on several distinctive data sources: 30 audio-recorded in-depth 
interviews with several levels of informants, site documents, observations and field notes. 
Then, I triangulated data to improve objectivity, to diminish potential biases, and to 
improve the robustness of the resulting theory. I always had in mind that the analysis was 
necessary from the start to be used in next observations. As soon as I collected data and 
the interviews were transcribed, all the data was analyzed and top-down and bottom up 
coded, using computer-assisted data analysis software (ATLAS.ti) 
Stern (1995) asserts that a grounded theory approach is appropriate for 





While public company financing is rather familiar, a grounded theory approach allowed a 
more in-depth understanding of the relationships and processes involved in situations 
about which little currently was known (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
As a research site, Colombia is becoming a benchmark capital market in Latin 
America from a financial development perspective (González, Guzman, Pombo, & 
Trujillo, 2012); it is a country where foreign investment growth (113.4 percent) was the 
fifth largest in the world from 2010 to 2011, while in developed countries the growth rate 
was 18.5 percent over the same years (Portafolio, 2012). Moreover, the Colombian stock 
market has become one of the best performing in the region 
(www.stockmarkets.com/exchanges/south-america/colombia-stock-exchange, June 27th, 
2014), and most of the private companies are family-owned, according to 
Superintendencia de Sociedades de Colombia (2006), the entity that supervises and 
controls all the commercial and uni-personal firms in Colombia. Bartunek and Seo (2002) 
state that qualitative research is quite helpful, and sometimes necessary, for exploring 
local meanings of a phenomenon, and given the country’s superlative economic statistics, 
it can be used in this case for this research in Colombia. 
As with any other study in any field, this research is not free from limitations: 
specifically related to the sample size; Colombia, the place in which the study took place 
with very particular economic conditions; extending the observations of this study to 
other countries; different levels of development for different kinds of financing in 
Colombia; individual interviewee’s interpretations of historic situations; different 
generations of family companies in the sample; the family dynamics concept which is 





over time; the credibility of the interviewee’s answers; etc. All of these limitations and 
concerns, in turn, offer opportunities for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: FAMILY BUSINESS DYNAMICS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
This literature review outlines the existing state of research in family business 
financing and its relations with family dynamics and family business strategy. This study 
is based on a grounded-influenced theory approach. Several mainstream authors from this 
research tradition advise not to review the literature beforehand when using a grounded 
theory approach (Glaser & Holton, 2004; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stern, 1994; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1994), because theory should be grounded in the collected data; the researcher 
should not be biased by existing research and instead approach the data with a blank 
mind, letting the evidence emerge freely. 
Hutchinson (1993) and Pratt (2009) have another view about the literature review 
as precursor of grounded theory research. This view suggests that a literature review 
should precede data collection and analysis in grounded theory so that the researcher can 
identify the gaps in that line of research and provide its rationale. Gioia et al. (2013) also 
feature a methodology that enhances grounded theory development, and advise initially 
consulting existing literature without judgment to allow discovery of new insights. 
Following these recommendations, I deemed it necessary to conduct this literature review 
in order to get acquainted with concepts and the current state of the literature on the 
subject; this information was useful in identifying and structuring the appropriate 
questions for the qualitative interviews. It also assisted me in being attentive to the issues 





To make this project of value and since the family business is the basic unit of 
analysis, it is necessary to offer a family business definition to be used throughout the 
research. Family business definitions used in much previous research have varied widely 
(Wortman, 1995), which prompts me to posit a more exact working definition that will 
guide me through the study. Hence, I will proffer a family business definition first, and 
then review some of the papers and materials written on family business differences 
when compared to public companies. Likewise, I considered some of the papers written 
on capital structure of family companies and capital structure’s relation to family 
dynamics. I also explored the extant literature related to family influence and family 
dynamics and their effects on strategic issues of capital structure or financing, as well as 
the impact of capital structure on family dynamics.  
2.1 Family business definition 
In the first editorial note to the first issue of the Family Business Review, 
Lansberg, Perrow and Rogolski (1988) openly inquire about what is a family firm. 
Furthermore, in his review of the family business literature, Wortman (1995) reports that 
there were over 20 different definitions of family business. For instance, Chua, Chrisman 
and Sharma (1999, p. 25) define a family firm as a “business governed and/or managed 
with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business, held by a dominant 
coalition, controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in a 
manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families.”  
Despite the efforts to achieve a clear definition, Astrachan and Shanker (2003) 
acknowledge that the unique family business definition has not yet been achieved. More 





organization. He argues that children have always worked with their parents, brothers 
have worked together, and men and women who married took roles in factories, stores, 
and merchant banks. All human societies are an outgrowth of that biologically 
determined tendency of human kind (Kaye, 2005). Likewise, Villalonga and Amit (2006, 
p. 390) define a family firm as “One firm whose founder or a member of the family by 
either blood or marriage is an officer, a director, or the owner of at least 5 percent of the 
firm’s equity, individually or as a group.” Moreover, in the Colombian milieu, there is no 
clearly accepted definition. The more frequently used definition for a family business is 
the one given by Superintendencia de Sociedades (2006, p. 19): “The family company is 
that organization where more than 50 percent of the organization belongs to the same 
family.” However, this definition is only used by the Superintendencia de Sociedades for 
statistical purposes and is limited in that a family can control a company with a variety of 
different amounts of non-voting common and voting equity. 
This definitional diversity is challenging because of the varying degrees of 
specificity across studies, which makes comparisons of results problematic. When 
different definitions of family business are applied, the percentage of family business in 
one sample can differ between 15 percent and 81 percent, according to the definition used 
(Westhead, Cowling, & Storey, 1997). That is why Dyer (2003) recommends having a 
clear definition for each study so that the results can be compared and analyzed 
accordingly. Therefore, I use the Klein et al. (2005) definition. 
To operationalize the family business definition, I use the F-PEC scale developed 
by Klein et al. (2005), which measures the extent and quality of family influence on a 





vary in the organization over time, and can be manifested in many different ways in the 
organization (Klein et al., 2005). The scale was empirically tested and validated through 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, with high levels of reliability (Klein et al., 
2005). The F-PEC scale allows for continuous assessment of family involvement (instead 
of dichotomous distinctions), and for comparisons among various types of family 
businesses (Klein et al., 2005). Moreover, it is also commonly used in the literature 
(Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012; Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008; Holt, 
Rutherford, & Kuratko, 2010). 
2.2 Family companies in the world 
Family firms play an important role in the economics of today’s world. They are a 
major source of technological innovation and contribute a large share to economic 
progress (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003). Family firms also make up most of the businesses 
in the world (Gallo, 1998; Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1996; Litz, 1995), 
provide significant employment and employment growth (IFERA, 2003 in Astrachan & 
Shanker, 2003), and form the majority of organizations in developed economies 
(Kirchhoff & Kirchhoff, 1987). Even in listed firms where the family does not have 100 
percent ownership, their control of board seats is 2.75 times greater than their equity 
stake would indicate (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Family firms are also prolific investors. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), for instance, using the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) 
firms from 1992 through 1999, observed that founding families are a prevalent and 
important class of investors. The authors also investigated the relationship between 
founding-family ownership and firm performance and found family ownership to be both 





founder businesses from the family business category, there is no evidence of superior 
market valuations (Miller, Le Breton Miller, Lester, & Canella, 2007). In other words, 
firms that include relatives as owners or managers on average do not outperform in 
market valuation, even during the first generation. On average, only businesses with a 
lone founder outperform (Miller et al., 2007).  
Moreover, family firms are present in one-third of the S&P 500, account for 18 
percent of outstanding equity, and constitute over 35 percent of the S&P 500 industrials. 
These families also own nearly 18 percent of their firms’ outstanding equity, and 16 
percent of the S&P 500 firms’ sample is still managed by family founders or descendants 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Family control and influence in the S&P 500 can be even 
more extensive than these ownership levels suggest.  
In fact, of all companies in the UK, the percent that are non-family companies is 
quite small, most smaller firms are family-owned in the US, and family firms 
predominate in the majority of continental European countries. For example, Faccio and 
Lang (2002) found that more than 60 percent of all listed firms in France, Italy, and 
Germany are family firms. According to estimates of the European Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA, 2005), family businesses represent the backbone of the European 
economy, as they account for over 70 percent of jobs and contribute to between 55 
percent and 65 percent of the Gross National Product of the European Union (EU) 
member countries. US figures closely mirror these statistics. Similarly, when compared to 
all other businesses in the world, family businesses contribute a high proportion to Gross 





Sociedades (2006) for Colombia claims that of the 19,109 firms on which they have 
received information, 70 percent are family companies. 
2.3 Capital structure of listed companies and family firms 
Capital structure refers to the way firms choose to finance their operations, 
expansion and growth, and there is significant theoretical and empirical work in the fields 
of finance and economics relating to capital structure decision-making processes of 
public companies (Chaganti, De Carolis, & Deeds, 1995). Moreover, most of the 
empirical studies on capital structure have relied upon public information of large 
corporations with publicly traded securities (Cole, 2013). Among these capital structure 
theories, there are: Modigliani and Miller’s model (1958), Trade-off (Delcoure, 2007), 
Pecking Order (Myers, 1984), Agency (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006), and 
Signaling Hypothesis model (Chen, 2004). 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) initiated the most significant study on the capital 
structure issue, which was followed by various studies that have been conducted in 
diverse dimensions of capital structure. Modigliani and Miller’s Model (1958) assumes 
perfect markets and perfect competition, and presents three basic propositions in relation 
to the debt to equity ratios of companies: first, they posited that financial leverage has no 
effect on shareholder’s wealth; second, that shareholders expect higher rate of return 
when the debt to equity ratio is higher; and third, that the rate of return that the 
shareholders expect to receive increases with the higher relation of debt to equity because 
of higher risk for the investment. However, this model assumes that profit maximization 
is the only goal of a company, which has been seen as an incorrect assumption as 





(Grabowski & Mueller, 1972). Due to that limitation, that theory has its constraints when 
explaining even capital structure in public firms (Myers, 1984).  
Another approach to capital structure is the Tradeoff Theory that states that a 
taxable corporation should increase its debt level until its tax advantages of borrowing 
against the costs of financial distress is balanced. Debt level is expected to be increased to 
the limit where the marginal value of the tax shield is equal or lesser to present value of 
possible financial distress costs (Delcoure, 2007). Financial distress is defined “in terms 
of potential bankruptcy risk using an accounting based index of such risk” (Sudarsanam 
& Lai, 2001, p. 184). The optimal capital structure under this theory is calibrated to 
reflect firm characteristics at a given point in time and uses contingent methods to value 
interest tax shields (Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, & Weisbach, 2005). 
The Pecking Order Theory (Myers, 1984) describes a hierarchy of financial 
choices for a firm, which starts from internally generated financing to debt and lastly, 
outside equity (Seifert & Gonenc, 2008). The Pecking Order Theory suggests that 
management would prefer equity financing in favor of debt financing in view of 
information asymmetry condition and the benefit of reduced transactions costs. Based on 
this theory, highly profitable firms will tend to use internal funding, whereas firms with 
low profitability tend to use external financing. Asymmetric information also influences 
decision making in regards to the selection of sources of financing. Managers with inside 
information that points at favorable results of investment would favor debt over equity. 
The decision rule seems to be "Issue debt when investors undervalue the firm, and equity, 





Family firms are prone to conduct their business using information asymmetry, 
seeking their own interest prior to that of other stakeholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This 
behavior may lead to moral hazards that jeopardize trust. On the other hand, the 
assumption that information asymmetry drives the pecking order in family firms has been 
questioned by Leary and Roberts (2010), who indicate that pecking order behavior 
appears to be driven by incentive conflicts or agency costs rather than information 
asymmetry. Trade-off and Pecking Order theories are considered ‘stable mates’ rather 
than competing theories (Fama & French, 2005; Leary & Roberts, 2010).  
Agency theory induces a positive relationship between level of debt and 
shareholders’ value (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). There are two forms of agency 
conflicts: manager-shareholders and creditors-shareholders, where the conflict between 
manager and shareholders is about fulfilling the respective parties’ individual interest 
(Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). The creditor-shareholder conflict may occur when 
managers borrow money to repurchase shares to lower the corporation's share base and 
increase shareholder return. In this case, stockholders will benefit, but creditors will be 
concerned given the increase in debt that would affect future cash flows. According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), when debt is increased, the agency costs of equity holders 
might be reduced and the opposite effect might happen when equity holders increase their 
capital in the firm. These situations can produce conflicts between debt holders and 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Since not all outside investors of a company have the same information, there are 
some models of capital structure based on Signaling Models of capital structure, which 





investors (Ross, 1977). The signaling hypothesis model states that high-value firms are 
able to use more debt financing because debt has its dead weight costs, which make less 
valuable companies more likely to fall into bankruptcy – and hence predicts that firms 
with the best earnings and growth prospects will employ the most leverage. This model 
states that firms with higher value would use more debt as it has less probability of being 
insolvent – hence suggesting that firms with high growth rate and large size would prefer 
debt financing (Chen, 2004). 
There are some limitations to these approaches. In the existing international 
studies of capital structure, most studies are made in different countries with very 
different legal, regulatory, and market institutions, making it difficult to differentiate 
firm-level effects from country-level effects (King & Santor, 2008). Additionally, “the 
modern theory of corporate finance has not been developed with small businesses in 
mind” (Ang, 1991, p. 1), and, according to Berger and Udell (1998, pp. 615-616), “the 
private markets that finance small businesses … are so different from the public markets 
that finance large businesses.” Moreover, most research has been focused on either public 
companies or privately held small and medium enterprises with little consideration of 
family business (Harris & Raviv, 1991). Additionally, not much has been written about 
how leaders of family companies make their financing decisions (Romano et al., 2000). 
That leads to the question: What determines capital structure of family business?  
In response to that question, Barton (1989), for example, identified that financial, 
personal and social variables influence family business capital structure decisions. For 
example, perceived risk, attitudes of the family toward risk, use of internal finances to 





goals of the management in combination with internal and external contextual factors 
influence family business capital structure. Romano et al. (2000) found that firm size, 
family control, business planning and objectives are also associated with debt. Romano et 
al. (2000) also found that equity and retained profits are probably used to achieve growth 
in sales for owners of large businesses and young firms. Moreover, equity is less 
preferred for older firms and for those firms that want to retain family control (Romano et 
al., 2000). In addition, family reputation is more likely to create longer-lasting economic 
consequences with external parties such as bondholders or banks developing a negative 
relation between debt yields and founding family ownership (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 
2003). 
Understanding the capital structure of a family firm implies taking into account 
several additional factors which might not be considered by non-family companies – 
factors such as agency costs (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006), the “pecking order” 
(Myers, 1984), cost of capital (Poutziouris, 2001), owners’ characteristics (Pettit  & 
Singer, 1985), and multidimensional returns (Zellweger, 2006). In this section of the 
literature review, I will consider agency costs and the pecking order approach. Owners’ 
characteristics and cost of capital will be considered later in the literature review. 
2.3.1 Agency costs in family firms 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) made it clear that the interests of the company’s 
managers and its shareholders are not always perfectly aligned. The authors emphasized 
that the separation of ownership and control creates agency costs, defined by the sum of 
the monitoring expenditures by the principal (designed to limit activities of the agent), the 





actions that would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated 
if he does take such actions), and residual losses (as a result of reduction in welfare of the 
principal caused by decisions of the agent). Agency theory then explains the relationship 
between principals and agents in business (Gerhart, 2010). According to Villalonga and 
Amit (2006), the classic owner-management problem described by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) represents Agency Problem I, in which a manager´s decisions may be oriented to 
gain personal advantages; for instance, managers avoid relying on external finance 
because it would subject them to the discipline of the capital market, Myers (1984). The 
problem is mitigated by the large shareholder’s greater incentives to monitor the 
manager. In Agency Problem II, the large shareholder may use its controlling position in 
the firm to extract private benefits at the expense of the small shareholders.  
To counter or deal with agency relationships, agency costs must be incurred (such 
as control mechanisms, incentive alignment, etc.). If the large shareholder is an institution 
such as a bank, an investment fund, or a widely held corporation, the private benefits of 
control are diluted among several independent owners. As a result, the large 
shareholder’s incentives for expropriating minority shareholders (Agency Problem II) are 
small, but so are its incentives for monitoring the manager, so we revert to Agency 
Problem I for those firms. If the large shareholder is an individual or a family, it has 
greater incentives for both expropriation and monitoring, which are likely to lead Agency 
Problem II to overshadow Agency Problem I. In fact, because large individual and family 
shareholders are frequently involved in management as well, Agency Problem I may be 





some of the inefficiencies of the system, making managers more willing to use debt and 
bear the threat it poses to their individual wealth (Schulze et al., 2003).  
Another expression of the agency problem takes place in the conflict between 
shareholders and bondholders, the so-called risk-shifting problem. Shareholders have 
incentives to expropriate bondholder wealth by investing in risky, high expected-return 
projects, whereas bondholders demand higher rents, and insist on protective covenants 
and monitoring devices, resulting in a higher cost of debt capital (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Bond investors, however, view founding family ownership as an organizational 
structure that better protects their interests, and that is why debt costs seem to be lower in 
family companies (Anderson et al., 2003). 
Agency costs are also due to conflicts between debt and equity investors (Myers, 
1977). These last types of agency conflicts take place especially when there is a risk of 
default. The risk of default may create what Myers (1977) referred to as an 
“underinvestment” or “debt overhang” problem. In other words, high levels of debt can 
depress spending and investment. Firms with high debt must devote more cash to interest 
payments, so they have less money available for spending and companies with weak 
balance sheets might also find it harder to obtain external funds for new investment 
projects. When these companies can raise external funds, they must pay a higher rate, 
which increases their cost of investing. In this case, debt will have a negative effect on 
the value of the firm.  
Building on Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) developed a model in 
which debt financing mitigates overinvestment issues but aggravates the underinvestment 





positive and a negative effect on firm performance, and presumably both effects are 
present in all firms. As for value creation, being a family business reduces Agency 
Problem I costs because ownership and management interests are typically aligned, and 
obtaining resources might be easier (López-Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 2007). If the 
family holds control in excess (Agency Problem II) through multiple share classes, 
pyramids, cross-holdings or voting agreements, these mechanisms may reduce 
shareholder value, with the reduction in value being proportional to the excess of voting 
over cash flow rights (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). On the other hand, Carney (2005) states 
that family firms may mitigate agency costs because of their parsimony (capital deployed 
sparingly and used intensively), personalism (unification of ownership and control in the 
owner), and particularism (families may employ alternative decision criteria than those 
based on pure economic rationality). Anderson and Reeb (2003) add the firm’s long-term 
survival and the family’s concern for the firm’s (family’s) reputation as mechanisms to 
mitigate agency costs. 
 Yet speculative arguments alone cannot unambiguously predict agency 
relationships (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). Empirical researchers find it difficult to 
obtain direct measures of the magnitude of agency costs since they are confounded with a 
variety of factors that are beyond the control of management (Berger & Bonaccorsi di 
Patti, 2006). Besides, there is no conclusive evidence that incentive alignment by CEO 
pay or equity ownership achieves significant organization performance (Nyberg, Fulmer, 
Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010). Some family firms reduce agency costs by keeping wages 
of family members working in the business below market levels, thus risking the loss of 





hiring family members, companies feel they need not implement expensive audit process, 
performance assessment procedures, or alignment strategies such as training or bonuses, 
based on the expected reliability of people bounded by family ties (Lansberg, 1983). 
Exerting tight monitoring systems would have repercussions for familial relations causing 
misalignment and, as a consequence, increasing agency costs (Schulze et al., 2003). 
Extant literature seemingly supports that family firms have lower agency costs of debt 
(lower debt financing costs) which then raises the question why family firms do not take 
on more debt as part of their capital structure. 
2.3.2. Pecking order approach in family business financing 
Myers (1984) posited that, in general, firms meet their financial needs in a 
hierarchical manner – first, by using internal equity (owner’s capital input), followed by 
borrowing from commercial lenders, and finally, by using external equity (issuing stock).  
Two bootstrapping mechanisms to finance family businesses stand out: personal assets; 
and Family Investment Enterprise (FIE). The former calls for resources from family 
members and the latter is the decision of the family to pool the proceeds after a sale into a 
common ownership arrangement (McEahern & Winget, 2009). Financing the family firm 
from inside offers advantages such as coordinating goals and objectives, achieving 
economies of scale, gaining greater access to investments, diversifying risk, and estate 
planning efficiencies. Among the disadvantages, the authors mention administrative costs 
and burdens, lack of privacy, and other family issues. Sinking all of the resources into the 
family business could put investors in serious financial straits. 
When testing pecking order theories, Helwege and Lian (1996) find that all types 





other hand, Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb (2008) strongly support the theory that small firms 
behave differently from large firms when choosing financing for their companies. There 
are also different academic approaches to the pecking order theory in family firms, 
including that of Barton (1989), which states that family companies follow a pecking 
order not only for financial factors but as a means of keeping control in three dimensions: 
hold a significant part of the capital; retain significant control over the company, which 
depends on the distribution of capital and voting rights among non-family shareholders, 
with possible statutory or legal restrictions; and hold top management positions. The 
financial point of view theory is that family firms strongly stick to the pecking order of 
financing (Blanco-Mazagatos, Quevedo-Puente & Castillo, 2007; Poutziouris, 2001; 
Romano et al., 2000; Zoppa & McMahon, 2002). To the contrary, Berger and Udell 
(1998), for example, found that in later stages of life cycles, not all family businesses 
choose external debt instead of family debt in order to maintain control as long as 
possible.   
2.4 Dynamics of family life 
Family and business can be seen as interpenetrating systems, which can overlap to 
the point of being considered a single system (Basco & Pérez Rodríguez, 2009). The 
strong interactions among family and business are innate to family businesses and are the 
source of the distinctive nature of this type of organization (Pieper, 2010). When 
referring to dynamics of family life, I include various aspects of family behaviors that 
affect the business and the ownership of the business,  such as: emotional pressures and 
stress (Craig & Lindsay, 2002); team dynamics and family relations (Astrachan, 2010); 





2003); family system behavior (Poza, 2010); family power (Miller & Le-Breton Miller, 
2006); family entrenchment (Kroll, Wright, & Theerathorn, 1993); ownership schemes 
(McMahon & Stanger, 1995); ownership dilution (Schulze et al., 2003); family and 
conflict (Pieper, 2010); and so on. 
The dynamics of family life affect strategic decisions for both the family and the 
business (Brunninge, Nordqvist, & Wiklund, 2007; Craig & Lindsay, 2002; Dyer & 
Handler, 1994; Van Auken & Werbel, 2006). Financing entrepreneurship, for instance, 
entails a certain degree of “irrationality” since some decisions can be affected by 
emotional pressures through loneliness and stress, and venture performance can be 
affected by team dynamics (Craig & Lindsay, 2002). Conditions unique to family firms 
may lead some members to develop a heightened sense of entitlement yet weaken bonds 
to the organization. Family members’ incompetence, opportunistic behaviors, and/or 
ethically dubious actions can impede the firm’s success, potentially resulting in a scandal 
that could lead to the firm’s demise and negative economic impact on employees, 
customers, and other stakeholders (Kidwell, Kellermanns, & Eddleston, 2012). In this 
research, I intend to explore how family dynamics and behavioral patterns influence the 
selection of specific strategies for financing and structuring – in distinct proportions – the 
capital of the family company and vice-versa. For example, what influences certain 
families to prefer financing growth with a specific proportion of private equity funds, and 
others to prefer financing growth with additional bank debt? Likewise, this literature 
review aims at understanding how the way a family firm structures its financing affects 
its owning family’s dynamics. For example, resorting to debt to finance growth or 





all family members may be willing to accept. In the event of default, it might jeopardize 
family cohesion. Other families would not welcome ESOPs (Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans) as a financing strategy due to the sensitive family information that becomes open 
to employees.  
2.4.1 Conflict in the family firm  
The apparent irreconcilable differences among family members spur conflict. 
Within the large literature on conflict, referred to as a situation in which seemingly 
incompatible elements exert force in opposing or divergent directions (Heitter, 1990), 
two types seem to make a positive contribution to family firm growth: cognitive and 
process conflict. Cognitive and process conflict are work-related conflicts that are void of 
negative emotions and thus, thought to be beneficial to performance because they 
increase options, prevent premature consensus, and foster employee involvement. 
Cognitive conflict centers on disagreements that are related to the work-at-hand and the 
strategies being pursued, while process conflict refers to the discussions about who is 
responsible for which tasks (Jehn & Mannix, 2001).  
Another type of conflict is relationship conflict, which refers to interpersonal 
issues, individual norms and values, and personal taste (Pieper, 2010). It usually involves 
emotions that emerge from unresolved or uncommunicated situations. Their very 
emotional nature makes communicating issues difficult, which in turn makes reaching an 
acceptable level of rationality difficult.  Family- relationship-based conflicts arise from 
different reasons, becoming a hindrance to cohesion, harmony, multigenerational success, 
and performance. Identity conflicts involve family members’ need to differentiate 





on degrees of confusion and disorientation among roles when family members work 
together; succession conflicts, related to owner and leadership issues, are included in this 
spectrum of relationship related conflicts (Danes, Leichtentrit, Metz, Huddleston-Casas, 
2000). 
Family cohesion is easily affected by divorce, sibling differences, reciprocal 
blaming for unfortunate investments, conflict of interests, intromission of in-laws, uneven 
allocation of family resources, and so on. The combination of conflict coming from 
within the business and conflict coming from within the family compounds the effects of 
conflict in family firms (Harvey & Evans, 1994). The dynamics of family firms’ conflict 
is based upon the following features:  
 members of a family group of co-workers often fight about issues underlying 
those over which they claim to be angry;  
 reasons for sustaining the conflict are often stronger than the family members’ 
desire to solve the conflict;  
 issues at stake are not linear but rather circular or systemic; they usually do not 
have a cause leading directly to an effect, and they usually are not traceable to 
one party’s behavior at a specific moment;  
 the conflict follows a dynamic pattern and the shared long-term goals often 
override separate interests and sometimes override common material interests 
(Kaye, 1991). 
Kidwell et al., 2012) argue that dysfunctional behavior of family members can be 
manifested by unethical or obstructive acts that damage the firm. The perception of unfair 





performers or shows preferential treatment toward certain family members – can create 
potential spillover effects on relationships in the family, prompting a proclivity for 
deviant and potentially unethical behaviors unique in family firms. Family businesses 
often hire family members who impede the firm by shirking responsibilities and 
consuming unearned perks, being generally less able, committed, industrious, or ethical – 
or they have interests less compatible with the firm than the owner anticipated (Kidwell et 
al., 2012). Matters related to shared vision, values, principles and strategic planning often 
lead to conflicts because participants may become irrational in seeking what they 
consider to be right. Conflicts over love, loyalty, the threat of personal loss, and 
unresolved leadership succession have a capacity to keep returning to the same emotional 
source to recharge their animosity, creating a dysfunctional family climate.  
Outsiders such as potential investors, banks, and venture partners assess these 
setbacks prior to entering into business agreements of any sort with family businesses. 
Family conflicts may signal high risks for investors who could counteract risks by 
requesting collaterals, harsh loan conditions, and high debt rates. From another 
perspective, families experiencing conflicts become a ground for investors’ opportunistic 
behavior, taking advantage of the feelings of frustration, disappointment, fatigue, and 
even anger among family members by offering quick and cheap financial fixes to get a 
way out in exchange for their shares or other assets.  
2.4.2 Reputation in the family firm 
According to Sonnenfeld and Spence (1989), the level of debt family companies 
carry tends to be low to avoid damaging family reputation and to prevent losing 





financing is higher for family firms with family member CEOs relative to family firms 
with non-family CEOs. This may be more attributable to founder descendents than to 
founder CEOs, due to the fact that descendants are more likely to detract from firm 
performance (Anderson et al., 2003). 
Lenders ponder some features of family dynamics when it comes to collateral 
requested when acquiring debt. For example, family members having a non-diversified 
investment portfolio are mainly concerned with the long-term survival of the firm and 
prefer to pass the firm to their heirs rather than to consume the created wealth (Ang, 
1991). Further, family firms are more concerned about the reputation of the firm and their 
family due to their sustained presence in the firm (Bopaiah, 1998; Anderson et al., 2003). 
In addition, family firms would also be characterized by a cohesive management 
structure, self-regulation, and personal contacts with external parties (Bopaiah, 1998). 
Such characteristics suggest that undiversified family shareholders reduce the risk for 
bondholders, resulting in lower agency costs of debt. As such, family firms incur a lower 
probability of pledging collateral or personal commitments.  
On the other hand, Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) found for a sample of small 
private firms that family ownership increases the likelihood of collateral being required. 
Private family ownership increases potential shareholder-bondholder agency problems 
when obtaining high amount loans. Familial altruism could cause higher agency costs 
because of the higher likelihood of ‘free riding’ by family members, entrenchment of 
ineffective managers or predatory managers. Therefore, family firms incur a higher 





As to the impact of IPOs on the family subsystem, Marchisio and Ravasi (2000) 
found that besides facilitating entrepreneurship and growth, family companies go public 
because of visibility and standing of the company. García Pérez de Lema, Duréndez, and 
Mariño (2011) also found reputation and status as motives for going public, as they may 
be means to increase the prominence, prestige, and status of company stakeholders. 
Reputation and social networking are many times motives to go public because doing so 
can improve the external relations of the company with different stakeholders and bring 
about internal changes in planning and accounting. However, Brau, Francis and Kohers 
(2003) concluded that the liquidity effect of the decision to go public is traditionally 
assumed to be one of the primary reasons for IPOs, particularly in the presence of factors 
such as industry concentration, high-tech industry affiliation, current cost of debt, relative 
“hotness” of the IPO market, firm size, and insider ownership percentage.  
Yet, despite the existence of the previously mentioned studies on family dynamics 
and their influence on the capital structure of the family firms, Barton and Gordon 
(1988), in Zellweger, Frey and Halter (2006), propose that researchers should take a 
broader managerial perspective which considers nonfinancial and behavioral factors as 
perceived business risk (Kale, Noe, & Ramirez, 1991; Matthews, Vasudevan, Barton, & 
Apana, 1994), and also consider individual managerial perceptions and preferences 
(Norton, 1991); however, Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) still argue that the associations 
between family business dynamics and the capital structure of family firms has not been 
put together concisely. For example, might it be that a family in conflict desires capital 
from outside expert investors to help mitigate that conflict? Or perhaps not wanting to be 





generated funds. When does the potential airing of family blemishes outweigh the 
benefits of an IPO? If there is a highly competitive dynamic in the family, might they be 
more likely to want access to capital markets so they can more readily afford displays of 
success? 
2.4.3 Family firm´s transparency in business 
Effective and timely disclosure of reported earnings, corporate governance 
practices, and early warning for a given magnitude of bad news provide the tools for a 
more comprehensive assessment of financial risk, a key element for potential investors. 
Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan, (2007) reported that earnings are of better quality for 
family firm as compared to non-family firms. Likewise, the authors mentioned above 
posited that family firms are more likely to warn about poor earnings through 
management earnings forecasts. Family firms make less voluntary disclosures about 
corporate governance practices in their regulatory filings, however, thus reducing the 
transparency of corporate governance practices to facilitate getting family members on 
boards without interference from non-family shareholders. The capital structure chosen 
by the family will then be related to the demands of disclosure of investors/lenders, and 
the compliance disposition of the family.  
Financial theory regarding the cost of capital states that the cost of capital is a 
market-based function of the characteristics of the investment, not the investor. This 
theory suggests that a firm’s cost of capital does not depend on a “family effect”– the 
quality of the relationships of the family members among themselves and with the firm. 
However, not all financial economists’ assumptions regarding the cost of capital hold for 





2.4.4 Systems models in family business 
To understand better the effect of financing structure on family dynamics, I will 
first describe the family business as a system, and then explore different family dynamic 
typologies of family companies. To explain the family business organization, Tagiuri and 
Davis (1982) developed the three-circle system model to represent the interactions that 
occur within a family business. In their model, the authors define the family business 
system as three independent but overlapping subsystems: business, ownership, and 
family. These three subsystems and their overlaps are used to illustrate how individuals in 
family business make decisions or develop strategies that fulfill the goals of each 
subsystem and the whole family business. This model also supports our consideration of 
the associations that occur in a family-owned firm (Tagiuri & Davis, 1982).  
Astrachan (2010) suggests that families are systems whose members interrelate 
with each other, and their attitudes affect the entire system. In addition, families are 
groups attached by principles, normative values including altruism and reciprocity 
(Stewart, 2003), and these relational and systemic ties emphasize the importance of 
understanding properties of the whole, where a single relation can affect the entire system 
(Cox & Paley, 1997). Even more, the behaviors of individuals can be better understood in 
the context of the whole system (Poza, 2010).  
Correspondingly, other models can also help one to understand how family 
dynamics affect the company’s strategic decisions and vice-versa. For example, Gersick 
et al. (1997) and Lansberg (1999) characterize different ownership structures and posit 
that ownership evolves from “controlling” owners to “cousin consortiums,” with each 





Since the owners of family companies are family groups, families and family dynamics 
affect the strategic process of the business (Astrachan, 2010). When company 
inefficiencies or succession problems emerge on the horizon, for example, buyouts of 
family firms become a reasonable option. In many of those cases, the family firm 
constitutes a potential target for incumbent managers interested in acquiring a controlling 
share of the company (management buyout). Private equity companies may be stirred by 
the prospect of bringing in a new and efficient management team to streamline 
performance or set new bearings (management buy-in) (Scholes, Wright, Westhead, 
Bruining, & Kloeckner, 2009). 
2.4.5 Family business dynamic typologies 
Dyer (2003) suggests that not all family firms are alike because of the different 
dynamics found in families that own and manage their family firms, and he suggests 
using typologies to present differences and commonalities in organization forms and 
outcomes of those forms. The typologies presented by Dyer (2003) suggest different 
types of performance, and the question his model presents could be what typologies are 
those that lead to better performance. He concludes that family dynamics typology would 
be a way to understand how family dynamics affects agency costs and family assets 
based on family typologies.  
In the same way, since capital structure is a strategic decision (Barton & Gordon, 
1988; Romano et al., 2000), it seems worth using a family business typology that 
includes decision making to understanding how family dynamics affect decision making 





families according to its decision-making dynamics. Those family dynamic typologies 
are:  
 The closed paradigm family, in which the family relies on family hierarchy of 
authority which regulates processes and decision making. 
 The random paradigm family, an egalitarian family system where each member 
has independent thought and action, and where collective needs are met 
through individual initiatives.  
 The open paradigm family, where a democratic approach for decision making 
is used as the family’s collective goals and values are achieved through 
integrating individual needs.  
 The synchronous paradigmatic family, where no family member needs to be 
told what to do because they have agreements relating to values and goals that 
regulate family processes and decision-making. It is argued that, in 
synchronous paradigmatic families, all family members internalize the rules.  
I will be using the Constantine model in this project because of its relation to family 
dynamics and the decision-making processes (Constantine, 1993). 
2.4.6 Interconnections of family and business capital structures  
Haynes and Avery (1997) suggest that most of the research on small businesses 
financing overlooks the interconnection of family and business finances in business 
owning families. Instead, the research focuses on models of profit growth, the risk-
tolerance predilections of the owner-manager, and the financial and regulatory structure 
of corporate financial markets, or it uses samples from the upper boundaries of what 





some more recent studies (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; López-Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 
2007) do take into consideration family dynamics and their influence on capital structure 
decisions and vice-versa.  
2.4.6.1 Dynamics of family control and capital structure 
          The dynamics of owning family control and its influence on the family business 
and vice-versa has been studied by many researchers. For example, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) found that combining ownership and control allows concentrated shareholders to 
exchange projects for private rents. In that way, controlling families may take resources 
away from profitable projects to satisfy personal interests, forgoing maximum profits for 
external shareholders. This entrenchment occurs when managers gain so much power that 
they are able to use the firm to further their own interests rather than the interests of other 
shareholders.  
The same entrenchment phenomena might occur in firms with widely distributed 
ownership and without large-block owners, where boards may appoint outsiders and are 
not vigilant or fail to exercise their fiduciary authority over insiders, thus favoring 
entrenchment (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Family CEOs usually have disproportionate 
power compared to their share of ownership; they also hold a larger tenure than those in 
non-family firms (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). In addition, boards of family firms 
are usually smaller (Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007), and are loyal to the family so decisions 
are rarely questioned (Kroll et al., 1993). These factors also favor entrenchment.  
Moreover, family firms are usually risk-averse, and this proclivity makes them 
prefer less risky financial options (less debt), because an increase in debt increases the 





scenario (McConaughy, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001). Other studies show how family 
decisions, when based on a need to maintain control, affect the potential of optimal 
leverage (McMahon & Stanger, 1995), or the difficult situations family firms may face if 
they seek control but relinquish outside capital (López-Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 
2007). These patterns of control dynamics and entrenchment over investment priorities 
and capital structure posit a challenge to optimal performance, and may affect confidence 
of non-family investors on the ability of the family to run the business objectively. 
Highlights of other studies relating to control and family dynamics include:  
 the possibility of improving management successions despite the risk of losing 
control through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) (Dig & Pukthuanthong, 2013);  
 the cost of going public because of the risks of losing control (Becchetti & 
Trovato, 2002; Berggren, Olofsson, & Silver, 2000; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 
2004);  
 the family fear of losing control as their companies go public (Benninga, 
Helmantel, & Sarig, 2005; Berggren et al., 2000; Giudici & Paleari, 2000; 
Marchisio & Mazzola, 2002; Marchisio & Ravasi, 2000);  
 the considerable control many family companies have even after several years 
post IPOs (Jaskiewicz, González, Menéndez, & Schiereck, 2005; Marchisio & 
Mazzola, 2002); 
 the importance of the agency costs of equity arising from the separation of 
ownership and control of firms whereby managers tend to maximize their own 





To guarantee family control of the firm, families tend to reduce their potential financial 
resources, thus limiting their entire resource structure. Consequently, this trade-off lacks 
financial resources that affect the development, growth opportunities, and long-term 
survival of private family businesses (Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007). 
2.4.6.2 Dynamics of owners’ characteristics and capital structure   
Owners’ characteristics are important when studying the capital structure and 
decision making of family companies. Nevertheless, with the limited public information 
available, studies on capital structure focused primarily on company characteristics until 
the early 1980s. After the publication of the U.S. Census Bureau’s 1982 Characteristics 
of Business Owners database (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1987), research on capital 
structure and financing began to include characteristics of the owners as well as 
characteristics of the firm.  
Age may cause the controlling owner to avoid investments that other family 
members favor because he or she views the investments as too risky or as personally 
threatening – in the case, perhaps, of their requiring the controlling owner to learn new 
skills (Schulze et al., 2003). In terms of gender, women are more likely to choose 
entrepreneurship as a career for reasons of family stability and flexibility, while men are 
primarily motivated by growth and wealth (Rutherford, Muse, & Oswald, 2006). Female-
owned and operated small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) are less financially 
successful than male-owned and operated SMEs (Fasci & Valdez, 1998).  
As for other owner’s characteristics, Bates (1991) used a sample taken from the 
census database to examine the dollar amount of debt financing incurred by small 





decisions. College-educated non-minorities and those with managerial experience 
consistently received larger loans than other nonminority borrowers, other things being 
equal. This study also indicates that highly educated owners with large equity inputs meet 
the conditions bankers consider when they determine the size of the loans, particularly in 
SMEs.  
Business decisions made by a family member/owner who is not employed by the 
company may center more on dividends, while business decisions made by a family 
member/employee who is not an owner may focus on expansion and growth (Gersick et 
al., 1997). Family firms may be headed by owners who look to satisfy more personal 
goals before financial goals, as opposed to growth-oriented firms that seek growth as a 
primary goal. Owners that attempt to address family concerns before business concerns 
often constrain growth and development (Budge & Janoff, 1991). Pettit and Singer 
(1985) suggested that the capital structure of small firms (not necessarily family-owned 
enterprises) is determined in part by:  the interaction of the owner’s preferences for risk 
and return, because most small business managers have most of both their human and 
financial capital placed in the firm;  characteristics of the firm, such as its legal form of 
organization, because of tax effects on different types of organizational forms; and  the 
direct (such as higher interest rates, closer banker’s relationships, more collaterals) and 
indirect (such as restrictive covenants, more stringent limitations, direct management 
assistance from the banks) costs of various financing packages. 
Family tensions impact business decisions. Divorce is the most extreme and 
increasingly common manifestation of “overload” that family members endure in an 





(2003) found that divorce had a negative and significant impact on a number of 
performance measures, including size and profitability. Possibly the most common 
organizational manifestation of work/family tension is turnover among family members 
(Beehr, 1995). This is caused initially by role conflict that family members feel between 
their roles at work and their roles at home. It is magnified by the fact that family 
members cannot get away from each other since they are often part of the home life as 
well (Kaye, 1991). This evidence of family/work tension can impede growth and possibly 
lead to failure. Families are also vulnerable to a form of inertia that can paralyze 
decision-making and threaten firm survival (Meyer & Zucker, 1989).  
In addition, there are other characteristics of business owners that may affect the 
financial structure and decision making in family companies and vice-versa. For 
example, Haynes and Avery (1997) contend that the reasons family firms use debt for 
financing is still debated, and that given the linking of personal and business debt (which 
banks often require to receive debt financing), the debt structure of small-business 
owners is probably different from the debt structure of other types of owners. Moreover, 
aside from their firms’ mere size, family firms fear going into the stock market because 
the legacy the founders wish to leave to their families could be lost along with their 
privacy (Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Cabrera & Santana, 2001; Crocker, Hartzell, Jarl, & 
Kallberg, 2008; Post, 2011; Rossouw, 2009; Wu, 2006). As a consequence of this 
interaction or “peculiar logic” driven by owner managers’ personal inclinations 
concerning growth, risk, and ownership control, the company could be handicapped for 





then, that characteristics of business owners affect the financial structure of family 
companies and their decision-making, and vice versa. 
2.4.6.3 Dynamics of succession and its influence on capital structure and vice-versa  
Both in family and non-family businesses, succession is a continuous process that 
demands new sources of money that can overcome the costly, scarce, and heavily short-
term funding (Poutziouris, 2001). Moreover, the capital structure of a family firm is 
affected by the fact that many families deem survival to be a main concern along with 
bequeathing assets to descendants. Therefore, they are more likely to maximize firm 
value rather than shareholder value when a divergence occurs between the two 
(Anderson, 2003). Schulze et al.’s (2003) work is interesting in this regard as it also 
points to the relevance of ownership dilution in a succession process as a possible 
dynamic that impacts the capital structure of family firms. Some regression outcomes, for 
instance, support a U-shaped relationship between family ownership dispersion and 
leverage (Bjuggren, Duggal & Giang, 2012). 
In terms of family companies, according to Gersick et al. (1997), the ownership of 
a family firm generally goes through three broad phases of dispersion: the controlling 
owner stage, the sibling partnership, and the cousin consortium. In the controlling owner 
stage, founders usually lack access to the public markets, so investments are limited by 
the availability of funds internally generated (Romano et al., 2000). Small business 
owners typically have undiversified personal financial portfolios, meaning that much of 
their wealth is tied up in the business and is therefore illiquid. In addition, because of 
personal financial guarantees, small business owners do not have the benefit of limited 





the problem of imperfect or incomplete information, often referred to in economics 
literature as the problem of asymmetric information leading lenders and investors to 
counteract asymmetries by refusing to lend or invest (Coleman & Carsky, 1999).  
For the reasons mentioned above, the controlling owners of family firms, and in 
particular the founders, will at the beginning be very motivated to use debt to finance 
their chosen investments. Although Harijono (2005) reports that family firms seem to 
employ, on average, 20% more in debt than non-family firms, Sonfield and Lusier (2004) 
show that 40% of first generation family firms use equity funding more than debt 
funding, and that very few of these first generation firms are incorporated. In contrast, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that insider ownership – either by manager or families – 
has no impact on capital structure decisions at all. Families employ somewhat less debt 
(18.42%) than non-family firms (19.34%); however, the findings are not statistically 
significant. 
In the sibling partnership stage, the principal shareholder is not the founder of the 
family firm, but siblings. Siblings tend to be more conservative when making investments 
due to their sense of entitlement. They believe that investments may add risk and threaten 
the value of their anticipated inheritance (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). When 
ownership is dispersed and the firm enters the sibling partnership stage, debt financing 
seems to decline. One reason for this may be that the agency conflicts within the family 
become too extensive as each sibling tries to maximize his or her family’s utility. The 
firm may then be trapped in a status quo-like situation where none of the siblings or the 





wealth is invested in the company, the risk taking is assumed to be minimized by the 
employment of less debt (Bjuggren et al., 2012).  
On the other hand, family firms may employ more debt in order to control the 
self-interests of the family agents, to limit the negative consequences of altruism within 
the firm. It is argued that altruism causes parents to increase their generosity, which can 
result in a dilemma where their children ‘free ride’ (Schulze et al., 2001). In order to 
discipline and avoid the free riding problem caused by family members, the usage of debt 
may be more extensive than the agency theory predicts (Bjuggren et al., 2012). Kaye and 
Hamilton (2004) likewise believe that descendants are less likely to employ a highly 
leveraged capital structure, as they are more concerned about wealth preservation than 
about wealth creation. This conservative orientation also concords with the stagnation 
theory suggested by Miller, Le Breton-Miller and Scholnick (2008).  
In contrast, other studies show that only 11% of second-generation family firms 
use equity funding more than debt (Sonfield & Lussier, 2004). In the cousin consortium, 
ownership is even more dispersed, and it is less likely that a single individual owns a 
controlling or majority interest in the firm. Inside directors, it follows, should be less 
concerned with consumption and more concerned about the future value of their assets. 
The end result is an increase in the alignment of interest that exists among board 
members and, hence, reduced agency costs. Cousin consortiums’ managers are both more 
willing to use debt to pursue their objectives and, because of the dispersion of ownership, 
more able (and more likely) to bear that risk (Schulze et al., 2003). In contrast, Sonfield 
and Lussier (2004) show that 33% of the third generation family firms use more equity 





Moreover, Molly, Laveren and Deloof (2010) as well as Kaye and Hamilton 
(2004) establish that the transfer of ownership from the first to the second generation 
appears to negatively influence the leverage of the company. Nevertheless, Molly et al. 
(2010) posit that, in later generations of family firms, this effect could be reversed 
because next-generation family members are often more concerned with wealth 
preservation than with wealth creation. A result of this attitude can be lower debt for the 
company and lower orientation toward firm growth because of a lack of external 
financing (Molly et al., 2010). 
Zellweger (2007) suggests that, to family shareholders, ownership and capital are 
an entrepreneurial legacy to be passed on to the next generation of the family. And while 
the decision to go public gives outside investors access to company equity and family 
firm owners risk losing control through an IPO, it is also a strategic decision which 
improves or overcomes management succession problems. Marchisio and Ravasi (2000) 
explain that, as generations go by, the number of shareholders increases, and their ties to 
each other and to the company loosen. The fragmentation of the ownership increases the 
probability that a family shareholder wants or needs to sell or to exchange stock. Internal 
factors in relation to the lack of specific skills in family business (Garcia-Perez, 2011) 
also supports the move to  going public as a way to attract professional managers, thus 
ensuring a most effective strategic direction, and in the long run, the survival of the firm 
(Ding & Pukthuanthong, 2013; Jaskiewicz et al., 2005; Marchisio & Mazzola, 2002). 
Other research indicates how going public helps family companies to deal with liquidity 
needs of senior generations associated with cashing out and paying estate taxes 





Another example of the influence of capital structure on family business 
succession dynamics is given by means of an investment of a private equity investor or a 
private equity fund in a family company. Private equity funds usually invest for short 
periods of time, or sometimes impose other special requirements. The risks of prompting 
the exit of this equity investor might reduce the involvement of next generation of family 
members because their commitment and trust decline (Marchisio, Mazzola, Sciascia, 
Miles, & Astrachan, 2010). 
2.5. Family business differences from non-family listed companies  
Family businesses are unique and pursue strategies different from those of other 
companies (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Zhara & Sharma, 2004). Habbershon and 
Williams (1999) posit that the uniqueness of family businesses results from the mixing of 
family and business life. In its essence, a family firm shows a family’s influence over the 
strategic direction of a firm, the intention of the family to keep control, a particular 
family firm behavior and unique, inseparable, synergistic resources and capabilities 
arising from family involvement and interactions. A family’s vision and intention for 
trans generational sustainability leads to the institutionalization of the perceived value of 
the combined family and business systems. In fact, when compared to publicly held 
companies, family firms have a long-term perspective (Le-Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). 
They sometimes pursue other than merely financial goals such as: the satisfaction of 
needs for belonging, affect, and intimacy; the perpetuation of family values through the 
business; the preservation of the family dynasty; the conservation of the family firm’s 
social capital; the fulfillment of family obligations based on blood ties rather than on 





(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). Family firms frequently reach 
a match of family proprietorship with brand identity (Craig, Dibrell, & Davis, 2008). 
Furthermore, family involvement in ownership, management and governance 
makes family businesses different from non-family businesses (Klein et al., 2005). 
Families also add distinct family resources to their companies – labor, values, and trust 
capital – that are difficult to match by non-family companies (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
Because family firms have a longer time horizon and hold patient capital, they are not as 
concerned with short-term results as are many non-family firms (Dreux, 1990). Also, the 
desire to perpetuate the business for future generations provides a special incentive to 
manage capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). As a consequence, family firms’ strategies differ 
greatly from non-family counterparts. 
López-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar (2007) have obtained results suggesting that 
family business characteristics lead them to employ financial policies unlike other 
businesses. Some family firms set their financial policy by a trade-off between tax 
savings and the likelihood of financial distress derived from debt, as in the trade-off 
theory. The pecking order theory also explains family businesses’ particular financial 
behavior. These studies indicate that growth opportunities, financial distress costs, and 
internal resources appear to be the main factors that differentiate the financial behavior of 
family firms from that of non-family businesses (López-Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 
2007).  
There is also indication that family firms apply longer time horizons in their 
decision making. According to Ward (1997), family firms often try to pass their firms on 





heritage that spans generations (Cruz, Nordqvist, Habbershon, Salvato, & Zellweger, 
2006). Moreover, unlike other shareholders, family company shareholders frequently are 
committed, patient capital holders, without need for prompt liquidation in the short run 
(Dobrzynski, 1993). Because of their patient capital, they are capable of pursuing more 
creative and innovative strategies (Kang, 2000; Teece, 1992).  
Family firms may benefit from long-term investments by implementing low cost 
of capital strategies. As the annual default risk of an investment diminishes with 
increasing holding period, the risk-equivalent cost of equity capital of firms with longer 
planning horizons (e.g., family firms) can be lower as well. The perseverance strategy 
represents investment strategies in which long-term-oriented firms invest in lower return 
but equal risk projects than their more short-term-oriented counterparts. The outpacing 
strategy comprises investment projects with higher risk and equal return than those of the 
short-term competitors (Zellweger, 2007). For example, McMahon and Stanger (1995) 
suggest that the family’s main concern is to pass the company across generations, so 
family managers will base financial decisions more on how those decisions affect family 
control than on a complete valuation of complicated financial issues (e.g., optimal 
leverage). Family businesses also tend to hold conservative financing policies to shield 
their assets from risks and hand them on to future generations. Conservative financing 
policies are defined by a stronger preference for using internal resources for financing, 
less investment in intangible assets, a lower level of debt, a high intensity of capital in the 
hands of a single family, and a stationary ownership structure – characteristics that direct 
them toward rejecting the possibility of sharing control of the business with external 





Habbershon and Williams (1999) posit that the uniqueness of family businesses 
results from the mixing of family and business life. In addition, the dynamics of the 
family may affect the significance of the non-financial and financial goals (Harris, 
Martínez, & Ward, 1994). Over time, performance of the company along financial and 
non-financial goals may affect family dynamics as well (Pieper, 2007; Pieper & 
Astrachan, 2008). 
2.6 The effects of family dynamics on financial/non-financial goals and vice versa  
The neoclassical models and theories solely consider financial issues and exclude 
non-financial concerns (Lubatkin, 2005). Besides, capital structure and financial behavior 
seem to deviate from the neoclassical paradigm, because behavioral finance appears to 
provide more appropriate explanations of financial managers’ behavior (Vasiliou & 
Daskalakis, 2009). Furthermore, research shows that owners of family companies not 
only have financial goals, but other goals apart from financial goals (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Gomez-Mejía, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001), and those goals do not 
necessarily benefit the business itself (Pollak, 1985). This characteristic is important 
because, according to Stonehill, Beekhuisen, Wright, Remmers, Toy, Pares, and Bates 
(1975), traditional theories prescribe that a firm should choose its debt ratio only to 
minimize cost of capital and to achieve the financial goal of maximizing the 
shareholders’ wealth; these are theories that do not take into consideration other than 
financial goals. 
There are many examples of non-financial goals family businesses might have. 
Those non-financial goals relate to employment of family members (Chrisman, Chua, & 





reputation in the community (Ehrhard & Nowak, 2003; Khatri & Ng, 2000), brands that 
bring recognition to the family (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), legacy values in certain 
traditional business of the family (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005), socioemotional wealth 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), opportunities for future family generations that do not make 
sense from a pure financial perspective (Fama & Jensen, 1983a), and lowering risk for 
the family by means of diversification into other business activities not necessarily value 
driven from a financial point of view (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). These non-financial 
goals are not always analyzed (Zellweger, 2006), and not much attention is given to how 
these non-financial goals affect the capital structure of family firms.  
Another important issue is that the owning family’s financial and non-financial 
goals may change over time according to the family age and the stage of the business 
lifecycle (Churchill & Lewis, 1983; Robinson, Pearce, Vozikis, & Mescon, 1984; Ward, 
1987). Early in the life of the business, owners must spend time positioning the firm in 
the market, and as it ages, owners redirect their energies to managing the entity (Ward, 
1987). Zellweger (2006) presents evidence that company owners often tend to give value 
to many emotional factors and substitute them for financial outcomes. As this happens, 
and owners follow non-monetary goals such as prestige, independence, employment for 
family members (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997), these owners’ subjective needs and 
preferences may end up skewing positively or negatively the cost of capital (Zellweger, 
2006). For example: as family companies strive for independence, owning families may 
become averse to projects characterized by low independence (in terms of equity levels), 





to the independence in the way they can be financed, even if the projects have a higher 
cost of financing (Zellweger, 2006). 
Worth analyzing is how the high exit costs of leaving the family business impact 
the behavior of family members and particularly inside directors and family shareholders. 
There generally are not liquid markets for private family business stock, and selling 
shares means relinquishing rights and benefits, not to mention foregoing or reducing the 
share expected as inheritance. The socio-emotional costs are also high when a family 
member employed in the business leaves the company: loss of intimacy, reduced status, 
breaking familial expectations, and severing family ties. These high costs tend to lock 
shareholders and family employees into a firm, making the conflicts that arise more 
persistent and a convergence of interests more difficult to achieve (Schulze et al., 2003). 
2.7 The effects of family dynamics on the cost of capital 
McConaughy (1999) posits that, according to modern finance theory, cost of 
capital is an opportunity cost in the sense that it can be the return gained in a similar 
project in the firm, or seen another way, the return that an outside investor expects to 
receive when investing in the firm. It is a combination of the cost of borrowing and the 
return expected by investors or potential investors. This is called the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC). The cost of capital to a firm is also a hurdle rate: the minimum 
rate that an outsider investor will expect to have when investing in the firm 
(McConaughy, 1999).  
Furthermore, knowing the cost of capital is necessary in financial decision making 
because it is a benchmark for performance, and assumptions are made that economic 





associated cost of capital (Copeland, Koller, & Murrin, 2000). If the hurdle rate is set too 
high, it might happen that many good projects will be rejected simply because they do not 
achieve the minimum set rate. Similarly, if the hurdle rate is set too low, projects that are 
not good will be accepted and losses for the company will occur (McConaughy, 1999). 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (March & Shapira, 1987), considered as 
a standard formula for calculating the cost of the equity capital of a project, has some 
important hindrances when traditional cost of capital is applied to a family business. 
Among those hindrances is the assumption of constant risk aversion, knowing that when 
families pledge personal collateral, most of their family estates are invested in the family 
firm. CAPM is based on diversified investments, but family investors are generally 
undiversified, having large amounts of their capital tied up in their firms. Their 
investment is then undiversified. Family firms have a strong preference for control, but 
CAPM is more oriented toward minority shareholders’ interests. Likewise, CAPM 
assumes inexistence of information asymmetry, but family firms might have more 
information than non-family shareholders (Zellweger, 2006). Other shortcomings include 
the validity of beta (a statistical indicator of past volatility of cash flows) in the cost of 
capital formula, the reliance on historical data, and the irrelevance of the holding periods 
of the investment (McNulty, Yeh, Schulze, & Lubatkin, 2002). Zellweger (2006) adds to 
this line of research that the long-term investments horizons of family firms are a source 
of competitive advantage because of decreasing the risk of the investment in the long run. 
Zellweger (2007) proposes that firms with a longer time horizon for investments can 
apply a lower cost of equity for investments, can invest in riskier projects, and can invest 





shareholder value. This last issue along with the above-mentioned issues should be 
considered when computing the cost of capital in a family firm. Finally, another problem 
is that when applying CAPM to private businesses, the assumption must be made that the 
business would be valued in line with the listed companies upon which betas are 
determined and market values are set, and that may not be the case at all (for example, 
family members employed and family control may greatly reduce the valuation a market 
would place on a business) (McConaughy, 1999). The cost of capital of family firms has 
been questioned for many years. For example, De Visscher, Aronoff, and Ward (1995) 
suggested revising the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to include in the 
cost of equity capital two additional factors: an illiquidity premium (IP), and a family 
effect (FE). The traditional CAPM was suggested to be affected in the equity capital 
formula by FE so that CAPM x (1-FE) where FE could go from 0 to 1, where 0 stands for 
a restless family or litigious group, and 1 for a family perfectly dedicated and committed 
to its firm. There is a major shortcoming with this methodology which is not easily 
solved because of the subjectivity of the family effect factor. A family effect correction 
indicates a measure of the cost of accepting returns lower than the average market’s 
estimate of the cost of capital, that is, the opportunity costs of its actions. For instance, 
the family might be content to let a family member run a division because that member 
derives a great deal of joy from it, despite the fact that others might be better at the job 
(McConaughy, 1999). 
In addition, Adams, Manners, Astrachan, and Mazzola (2004) studied what they 
considered to be the most difficult component of the cost of capital in the privately 





equity can take any value from one determined using a public company model to the “gut 
feel” the family members want to have as their return for their investment. Adams et al. 
(2004) encourage private company leaders to recognize the fact that the cost of equity is 
simply an expression of their expectations.  
Adams et al. (2004) propose that the cost of capital for the equity for private 
company investors depends on their aspiration goals for growth of the business, and the 
ability of the business to fund their own liquidity or payout in dividends. In other words, 
for cost of capital of private companies, Adams et al. (2004) propose equating its goals 
for growth and payout to its cost of equity. This view, according to Zellweger (2007), is 
in part discretionary, and it challenges the traditional arguments of traditional finance. 
Traditional finance would argue that if the investment underperforms the market, the 
family shareholders would exert pressure to allocate their money in the capital market at 
higher returns. Zellweger (2007) argues that if the cost of capital can be determined by 
the owners’ requirements, family shareholders are free to substitute monetary goals for 
non-monetary goals (prestige, family employment, etc.). Adams et al. (2004) go even 
further when stating that the cost of equity is generally an expression of the expectations 
of investors.  
2.8 The effects of sources of capital on future outcomes  
Romano et al. (2000) contend that modern theory of capital structure and its 
effects on company value is based on the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
whose theory assumed perfect markets and competition with the necessary information 
made available. Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that changing capital structure alters 





investors. These concepts, however, have little application to family companies, because 
managers of these companies have other goals in addition to shareholder wealth for their 
companies, for example, building something for the family, lifestyle needs and personal 
challenges (Chaganti et al., 1995). 
However, in the long run, the appropriate selection of financing sources would 
have an impact on the selection of the firm’s strategy and even on company value 
(Faleye, Mehrotra, & Morck, 2006). How to craft a capital structure to maximize 
shareholder wealth is a question that has gained prominence within the strategic 
management field because of the apparent link between capital structure and the ability of 
firms to elaborate appropriate strategies to compete and achieve their goals (Simerly & 
Li, 2000). Masulis (1983), for instance, developed a model based on corporate finance 
theories which relates firm value to corporate structure. He concludes that changes in 
stock prices positively relate to leverage changes and those changes in firm values 
positively relate to changes in firm debt level, supporting the view that the selection of 
financing source certainly affects firm value.  
Romano et al. (2000) developed a model in which family businesses fund their 
companies from multiple sources and their decisions turn into complex systems that 
include not only financial but behavioral and social factors. In their model, for instance, 
service industries and firms whose owners’ objectives are to create a lifestyle business 
and who plan to achieve growth through new product or process development are likely 
to utilize capital and retained profits as a source of business finance. Romano et al. 
(2000) also provide empirical support of interactions among owners, firms and family 





This bottom up study will help elicit the criteria that top executives of outstanding 
family firms apply to select financing sources or a combination of them. In particular, it 
would bring light to the contractual features used to finance their strategic plans with 
resources from within (interest rate, type of lender, repayment conditions, etc.), and 
similarly, what the features of family equity are (dividends, investment horizon, required 
return respectively expected costs of capital, etc.). 
2.8.1 Ownership effects on future outcomes 
Myers (2001) and Mahrt-Smith (2005) postulate that there are connections 
between capital structure and ownership structures that influence firm value, although 
these arguments are difficult to test empirically, according to Berger and Bonaccorsi di 
Patti (2006), because of confounding factors beyond the control of management. As the 
authors posit, tests of the agency theoretic hypotheses in the literature generally use 
financial ratios, stock market values, or some combination of these to measure 
performance. Such measures usually do not net out the effects of differences in 
exogenous firm-specific factors beyond management control that may affect performance 
and which may be confounded with agency costs, factors such as measures of local 
market prices, firm size, variance of earnings, market concentration, and the regulatory 
environment. 
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance can be quite 
different across companies. For example, large ownership stakes reduce the value of the 
firm due to reducing the probability of bidding by other agents (Barclay & Holderness, 
1989). An existing block holder thus represents a substantial impediment to an outsider’s 





transferring control (Barclay & Holderness, 1989). Other studies also argue that holders 
of large blocks may negatively affect firm value as they may abuse their position of 
dominant control at the expense of minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). On the other hand, Mello and Parson (1998) posit that 
ownership structure is an important cause of firm value due to the fact that active 
investors with large shareholdings play an important role in supervision, which raises the 
value of the firm and also increases the efficiency for market control.  
Extant research shows that family firms outperform non family-owned 
companies, with ownership being one of the key factors (Anderson  & Reeb, 2003; 
Mazzi, 2011). Family firms have a more parsimonious use of capital, employ more 
unskilled, cheap labor, use less capital, pay lower interest rates on debt and initiate more 
profitable acquisitions thanks to their longer horizons; heirs can manage their labor force 
more efficiently (Sraer & Thesmar, 2007). Firms managed by a descendant of the founder 
pay significantly less to their managers, and turnover for heirs is less likely than is 
turnover for professional CEOs in family firms (Sraer & Thesmar, 2007).  
In fact, Zellweger (2007) posits that a large share of equity such as that held by a 
family shareholder will outperform low yield securities because the risk of future 
outcomes is generally subject to the law of large numbers (the average of the results 
obtained from a large number of trials should be close to the expected value, and will 
tend to become closer as more trials are performed). Moreover, Sraer and Thesmar 
(2007) hypothesize that family firms largely outpace publicly held businesses even in 





controlled firms, for professionally managed family firms, and more unpredictably, for 
firms run by the offspring of the founder.  
Adding to the existing literature, Anderson and Reeb (2003) indicate that the 
relation between family ownership and firm performance is not uniform across all levels 
of family ownership. They find that performance (using both market and accounting 
measures) first increases and then decreases based on what level of ownership the family 
has. When families have the greatest control of the firm, there is a potential for 
entrenchment and poor performance as it was posited before when relating the dynamics 
of family control and capital structure. 
2.8.2 The effects of private equity funds on future outcomes 
Private equity investors are another important source of capital in a family firm 
(Upton & Petty, 2000), but literature concerning either its effects on future outcomes or 
the post-listing effect of the relationship between family businesses and private equity 
investors is relatively limited. Most studies of private equity examine management 
buyouts or management buy-ins rather than minority investments by private equity 
investors (Wood & Wright, 2009). In particular, such relationships previously have been 
analyzed from a unilateral perspective, typically dealing with the entrepreneurs’ point of 
view, not from the entire family business perspective (Astrachan & McConaughy, 2001; 
Marchisio & Mazzola, 2002). Sometimes the underpinning reason for seeking an investor 
is to consolidate control, for example, buying out a family member with conflicting views 
or concentrating ownership in one branch of the family, which, it was argued, would free 






Among the private equity literature on effects of private equity on future 
outcomes, Astrachan and McConaughy (2001) find that venture capitalists in closely held 
IPOs impact performance (Return on Equity), and when private equity funds invest in 
family companies before going public, their investment creates market credibility 
because of the expertise and connections of private equity players, and because insiders 
become more accountable to investors, which in turn increases firm value. Private equity 
also promotes family business efficiency, reduces risk-aversion proclivity and the use of 
short-term debt (Schulze et al., 2003). Furthermore, private equity investment in a family 
company is viewed as a sign of the company’s quality (James, 1987). Achleitner, 
Herman, Lerner, and Lutz (2010) examined the Messer Group, a family-owned German 
company that evolved from manufacturing acetylene generators and lighting fixtures to 
producing chemicals for Hoechst (now Aventis) and becoming a world leader in gases 
and cryogenics; their study helps to explain how corporate governance is changed by 
means of the investment of a private equity fund and how it helped to create company 
value. The private equity firm had an influence on operational as well as strategic 
decisions through their presence on the supervisory board and in the shareholder 
committee. The deal introduced a management incentive program, and forced divestitures 
leading to reductions in employment. Differences in the time horizons and priorities of 
the private equity firm and the family became apparent. The case showed that even 
though ownership was equally concentrated prior and post-buyout, the deal initiated 
important changes in how management was supported, monitored, and incentivized, 
leading to operational improvements in the firm. Along this line, Marchisio et al. (2010) 





innovative actions (passion, management, decision-making, leadership), and help to 
organize the next generation members. In addition, family holdings allow spin-offs or 
new ventures that promote entrepreneurship, and favor succession strategies to avoid 
jeopardizing the financial and social well-being of the family’s core business.  
However, in contrary findings, a study of listed Italian family businesses by 
Viviani, Giorgino, and Steri (2008) concluded that being a “family-owned” company 
does not impact market performance. Consequently, there is insignificant evidence as to 
the value of private equity funds holding participation in the authors’ sample of Italian 
family firms prior to going public. Additionally, the private equity drive has been 
connected to asset stripping and short-term actions, and as a consequence, financial and 
economic returns achieved sometimes have unfavorable implications for research and 
development, investment, managerial practices, and employment (Wright, 2013). 
2.8.3 The effects of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) on future outcomes 
ESOPs have gained increasing importance due to government and executive 
manager support (Carberry, 2011). Governments encourage employee ownership because 
of the macro-economic effects on economic growth and employment (Weitzman, 1985), 
and executive managers because of the effect on productivity, cooperation, and 
information sharing (Blasi, Conte, & Kruse, 1996). This view has both encouraging 
voices that support this form of equity, and negative voices that claim contrary 
propositions. 
Among the support voices for ESOPs as a way of collecting equity for companies 
and their future outputs, Liu, Tao, Li, and El-Ansary (2008) contend that this form of 





to build and enjoy trust capital, and to produce positive economic firm performance 
(Blair, Kruse, & Blasi, 2000; Park & Song, 1995; Quarrey & Rosen, 1987). There is also 
empirical support that contends that employee ownership has positive future outcomes on 
employee conduct such as enthusiasm, job satisfaction (French & Rosenstein, 1984; 
Hammer & Stern, 1980; Klein, 1987), and a superior level of task involvement (Frohlich, 
Godard, Oppenheimer, & Starker, 1998). 
An opposite view held by Guedri and Hollands (2008) proposes that the 
relationship between employee ownership and firm performance is much more 
complicated than often described. Their theoretical framework proposes that employee 
ownership at certain levels may become a motive for agency cost. That might happen 
because employees’ attention to maximizing their own interest against the collective 
value maximization tends to reduce efficient outputs and control mechanisms. Depressed 
productivity may simply reflect labor using its voice to enhance its labor-leisure trade-off 
to attain greater leisure. However, it might also reflect depressed investment in 
innovation, which might erode the value of current labor's firm-specific human capital 
(Faleye et al., 2006). Moreover, Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003) posit that labor uses its 
corporate governance participation to maximize their own equity interests, wages and 
benefits, and that this often shoves corporate policies away from, rather than toward, 
share value maximization for all shareholders. 
Furthermore, there are some other thoughts on the inefficiency of outputs when 
employees have a stock representation in the company’s equity. Jensen and Meckling 
(1979) consider institutional representation of employees to be a source of inefficiency in 





investments, and because of management and labor entrenchment. Additionally, Falaye et 
al. (2006) contend that employee ownership has a negative influence on investment, risk 
taking, growth, and the creation of new jobs. 
In some family businesses, ESOPs have become a means for transferring 
ownership to employees and gaining tax deferred liquidity (Dreux, 1990). However, 
family owners might be reluctant to use ESOPs because of the concern over dilution of 
equity stake (Villalonga & Amit, 2009), and because that dilution of equity can distress 
the family and negatively affect their financial position (Gomez-Mejía, Makri, & 
Quintana, 2010). Despite the reluctance of family business to relinquish control of the 
business by means of ESOP programs (Villalonga & Amit, 2009), family businesses are 
also inclined to have motivated employees to maintain a competitive advantage aligning 
employee interest and shareholder’s intentions (Le-Breton Miller & Miller, 2006). ESOPs 
might be a way to motivate and increase the productivity of the work force (Pfeffer, 
1995), and diminish monitoring costs (Daily & Dollinger, 1992).  
2.8.4 The effects of Initial Public Offering (IPOs) on future outcomes 
Research on how family-owned business performance behaves after an IPO is 
scarce (Jaskiewicz et al., 2005), as is the effect of ownership structure in any specific IPO 
context (Chahine, 2007). Mazzola and Marchisio (2003) recognize that going public 
increases shareholder diversification and Carney (2005) contends that keeping ownership 
in the family limits the firm’s financial resources, restricts its resource structure, and 
inhibits its growth. Moreover, companies going public obtain equity for further growth 
(Ding & Pukthuanthong, 2013); thus, going public is a way to access another financing 





Other studies suggest some of the effects of going public include: making possible 
funding specific projects (García-Pérez-de-Lema et al., 2011); lowering a company’s 
debt-equity ratio (Ding & Pukthuanthong, 2013); enabling shareholders to hold a more 
diversified portfolio as well providing additional funds for new investments (Harjoto & 
Garen, 2005); offering companies an external financing alternative that diminishes the 
bargaining power of financial institutions (Rajan, 1992); providing a substitutive 
financing source from bank financing with a lower cost (Holmstron & Tirole, 1993). In 
addition, through the liquidity provided by IPOs, family firms access an alternative 
financing source and avoid credit rationing, which can help guarantee the survival of the 
firm (Bessler & Bittelmeyer, 2008; García-Pérez-de-Lema et al., 2011). Finally, the 
García-Pérez-de-Lema et al. (2011) study found that strong family involvement has a 
positive impact on the long run stock market performance of initial public offerings. 
 As can be observed through this literature review, I have consulted existing 
literature on family dynamics and capital structure of the family firm without judgment, 
and I have become acquainted with current state of literature on the subject. Since the 
family business is the basic unit of analysis in this study and there is such a wide array of 
working definitions for family companies, I proposed to operationalize a specific family 
business definition, and to make that the definition used throughout the research process. 
I chose the F-PEC scale (Klein et al., 2005) for the family business definition, which will 
give me a continuous assessment of family involvement instead of dichotomous 
distinction. Then, I reviewed the different approaches of capital structure, most of them 
related to public companies and large corporations, and concluded that other variables 





structure decision making. With a better understanding of the existing literature both on 
capital structure and family dynamics, the variables that influence capital structure 
decision making, and a specific family business definition in place, I now focus on 
constructing a solid, effective research design to explore how family influence and family 
dynamics affect capital structure decisions in family firms and the effects of those 
decisions and firm performance on the owning family.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS – QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
“Theory building seems to require rich description, the richness that 
comes from anecdote. We uncover all kinds of relationships in our 
’hard’ data, but it is only through the use of this ’soft’ data that we are 
able to ’explain’ them, and explanation is, of course, the purpose of 
research. I believe that the researcher who never goes near the water, 
who collects quantitative data from a distance without anecdote to 
support them, will always have difficulty explaining interesting 
relationships” (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 113). 
The overall purpose of this study is two-fold. On one hand, the thrust of this 
inquiry is to explore how family influence and family dynamics affect capital structure 
decisions (sources of equity and debt financing and levels of debt and equity financing). 
On the other hand, this research aims to explore the practical effects of capital structure 
decisions on family dynamics. To fulfill these goals, I had to obtain a clear understanding 
of the capital structure process and how capital structure affected their family dynamics. I 
also had to understand how these decisions affected family dynamics. 
Hermanson (2013) deems qualitative work as the most creative of any research, 
since it allows one to understand a process, elucidate underlying thinking, perceptions,
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 and anecdotes, appreciate subtle and sometimes conflicting considerations, and greatly 
deepen the theoretical understanding. In addition, since research on capital structure of 
private companies and how these strategic options affect family dynamics is in its 
infancy, one method for delving into embryonic stages of research is to start with 
qualitative approaches in order to identify the interactions and interrelations among 
concepts (Parry, 1998). It merits a qualitative approach to research when little 
investigation has been made in a topic and especially when the specific variables and 
important variables to examine are not known (Creswell, 2013). Ultimately, after 
identifying general theories and yielding initial ideas, quantitative research may develop 
the literature further through empirical and quantitative testing (Parry, 1998). 
This study took place in the South-American country of Colombia, with 11 
Colombian family companies as a purposeful sample. Although the sample was restricted 
to Colombian family companies, some of them multilatin firms, this study contributes to 
a better understanding of family firms for emerging markets in general. A study by 
González et al. (2012, p. 627) states that “Colombia is a representative capital market in 
Latin America from a financial development perspective,” and according to Robert Ward, 
Global Forecasting Director of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Colombia has 
been included as one of the second generation of emerging markets (CIVETS: Colombia, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa), with controlled inflation, and 
stable financial systems.  
As posited before, qualitative research is helpful, and sometimes necessary, for 
exploring local meanings (Bartunek & Seo, 2002), and in the context of this study, for 
exploring how family influence and family dynamics affect capital structure decisions 
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and the interactions that create these decisions. Cook and Campbell (1979), well-known 
advocates of quantitative and experimental approaches in behavioral research, state that 
“Field experimentation should always include qualitative research to describe and 
illuminate the context and conditions under which research is conducted” (p. 93). Many 
quantitative approaches implicitly assume the same meaning for predefined variables 
across different locations. Qualitative approaches, on the contrary, attempt to increase 
understanding of local perceptions, to “explicate the ways people in particular settings 
come to understand, account for, take action, and otherwise manage their day-to-day 
situations” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 7). Exploration of local meanings by 
mechanisms of qualitative approaches offers the possibility of stimulating the 
development of new understandings about the variety and depth with which 
organizational members experience important organizational phenomena (Bartunek & 
Seo, 2002). Echoing Bartunek and Seo (2002), the variety and depth to which family 
members, non-family employees and other stakeholders in family enterprises see capital 
structure phenomena and their relations with family dynamics is at the core of this 
project. Utilizing the qualitative approach allowed me to gain in-depth understanding of 
the relationships and processes involved in family business financing and provided 
answers to how family influence and family dynamics affected capital structure decisions 
and vice-versa.  
I do not pretend to give explanations of variances in my findings in statistical 
terms, but the qualitative method I used supplied the data which enables me to give richer 
explanations of how and why different financing strategies and processes affect the 
dynamics of the family and vice versa, adapting concepts from Markus and Robey 
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(1988). Markus and Robey (1988) apply the differences between variance and process 
theories to explain causality. While variance theories posit a clear relationship between 
an antecedent and the corresponding effect, process theory asserts that the outcome can 
happen only under the antecedents, but the outcome may also fail to occur.   
Finally, in pursuing an explanation of how financing decisions in family business 
influence family dynamics and vice versa, I give a rich and substantial description of this 
process by means of a qualitative study, using in-depth interviews and studying 
companies in depth (Hoff, 2013). I hope to make a positive contribution to the family 
business field not by changing the overall system, as Hermanson (2013) posits, but by 
turning dispersed individual narratives of success and non-success into meaningful and 
overarching frames to help family firms understand and decide on the best capital 
structure to support their businesses without jeopardizing their core family values. 
3.1 The grounded-influenced (GT) theory approach 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) maintain that grounded theory research provides an 
improved understanding of a phenomenon about which little is known. Stern (1995) also 
asserts that a grounded theory approach is appropriate to investigate an uncharted area or 
to gain a fresh perspective on a familiar situation. Following the grounded theory 
approach, I uncovered relevant conditions and explored how individuals respond to them 
and the consequences of their actions (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). This is GT-influenced 
research, and while the Glaserian and Straussian (1967) approach informs my thinking, I 
applied Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2013) methodology to bring qualitative rigor to this 
research. 
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The grounded theory (GT) process (see Figure 1 below), which highly influences 
this research, is a way of generating theory based on conceptual ideas. Those ideas came 
from participants’ main concerns, how they deal with them, and my interpretation of how 
and why individuals do the things they do. Figure 1 shows how the data collection,  
Source: Lock (1996, p. 240) and Pieper (Qualitative Methods Class, Kennesaw State University,  
Fall 2013). 
 
coding, interpretation, and sampling overlap continuously until sample saturation was 
reached and the concepts collected start repeating. Two analytic operations occurred 
simultaneously: constant comparisons and theoretical sampling. As soon as I collected 
data, the data was coded and I decided if more data collection (theoretical sampling) by 
means of events, activities, interviews, etc., was necessary. When considering financing 
the family business, initial questions that arose tended to be what the current state of the 
capital structure of the family business is, and how participants (family managers, non-
Figure 1. Grounded Theory (GT) Process 
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family managers, family shareholders, etc.) are dealing with the state of that capital 
structure. 
Several pieces of the process of building theory from GT research have appeared in the 
literature. One is the classic work on grounded theory development by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) and more recently, that of Strauss (1987). These authors have detailed their 
comparative method for developing grounded theory. The method relies on continuous 
comparison of data and theory building with data collection. It emphasizes both the 
emergence of theoretical categories solely from evidence, and an incremental approach to 
case selection and data gathering. 
 Glaser and Strauss (1967), moved by the constant use of hypothetic-deductive 
research at that time, help to solve many problems researchers encountered, according to 
Casto (2014). Researchers used to collect data from interviews, observations and other 
methods, and lacked consistent procedures to mold data into theory. Developing different 
procedures to solve that problem, Glaser and Strauss (1967) found one solution in the GT 
approach.  
According to Glaser (1978), data of all sorts are a fundamental input for GT. All 
data that the researcher is exposed to when studying a certain phenomenon could help the 
researcher generate concepts and theory. Not only interviews and observations, but 
lectures, seminars, newspaper articles, surveys, or statistical analysis are means to 
develop theory. “All is data,” the Glaserian method dictum claims (Glaser, 2001, p. 145). 
Grounded Theory can happen in different ways (Glaser, 1998). The GT method 
emphasizes induction or emergence and the individual researcher’s creativity within a 
clear frame of stages. 
   70 
 
On the other hand, Strauss (1987) was more interested in the validation criteria 
and a systematic approach aiming at the generation of theory. Before Strauss’ death in 
1994, Strauss gave an interview and named three basic elements he believed every 
grounded theory approach should include (Legewie & Schervier-Legewie, 2004). These 
three elements are: 
 Theoretical sensitive coding, that is, generating theoretically strong 
concepts from the data to explain the phenomenon researched; 
 Theoretical sampling, that is, deciding whom to interview or what to 
observe next according to the state of theory generation, and that implies 
starting data analysis with the first interview, and writing down memos and 
hypotheses early; 
 The need to compare between phenomena and contexts to make the theory 
strong. 
3.2 Data collection methods 
To collect my data, I relied on several distinctive data sources (Martin, 2011): 
interviews with several levels of informants using a minimum, as possible, of one owner, 
one employee close to the family, and one more person (owner/non-owner) from a 
different generation from 11 companies; site documents (archival data, annual reports, 
internal documents, press releases, and websites); and observations and field notes. Then, 
I triangulated data (see Figure 2 below) to improve objectivity (Mitorff, 1972), to 
diminish potential biases (Huber & Power, 1985), and to improve the robustness of the 
resulting theory (Jick, 1979). 
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Although the analysis of the data collected is explained later, I always had in mind 
that analysis was necessary from the start, because all the information and observations  
Figure 2. Building credible evidence from multiple data sources 
Source: Kaczynski, Salmona, and Smith (2013) 
collected were used in the next observations and interviews (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). I 
analyzed first data collected seeking for cues that improved the next gathering of 
information and data triangulation to capture relevant aspects as soon as they were 
perceived. When triangulating data, I gave particular attention to the inclusion of all three 
sources of data represented in Figure 2. This comprehensive use of data triangulation 
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enhanced the credibility and trustworthiness of the study with connections of evidence to 
the study design, analysis, and interpretation of findings (Anfara, Brown, & Mangione, 
2002).  
Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010) also suggest three strategies by means of comparing 
articles in several journals to address rigor: the first one has to do with concrete research 
actions rather than abstract criteria; the second suggests that rigor has to do more with 
internal and construct validity over generalizability as well as reliability; and third, 
extensively reporting emerging strategies to ensure validity. Case studies also emphasize 
external validity instead of internal and construct validity (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 
2008). While integrated into the data is some quantitative information such as balance 
sheet information of the chosen companies, I was cautious about using quantitative 
information recognizing that, as Maxwell (2010) posits, using numbers in qualitative 
research does not make that research a mixed methods study. 
3.2.1 Memoing 
Memos provided an essential source of evidence as important as data gathering 
itself (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), supporting the role of “researchers as instrument”; 
memos are featured in Figure 2 at the center of the triangle (Kaczynski, Salmona, & 
Smith, 2013). Memos are supposed to reflect ideas in process for personal use, suggests 
Schram (2003). I used three types of memo writing to track and manage the study, as 
advised by Kaczynski et al. (2013): methods, reflection, and analytic. I used methods 
memos to record changes in the design of the project and to describe reasoning behind 
such changes. Reflections memos described my personal journal of reflexivity. Finally, I 
wrote analytic memos to switch between inductive and deductive ideas while interpreting 
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meanings. I also used the analytic memos to answer the research questions, trying to 
establish in each of the questions the way to answer them by connecting the codes in the 
different documents through the query tool in the ATLAS.ti program, whose use will be 
explained below. Without a doubt, this made the analysis of the research documents and 
interviews much easier. 
3.2.2 Interviewing 
My main source of data were 30 semi-structured and flexible interviews 
conducted in 11 family businesses in Colombia over the year 2015, in Spanish, with a 
duration of one to two hours each, resulting on average in a 20-page, single spaced 
transcription1. The first interview took place in January 2015, and the last one in 
December 2015. The semi-structured interviews, although having predetermined 
questions (see Appendix), were flexible enough to allow the interviewer to make new 
questions while the interviewee was telling his/her stories. In some cases, when the need 
to interview the same person twice became evident, this was done with full cooperation 
from the interviewee, in some cases only just to complement previous information. All 
the interviews were done personally, except for one which was done via Skype. 
As mentioned earlier, I used an interview guide (See Appendix) with open-ended 
discovery questions that broadly outlined the topics of interest in financing family 
business and family business dynamics. The interview guide I used is based on 
techniques for semi-structured interviews, characterized by elements from both structured 
and unstructured interviews. A fixed set of sequential open ended and discovery-oriented 
                                                 
1 The transcriptions were done by a trustworthy and reliable person, allowing me to dedicate more 
time to coding and analyzing data.  
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questions were included in the guide, but additional questions were introduced during the 
interview to facilitate further exploration of issues brought up by the interviewees, thus 
almost taking the form of a structured conversation (Huber & Power, 1985).  
During the execution of this dissertation, 30 interviews were carried out with 
shareholders, presidents, managers, family members and/or advisors related to 11 
different family companies, of different sizes, that at different times have used different 
types of financing, and that belong to different sectors of the Colombian economy. Tables 
1 and 2 on the following pages present the interviewees’ basic information and the 
companies referred to in each interview. These two tables also describe the interviewees 
by their respective “aliases,” their relationship to the business and the family, and if 
family members, to which generation they belong.  
De Massis and Kotlar (2014) posit interviews are a targeted and very efficient 
means to collect empirical data. Ultimately, total interview number was determined by 
theoretical saturation in each family business. As mentioned before, I interviewed 
between one and three key people with different perspectives of each business: at least 
one shareholder, one employee close to the family, and in some cases one more person 
(owner/non-owner) from a different generation, because different generations appear to 
have different thoughts about the leverage of the company (Kaye & Hamilton, 2004). 
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Tasty Food AT President 1
Tasty Food BT Chief Marketing Officer 1
Tasty Food CT CEO Foreign Branch 1
Lunch Food AL Advisor 1
Lunch Food BL Board member 1
Energy Manufacturing AE President 1
Energy Manufacturing BE CFO 1
Energy Manufacturing CE Board member 1
Cash Financial AC President 1
Cash Financial BC Board member 1
Cash Financial CC Board member 1
Gown Legal Services AG CEO 1
Gown Legal Services BG President 1
Gown Legal Services CG CEO 1
Harvest Agro‐industrial AH Board member 2
Parts Automotive AP President 1
Parts Automotive BP Advisor 1
Parts Automotive CP CEO 1
Brick Construction AB Board member 1
Brick Construction BB New Business Leader 1
Brick Construction CB Board member 2
Mortgage Financial AM President 1
Mortgage Financial BM Board member 1
Mortgage Financial CM CEO 1
School Pulp & Paper AS President 1
School Pulp & Paper BS CEO 1
Whole Retail AW Board member 1
Whole Retail BW Board member 1
n= 30






Although high quality work has no magic number of interviews, Reay (2014), in 
her editorial in Family Business Review, states that around 30 interviews is the common 
appropriate number suggested; however, much of the interviews’ quality is dependent on 
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interviews in a topic area in which there is little knowledge can be powerful and valuable. 
Since I conducted in-depth interviews with people with different perspectives, I covered 
what I believed to be an ample spectrum of the subject matter. I made sure that the 
sampling choice followed grounded theory prescriptions for theoretical sampling.  
The qualitative interview is the most common and one of the most important data 
gathering tools in qualitative research (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Kvale (1983, p.176) 
defines the qualitative research interview as “an interview, whose purpose is to gather 
descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with respect to interpretation of the 
meaning of the described phenomena.” Furthermore, the aim of the interview is to focus 
in “specific situations and action sequences in the world of the interviewee” (Kvale, 
1983, p. 176). Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggest that qualitative interviews are like night 
goggles meant to examine that which is looked at but seldom seen (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, 
p. vii). I collected a large set of my data from in-depth interviews because interviews are 
one of the major approaches in collecting data in qualitative research (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009). I designed interviews to find interviewees’ memories of personal 
experiences related to financing their family business. My interview aim was to obtain 
basic information from each company in regards to financing and its relation to family 
dynamics. For this, I tried to interview three people in each company, in order to have 
different perspectives. However, this was not always possible due to different particular 
situations in each company and family. I also aimed for each company interviewed to 
have a particular type of financing (trade financing, bank loan, stock exchange flotation, 
private equity funds, retained profits, and ESOPs), and to have had said financing in 
different proportions. What emerged through the interviews was that some of the 
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companies in the sample could provide combined information related to different types of 
financing, since they themselves had been through different processes at different times; 
thus, one interviewed company could possibly provide different financing perspectives. 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p. 2) describe the research interview as a 
“professional conversation” where “inter-views” are exchanged and “knowledge is 
constructed in the inter-action between the interviewer and interviewee.” In this 
conversation, the ritual turn-taking is more formalized than in informal encounters (Farr, 
1984). Although various media of communication can be used to reach this objective 
(Opdenakker, 2006), to have a “professional conversation,” I focused on formal personal 
interviews as the appropriate mode to collect sensitive information, except for two 
extension interviews which were held via Skype. As far as the logistics of the interviews 
are concerned, all the interviews were recorded with previous permission from the 
interviewees to facilitate later transcription. Interviews took place at family and non-
family members’ offices in Colombia. I believe the familiar setting made the 
interviewees comfortable so they spoke more freely. Respondents were told the purpose 
of the study, and anonymity was assured. 
In order to obtain as much information as possible on the phenomenon I was 
investigating, my role was to put the interviewee at ease, establishing rapport while 
maintaining control of the discussion (Brewerton & Millward, 2001). Moreover, as 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) posited, I believe the value of my professional background 
contributed to the development of this project based on grounded influenced theory. My 
experience as a family business consultant and as a non-family CEO of several family 
businesses in Colombia was very helpful in developing alertness and sensitivity when 
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conducting interviews and collecting qualitative data (Glaser, 1992). While it can also 
introduce bias into the study (Gioia et al., 2013), I felt assured that my working 
experience had furnished me with the ability to set up an empathetic environment to build 
trust among the interviewees and put them at ease; I also feel I possess the alertness and 
sensitivity needed to discover and make sense through this research process. 
I audio-recorded the interviews for easier authentic transcription and analysis 
later.  To analyze the interviews and information, I followed Gioia et al.’s (2013) 
procedures in order to add rigor and improve the presentation of this research. The 1st-
order analysis gave me a number of categories that tended to explode to more than three 
hundred codes at first. Then, as research continued, I started looking for similarities 
among the different codes and I gave names to those categories (2nd-order analysis), 
reducing them to …… a more manageable number. I then gave those categories labels 
and started to consider what made sense of what was happening there, and I was ready to 
formulate other questions for the next interviews, looking for concepts and tentative 
relationships.  
When in 2nd-order phase, I was always looking for emerging themes and focused 
on concepts that did not have theoretical referents in the literature. Once there was a 
workable set of themes and concepts, I looked for new themes and emergent aggregate 
dimension. This led to the basis for data structure which helped to configure a visual aid 
to conduct a better analysis (Gioia et al., 2013). I continued with this process until no new 
themes and insights emerged from the data. At this stage, I had what Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) call theoretical saturation. 
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As mentioned before herein, I also used some secondary data, in some cases 
provided by the interviewees themselves, such as: a case study prepared by a Colombian 
university for one of the family groups, describing its story and how the company 
obtained financing at different times in order to overcome a financial crisis and keep the 
business afloat. In addition, I used a paper written by one of the interviewees, a second-
generation family member, who tells his own story working alongside one of his uncles 
(a founder of the family business). In this paper, the interviewee tells the story of the 
family from his own point of view, with a special emphasis on one of his uncles, founder 
of the business, and a person of particular qualities for that time and for the business.   
To the extent possible, I searched for financial information from each of the 
companies interviewed, and from some of the companies that made up the company 
group, when the family interviewed belonged to said group. In such cases, it was not 
always possible to obtain all the financial information. In those cases, where the financial 
information could be obtained, it was obtained only for the last three years; thus, it is 
important to consider that the capital structure of the past three years might not reflect the 
comings and goings that some of these companies have experienced in terms of capital 
structure. Therefore, the interviews produced information that was impossible to deduce 
from the financial statements alone. 
3.2.3 Theoretical saturation 
Data saturation or data redundancy is reached when nothing new is being added 
by participants in a study when they offer their ideas (Morse, 1995). Charmaz (2003) 
explains that saturation comes when putting new data into categories already devised. It 
entails bringing new participants into the study until the data set is complete (Morse, 
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Barret, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002). In other words, saturation will be reached when 
the data gathered yields scarce returns, when nothing new is being added (Bowen, 2008). 
Theoretical saturation, in effect, is the point at which no new insights are obtained, no 
new themes are identified, and no issues arise regarding a category of data (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998).  Following these theoretical saturation parameters, the same elements 
from previous interviews started to be repeated after interview number 27; thus, I 
considered that enough saturation had been reached with the data already gathered. 
3.2.4 Sampling  
With the sample chosen, the idea for the interviews was primarily to explore in 
depth how family influence and family dynamics affect capital structure decisions and 
vice versa. Since no rules govern the size of the population sample in a qualitative study 
(Kaczynski et al., 2013), I used purposeful sampling which I believe is the most useful 
way to sample in this case. Purposeful sampling represents a distinction in the practice of 
qualitative research. As this is qualitative research, I strategically selected “information-
rich cases” that provided knowledge regarding the issues of importance to the purpose of 
the study (Patton, 2002). This sample was deliberately selected where I believed it was 
representative (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). To clarify the difference between 
theoretical and purposeful sampling, the definition of theoretical sampling is: 
“Theoretical sampling is purposeful selection of a sample according to the developing 
categories and emerging theory… and the process is controlled by the emerging theory” 
(Coyne, 1997, p. 623). Glaser (1978) defines theoretical sampling as “...the process of 
data collections for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and 
analyses his data, and decides which data to collect next and where to find them, in order 
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to develop his theory as it emerges. This process of data collection is controlled by the 
emerging theory, whether substantive or formal” (p. 36). Then data collection is guided 
by a sampling strategy called theoretical sampling and, unlike purposeful sampling, the 
sample is not selected from the population based on certain variables (Chenitz & 
Swanson, 1986), rather, and as Ramachandran (1998) asserts, a single but meaningful 
case can be a very powerful example of the sampling method and sample size used in 
qualitative studies. As far as the sample size is concerned, and based on the above-
mentioned example, sample size is less a matter of quantity and more a matter of quality 
of information gained from the sample (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006). Crouch and 
McKenzie (2006) posit that sample sizes in qualitative studies, which may or may not be 
fixed prior to data collection, depend on the resources and time available to tab them, as 
well as the study’s objectives. In this case, the sample size was fixed a priori as a broad 
benchmark, before the data collection by means of the interviews, and taking into 
consideration my availability of time. In any case, I had in mind the feasibility of 
theoretical saturation (the point in data collection when new data no longer brings 
additional insights to the research questions), so as to make adjustments to conduct more 
interviews if necessary. I let theoretical sampling guide the process. 
Qualitative research such as that I used herein benefits the most because I found 
large variance in the capital structure of family firms in my sample, and in the different 
moments throughout the life of the companies; the more variance there is among the 
firms in the dependent variable, i.e. capital structure, leverage levels, and financing, the 
richer the results. Therefore, my criteria were to determine that the sample contains the 
different types of financing one can find in a family company in different moments and to 
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explore the phenomenon in question in as many facets as possible. That is why I did a 
careful assessment of my case studies prior to conducting the interviews. 
In 2010, CONFECAMARAS (Federation of Chambers of Commerce of 
Colombia) estimated at 511,000 the total number of family firms in Colombia (Portafolio, 
2010). In 2005, 46.8 % of the large enterprises were family firms. Although they span all 
of the economic sectors, they are mostly in retail, real estate, and financial services. Their 
share of the GNP was 21%. Their share of total investments was 23.5% (Daníes, 2006). 
Moreover, nearly 63% of them are moving toward the second generation (Portafolio, 
2010). 
In order to have representation of all the financing types in family business, I 
looked first into several databases searching for medium-sized companies (with reported 
assets between 5,000 to 30,000-fold minimum wage and large companies over 30,000-
fold minimum wage (Bancoldex, 2014), that represent different capital structures, have 
their operations and businesses in different sectors of economy, and find themselves in 
distinct generational stages. 2 This large variance in the capital structure of family firms, 
the dependent variable, would surely render ample and sound information and insights 
for my research. I finally came up with a set of eleven companies that comply with the 
above said criteria. Moreover, I had to make sure they wanted to be part of this study and 
would release enough family and business information as possible, within a 
confidentiality agreement, to support my insights. The chosen companies represented 
cases where family businesses have changed or are contemplating a change in capital 
structure, so that I could look at the family dynamics effects. To collect valuable 
                                                 
2 In 2014 the Colombian’s monthly minimum wage was equivalent to US 313 Dollars 
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information from different viewpoints, I interviewed at least a family firm Director/CEO, 
and/or a top manager and/or a family member for each of the selected organizations.  
In Colombia, there are several recent family companies changing their capital 
structure. Carvajal and Corona are just a couple of examples: 
  ●     Carvajal SA is a Colombian family business conglomerate (with business in 
education, packaging, office furniture, information services, pulp and paper, 
communication solutions and technology) more than 100 years old, with 
shareholders up to the sixth generation, more than 24,000 employees, and 
with factories and offices in 16 different countries. One of the business units 
of the family business conglomerate placed and sold preferential shares 
without voting rights in 2012.  
  ●     Corona, another family business conglomerate (ceramics, plumbing, retail 
home products, etc.), sold a minority part of its industrial business in the 
second quarter of 2014 to Victoria Capital Partners, an international private 
equity fund. 
 In selecting the sample population, 11 Colombian companies were chosen, some 
of them even multilatin companies founded and operating in Colombia, that would 
provide different stories at different moments in time, and different perspectives in 
regards to the type of financing used. Likewise, I tried to understand through the 
interviews, the different individuals related to the companies selected (these individuals 
were chosen together with the president of each company); how the different 
shareholding families behaved at a certain moment in order to decide what type of 
financing was the most suitable according to their strategy, perspective and moment in 
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time. The companies chosen decided to participate with enthusiasm in the project, having 
as a basic premise: the help that their own experience might provide to other family 
companies, not only in Colombia, in regards to their future financial decisions. 
To that effect, different size companies were chosen from different sectors of the 
economy (banking, financial services, food industry, consultancy, auto parts, 
construction, agriculture), that were representative of different types and proportions of 
financing. Amongst these companies there were also six family groups established as 
business groups, according to the Bogota Chamber of Commerce, with investments in 
several subsidiary companies. All the companies interviewed were founded more than 45 
years ago, and three of them are more than 100 years old. Two of these companies are 
still controlled by first generation shareholders, with second-generation family members 
as employees or members of the Board of Directors. Four companies are controlled by 
second-generation family members, three companies are controlled by third and fourth 
generation family members, and one company (second generation) is no longer controlled 
by the family since they sold their shares on the Colombian stock exchange.  
Another way to approach the financial choices taken by family firms is by 
considering how and in which degree family paradigms described by Constantine (1986) 
are related to the firms’ capital structure. Constantine grouped families into four 
categories: open, closed, random and synchronic paradigms. The families of the sample 
did not fit in any of them as a whole; however, there were several features that show a 
clear identification with the typologies they were assigned to in the table below.  This 
relationship between typologies and capital structure demonstrates the validity of systems 
theory, which explains how the family, business, and ownership subsystems nurtured by 
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the context become interdependent and evolve to become well-defined entities with 
adaptive financial mechanisms for growth and survival. 
Table 3 groups the interviewed business owning families according to the family 
typology model proposed by Constantine (1993) which classifies families into 4 types: 
open, closed, synchronous and random paradigms. This classification was made 
according to what was perceived in the interviews. In this study, six firms showed a 
closed paradigm behavior pattern, three were open, one was random, and one 
synchronous paradigm.  




 Closed paradigm families rely on a family hierarchy of authority, which 
regulates processes and decision making. They tend to have a traditional 
authority and pursue conformity to norms to assure continuation. Family and 
Company 
Alias




Cash Financia l X
Gown Legal  Services X
Harvest Agro‐industria l X
Parts Automotive X
Brick Construction X
Mortgage Financia l X
School Pulp&Paper X
Whole Reta i l X
Family Paradigm
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family identity come first and loyalty is encouraged. Using a qualitative 
classification method, most of the sample companies were found to belong to 
this group (Lunch, Harvest, Parts, Mortgage, School and Whole). Most of the 
oldest and largest, they are also all from traditional regions of Colombia where 
family values still hold and give identity or they are descendants from Middle 
East immigrants. Founders have held extended tenures and lasted long enough 
to see several generations. Their boards include external members. Authority is 
hierarchical to secure abiding by clear norms and procedures. All these 
families created holdings - including Mortgage in the financial sector - that 
follow this traditional behavior in which debt is close to zero. In School, debt 
surpassed the amounts agreed upon by the family, causing great concern and 
distress. Closed paradigm families also rely in retained earnings to fund their 
endeavors. Likewise, they have favored alliances, except Lunch, as a means to 
avail themselves of appropriate know-how and reduce risks. Some even regret 
having had a fund as a partner instead of a business ally to supply 
complementary capabilities. 
 In the open family paradigm, a more democratic approach for decision making 
is used, and the family’s collective goals and values are achieved through 
integrating individual needs. These firms are rather new in the business and 
have few members working in the organization. Their capital structure is 
flexible enough to seek different sources of financing, and they are more prone 
to taking risks. Companies belonging to this paradigm belong to different 
sectors: industry (Energy), Financial (Cash), and Services (Gown). It is 
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revealing that they all have promoted ESOPs. Though they are not into IPOs, 
they have private equity investors and use retained earnings as a source of 
financing growth. All of these features are consistent with an open-minded 
view of business and favoring trust with their employees. 
 The firm whose behavior is closer to the random family paradigm functions 
within an egalitarian system where each member has independent thought and 
action, and where collective needs are met through individual initiatives. This 
particular company is a male sibling partnership in which each member shows 
respect for the other’s decisions in his area of control and authority. This 
egalitarian scheme allows more room for creativity and expansion to other 
regions and countries. Tasty is the only company matching these features. It is 
a second generation company, a sibling partnership with close family ties. 
They expanded operations overseas, preserving the autonomy among its 
members. They use different sources of financing and agree on asset shedding 
to leverage their investments, showing a bent for new endeavors without 
keeping strong ties with the past.  
 In the synchronous paradigmatic family, no family member needs to be told 
what to do because they have agreements relating to values and goals that 
regulate family processes and decision-making. It is argued that, in 
synchronous paradigmatic families, all family members internalize the rules. 
Bricks shows a series of distinctive features that makes it fit into this paradigm: 
an entrepreneurial bent that spans over four generations; a balanced mix of 
family and non-family members on the Board that makes decision making 
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more democratic; a well-defined and enforced family protocol that approves 
nonfamily members working in the core business but restricts participation of 
relatives except in spinoffs; robust family and corporate governance; and solid 
partnership with outstanding international firms.  Brick uses almost all forms 
of financing including cross investments with multinational companies. 
Research departments and spinoffs are aligned with their long term views. 
To analyze how the different companies in the sample fund themselves, the 
following classification in regards to financing and/or capital structure was chosen:  
 no or little outside funding, including debt;  
 lots of debt but no outside equity;  
 private equity and giving up control; 
 private equity and not giving up control;  
 partnerships giving up control;  
 partnerships not giving up control;  
 public listing and not giving up control;  
 public listing and giving up control; 
 internal funding; and 
 funding through ESOPs. 
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 The following table describes the different methods used by the companies in the 
sample to finance their operations at different moments in time, and it can be noted that  
 
 
there is not one single type of funding, but that their capital structure is made up of a 
combination of different types of funding.  
Furthermore, the F-PEC scale developed by Klein et al. (2005) is a tool intended 
to assess the extent and manner of family involvement in and influence on the enterprise. 
As explained in Chapter 2, it considers three dimensions: power, experience, and culture. 
In this study, key questions from interviews and other sources of information such as 
























Energy High High High High High High High High
Parts Low High High Medium Medium High
Mortgage Low High High High High High High
Cash High High Medium Medium High High High
Harvest High High High High Low High Medium
School High Low* Low High Medium High Low High High
Brick Medium High Medium High High High High
Whole Low High* High High High High High High
Lunch Low Medium High High High High
Tasty High High High High
Gown Low High High Medium
* School Holding is not in the Stock Exchange
* Whole was sold in the Stock Exchange, and it was the first family company to negotiate shares in the Stock Exchange
Table 4. Capital Structure 




As to Power, I found that eight of the 11 companies studied show a high level of control. 
Ownership is concentrated within the family, and several family members work in the 
organization and hold positions on the Board. Relative lower power position of family 
firms is the result of letting investors in the organization and Board, or as a result of a 
policy that allows nonfamily members as employees. 
In the experience dimension, one firm is in the first generation, six in the second, three in 
the third, and one in the fourth. This data is consistent with information from the 
Superintendencia de Sociedades, the Colombian government agency that oversees 










Generation Power Experience Culture
Tasty Food Pres ident X X X Second 10 8 10
Tasty Food Chief Marketing Officer X ‐ ‐
Tasty Food CEO Foreign Branch X X X Second
Lunch Food Advisor X ‐ X 4 4 4
Lunch Food ‐ X X Second
Energy Manufacturing Pres ident X X ‐ Second 10 5 10
Energy Manufacturing CFO X ‐ ‐
Energy Manufacturing ‐ X X Second
Cash Financia l Pres ident X ‐ ‐ 10 5 10
Cash Financia l ‐ X X Second
Cash Financia l ‐ X X Second
Gown Legal  Services CEO X X X Second 10 5 10
Gown Legal  Services Pres ident X X X Fi rs t
Gown Legal  Services CEO X X X Second
Harvest Agro‐industria l ‐ X X Thi rd 10 10 10
Parts Automotive Pres ident X X X Second 10 5 10
Parts Automotive Advisor X ‐ ‐
Parts Automotive CEO X ‐ ‐
Brick Construction ‐ X X Thi rd 7 8 10
Brick Construction New Bus iness  Leader X X ‐ Fourth
Brick Construction ‐ X X Fourth
Mortgage Financia l Pres ident X X X Second 4 8 8
Mortgage Financia l ‐ ‐ X
Mortgage Financia l CEO X ‐ ‐
School Pulp&Paper Pres ident X X X Thi rd 10 10 10
School Pulp&Paper CEO X X ‐ Thi rd
Whole Reta i l ‐ X X Second 10 7 6
Whole Reta i l ‐ X X Second
F‐PEC
Table 5. F-PEC Assessment 
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firms are undergoing a transition process from the first and second generation to the next, 
since most of them were founded in the 1970s. The overlap of family and firm values and 
family business commitment determine the culture of a family firm on this scale. A 
remarkable eight of the companies studied acknowledge that core family values have 
been transferred and are lived up to in the business by means of becoming employees or 
by informing decisions as board members. This contrasts with family companies that 
have sold significant stock to private equity funds, and have experienced how some core 
business values are no longer implemented and enforced under the new administration.  
In regard to the type of financing used by these companies a variety of different capital 
structures and the proportions of financing were used to fulfill their strategies, especially 
their growth strategy, as well as to carry out investments in different projects. Initially, it 
was thought that each company chosen would represent just one particular type of 
financing; however, through the data and interview analysis, I found that one company 
could represent different types of financing, and that throughout time it had financed 
itself in different ways. In other words, it could be said that the sample chosen, though 
small and not chosen randomly, would be representative of the population that I was 
seeking to analyze (Hair Jr. et al., 2007), and thus it would be very suitable to this effect. 
What is more, Crouch and McKenzie (2006) establish, as was mentioned before, that 
more important than sample size is the quality of the information gained from the sample, 
and I believe that to be the case in this instance. The companies chosen in the sample 
included combinations of financing sources such as different types of debt (trade debt, 
e.g., a credit from supplier; bank debt; and other debt, e.g. private loans; and family 
capital). There were also other sources of capital for family companies with different 
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combinations: IPOs (in which two of the families retained control and the other did not), 
private equity, and employee’s equity (ESOPs in the US).  
The chosen companies gave me a purposeful sample, but before selecting the specific 
companies, I made sure that I had access to the information needed for my research. 
Following the recommendations of Corbin and Strauss (1990), chosen companies were 
from the very beginning representative of the phenomena I sought to study. This 
theoretical sample allowed for an analysis in terms of concepts, properties, dimensions, 
and variations to achieve better consistency and representativeness. 
3.3 Data analysis and coding 
Given the GT approach I used, data collection and analysis are intertwined. 
During this process, I organized the data seeking to answer my questions: “how do family 
influence and family dynamics affect capital structure decisions and vice-versa?” In a 
qualitative research study, according to Kaczynski et al. (2013), data analysis is like 
making sense of a puzzle. The authors posit that what one has to do is to place the small 
pieces on a table. Then, one has to become immersed in the task of constructing a picture, 
or a series of pictures since the analysis may render a few. The analysis starts then by 
coding the different interviews and documents. Codes may be classified in two ways: 
Top-down coding and Bottom-up coding. Top-down coding comes from what the 
researcher thinks might result according to the literature he has reviewed. An example of 
this type of coding would be: family conflicts, communication, and the generation in 
charge of running the company. Bottom-up coding comes from the analysis of the 
different documents. An example of this would be the different values that resulted from 
examining the interviews: intrinsic values, tradition-related values, control-related values, 
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etc. These codes were created as the interviews were being analyzed. From my 
observations, I generated memos and in them I saved some ideas.  
During the initial coding process more than 300 codes were generated, and as I 
gained more experience with the analysis, this number was reduced and some codes 
merged with others. My final list after coding, reviewing the codes several times, and 
grouping them, reached 100 codes.  
Finally, the authors recommend asking oneself whether one of those pictures of 
the puzzle is the real picture, and if it makes sense to others. If not, one has to keep on 
digging and interrogating the evidence to find a more real picture so that it makes sense 
to others as well (Kaczynski et al., 2013). Jorgensen (1989, p. 107) gives a similar idea to 
that of Kaczynski et al. (2013). The procedure, according to Jorgensen (1989), entails 
breaking up, separating, or disassembling the research materials into pieces, parts, 
elements, or units. That was how, in some cases, when a code had many elements I would 
break them up in subcategories that expressed the ideas in a better way, and at the same 
time the ideas would group themselves in families, in the same way as the codes. An 
example of a code family is shown in Figure 3. The initial codes were grouped into 
categories (family dynamics, values and generations) to then be named as internal factors 
(theme), according to Figure 3.  
With facts broken down into manageable pieces, Jorgensen (1989, p.107) posits 
that the researcher then sorts and sifts them, searching for types, classes, sequences, 
processes, patterns or wholes. The aim of this process is to assemble or reconstruct the 
data in a meaningful or comprehensible fashion. Seidel (1998) goes even further, 
explaining that data analysis is a symphony of three components, and noticing which is  
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which entails consciously searching for evidence (top-down coding) or randomly finding 
new aspects and supporting this searching by coding procedures (bottom-up coding). He 
compares data analysis with doing the laundry: after washing and sorting, clothes are 
piled up in separate heaps. 
Finally, researchers look for reoccurring patterns and relationships in the data by asking 
how the pieces of the puzzle fit together. In this case, and using the ATLAS.ti program, I 
found out through the co-occurrence of codes how these families of codes were related to 
the different types of capital structure and to the different families of documents. All of 
these steps led to general insights about the studied phenomenon, and shed new light on 
how to answer the research question. To this extent, I organized the codes and this 
allowed me to understand how family dynamics related to the capital structure of each 
company in the sample. 
 




Gioia et al. (2012) offer a method for improving rigor of grounded research and 
posit a methodology beyond merely identifying the applicable concepts. They cite some 
interpretive and qualitative researchers (Langley, 1999; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Locke & 
Golden-Biddle, 1997) who have noted that interviews and analyses should not be 
separated as they proceed together. As the interviews take place, codes and categories 
emerge, and the numbers of codes and categories explode at the front end of the study 
(Gioia et al., 2013; Glasser & Strauss, 1967).  
Based on previous studies I have explored, I anticipated between 50 to 100 1st-
order categories in the first 10 interviews as Gioia et al. (2013) posited, but the first order 
Figure 3. Coding System. Internal factors - sample 
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categories initially accounted for more than 300. As the research advanced, I focused on 
the similarities and differences among those categories to reduce the number of 
categories to a more manageable number (100). Then, I gave labels or phrasal descriptors 
to those new categories at a more abstract level, also called 2nd-order themes (external 
and internal factors). Aggregate dimensions (external and internal factors) helped to 
explain the phenomena I observed. It was like putting on the table the array of codes to 
start answering how the puzzle on the table (Kaczynski et al., 2013) made sense. Putting 
all of these pieces on the table, I started making sense of the array of themes at a more 
abstract level by organizing first order codes into second order (theory centric) themes, 
(Pieper, 2013). It is like the notion of axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
In this 2nd order analyses, I found concepts from the themes suggested to describe 
how families and family dynamics influence the capital structure of the company and 
vice-versa. I especially focused on new concepts – theories that do not have referents in 
the existing literature or existing concepts, for example, the relationship between family 
conflicts and capital structure – that move to new domains as Gioia et al. (2013) explain. 
I also followed the advice of Pieper (2013) to distil second order themes into overarching 
theoretical dimensions (when appropriate). 
Finally, Pieper (2013) advises to assemble terms, themes, into a “data structure,” a 
pivotal step in the entire research process (Gioia et al., 2013). Moreover, both Pieper 
(2013) and Gioia et al. (2013) advise to follow that step with the help of tables and visual 
aids. Those visuals show how the analysis has advanced from raw data to terms and 
themes over the process, such as in the tables presented herein. 
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Furthermore, Miles and Huberman (1994) have also outlined specific techniques 
for analyzing qualitative data. They include a variety of devices such as tabular displays 
and graphs to manage and present qualitative data without destroying the meaning of the 
data through intensive coding. Then, I make use of tables, graphs, relationships between 
codes, visuals, and link the research questions to data sources and evidence of findings 
with the help of the ATLAS.ti program. In the same way, Anfara et al. (2002) 
demonstrate transparent strategies to make those tables, to respond visually to 
misconceptions on the lack of scientific value of qualitative research. This way of 
constructing the analysis gave me the rigor for this qualitative research, according to Pratt 
(2008) and Tracy (2010) as stated by Gioia (2013, p. 20).  
Once I had the visual aids and tables built, making sense of those findings was the 
next step. Going back to the allegory of the puzzle of Kaczynski et al. (2013), the puzzle 
has to make sense of the several revealed pictures. “Understanding an issue from within a 
larger set of relationships imparts a significance to what otherwise might seem to be 
contradictory, random ideas or events. Sense making is about such things as placement of 
items into frameworks, comprehending, redressing surprise, constructing meaning, 
interacting in pursuit of mutual understanding and patterning” (Weick, 1995, p. 6). No 
doubt, this took time and patience not to conclude too abruptly (Gelman & Hill, 2007). 
Then, understanding the issue or sense making is about the reasonableness of the 
plausibility of the facts, (Weick, 1995). The idea was to become familiar with each case 
as a stand-alone entity. As Eisenhardt (1989) suggests, “In these situations, theory 
building from case study research is particularly appropriate because theory building 
from case studies does not rely on previous literature or prior empirical evidence” 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989, p.548). The core category in this process was previously defined: 
capital structure. It was found how this category related to other categories (family 
dynamics) and vice versa, and what resulted from the analysis of all the data is like a 
circular drive from capital structure to family dynamics and from family dynamics to 
capital structure. Since these results are the main product of this work, they shall be 
analyzed later on.  
3.3.1 Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) 
Although the analysis of the appropriateness of using computer software for 
qualitative inquiries is beyond the scope of this proposal, I would like to mention the 
underpinning reasons for my decision to use this tool, and also to explain why I chose 
ATLAS.ti as an instrument to help in my qualitative examination. The use of software 
packages as a means of undertaking qualitative research is becoming more common in 
social sciences (Mangabeira & Fielding, 2004). For example, Peters and Wester (2007), 
in their study of how qualitative data analysis may support the qualitative analysis 
process, conclude that the use of computer programs during qualitative analysis seems 
undisputed nowadays. However, acceptance of software-based data analysis protocols 
has not been universal. Some authors even suggest that CAQDAS has been found to be 
costly and has not given superior results (Dolan & Ayland, 2001).  
The two perspectives indicate that CAQDAS should be used with care (Atherton 
& Elsmore, 2007). Atherton and Elsmore (2007) also advise qualitative researchers to be 
“reflexive” when addressing ordering the qualitative research with CAQDAS, by 
discussing this explicit dimension in the methods section of their papers. In any case, 
computer software could be of great help in qualitative research (MacMillan & Koenig, 
   100 
 
2004). The use of software packages in qualitative research should be combined with 
other approaches to rejuvenate the data and facilitate the analysis (Atherton & Elsmore, 
2007). Moreover, computer-supported qualitative data analysis also allows systematically 
organizing and exhaustively analyzing data, and many papers would benefit from using 
this type of technology (Gephart, 2004). 
Additionally, McMillan and Koening (2004) who studied the literature connecting 
CAQDAS to methods, found that grounded theory is the dominant methodology for 
CAQDAS users, and comes out of a process of coding, conceptualization and 
categorization (Allan, 2003). As a follower of grounded theory in this proposal, I went 
always from coding, to writing memos, then to modeling. The CAQDAS facilitated the 
iterative process of data collection, data coding, analysis, and modeling. I took into 
consideration that the CAQDAS is only a tool for organizing data (Gilbert, 2002). In 
much the same way, ATLAS.ti is a computer analysis tool that enabled me to code and 
retrieve, build ideas, and conduct analyses of my data. With its advanced multimedia 
capabilities, ATLAS.ti allowed me to work with text, interviews, and even videos if 
needed, making it an invaluable research analysis tool (Friese, 2012). 
Nevertheless, using the ATLAS.ti package was a challenge. Learning how to use 
the technological package, learning about the qualitative research method, and carrying 
out the research, all at the same time, became an important learning process. As I 
mentioned before, coding the interviews resulted initially in more than 300 codes. Then, 
merging some codes with others that had similar meaning reduced those early results to 
100 codes. They were then organized into categories of superior order. 
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 Using the different aspects of the ATLAS.ti program was very useful. The analytic 
memos made it possible to organize the ideas and the “queries” raised during the 
analysis, answering the questions and establishing the relationship between the 
documents and the different interviews. As is well established by the basic premises 
regarding the use of technological packages, the analysis is not done by the package 
itself; however, its use does help to strengthen the analysis which otherwise would 
become too complicated due to the amount of data generated.  
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CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Before presenting the results of this research, I am going to discuss the design of 
this chapter to make its content easier to understand. First, in the manner of a journalist 
describing an event, I am going to present some of the interview results related to the 
importance of capital structure. Other than when necessary for clarification, I will not add 
my own dialogue, letting the interviewees’ words reveal how some external and internal 
factors influenced the capital structure of the companies in the sample, and vice versa, 
how the different types of financial structures affected family dynamics. External factors 
are those that relate to national and international economic and political situations, and 
they are common to all types of financing; it is the context referred to by the 
interviewees. The internal factors, on the other hand, are specific to individual sample 
companies; these are interviewees’ thoughts and ideas that express or reflect the situation 
or atmosphere within the business and the family that led to different capital structure 
decisions. 
 To list and explain the internal factors, a table for each type of financing is 
presented. Each table shows in what ways that specific type of capital structure affects 
and is in turn affected or influenced by the individual internal factors presented in the 
table. This influence can be seen through the referenced quotes of the interviewees. The 
internal family factors analyzed are family dynamics, family values, and generations, 
and, in some cases, the tables and their analysis show some of the internal business 
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factors that contribute to a particular type of financing. Each table is then followed by a 
richer, fuller description in the words of individual interviewees involved in or affected 
by the financial decisions made. While the data was being gathered through interviews 
and additional documents were being obtained, an inductive analysis was being 
performed following the methodology of Gioia, et al. (2012), and constant comparisons 
were also being made according to what Strauss (1987) indicated. These elements of the 
analysis were very important because they allowed the gathering of data to be made in a 
rigorous manner, and in the same way, to perfect the sample and the gathering of data via 
the interviews afterwards. This methodology also allowed the organization of topics and 
superior dimensions, and the discussion of the ideas outlined in the interviews. 
I started the analysis identifying initial concepts that influenced the different types 
of financing in the companies in the sample, using in some way the same language that 
the interviewees used in their own sentences, to the extent possible, or as Van Maanen 
(1979) says, codes of first order.  Then, I would observe the different relationships 
amongst these codes of first order so as to organize them in topics of higher order. 
Subsequently, I chose the topics and organized them in superior dimensions to see what 
frameworks were developing as the analysis progressed. This procedure, even though 
difficult to describe in a linear way, continued until the interviews did not reveal any 
additional relationships between the same concepts.
4.1 The importance of capital structure in the sample analyzed 
According to AC from Cash, capital structure becomes somewhat sophisticated, 
and somehow this same structure is necessary for the growth of family companies. He 
says, “in these financial structures one must be sophisticated and assertive” (P9:173-173), 
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and he adds, “I think the challenge of all these financial structures is how to properly 
ensure the growth of the company into the next decade” (P9:169-169).  He believes that 
family companies have changed with time and that, with all changes that Colombia is 
facing now, it is necessary to “guarantee tickets for the future”: 
 “I believe the capital structure of family companies must be given a lot of 
thought, because we are no longer running the same companies as before. The 
companies we are facing today are more global, more regional, we have to open 
markets. Colombia is a country with great expectations, but also with great 
question marks. We don’t know what may happen with the peace processes, how 
are they (the companies) going to change, and finally, I do believe that we have to 
guarantee tickets for the future with a clear capital structure” (P9:153-153).  
As a company, he says, they have to look at new ways to finance, not just 
maintain what they already have. “…The capital structure today becomes more important 
than their own strategy, their own family, and their own products (P9:153-153) ….” I 
think the challenge of all these financial structures is how to properly ensure growth 
towards the new decade” (P9:169-169). And, finally, AC claims that little importance 
has been given to the study of private companies. Most of the research done has been on 
public-owned companies. AC believes that, “…it is time to give importance to the study 
of private family companies” (P9:198-198). 
4.2 External and Internal factors that influence the different types of financing and 
vice versa 
According to the analysis of the interviews and documents, a number of internal 
and external factors influence the different types of funding used by the family 
   105 
 
companies in the sample at a given moment in time.   External factors include the global 
economy in general and the Colombian economy in particular. Internal factors are 
divided in two levels: family and business.  At the family level there are values associated 
to the family, family dynamics, and the family generation currently running the company. 
These are considered important factors that influence capital structure at a certain 
moment in time. At the business level, it was found that the size and age of the company 
are factors that influence its capital structure. Even though external factors such as the 
national and international economy could have also affected companies that are not 
family companies over the same time period studied, in the sample analyzed it can be 
seen how these external factors affected family dynamics, and/or the capital structure of 
these companies in particular.   
This section describes how each of these internal and external factors influenced 
the capital structures and/or the family dynamics in more detail, for each type of 
financing found. In order to explain such influences some quotes from the interviews, or 
some extracts from the documents analyzed, are referred to, and said quotes or extracts 
are connected to the capital structures found and to the family dynamics, respectively. At 
the same time, and conversely, the consequences and effects that the capital structure has 
had on family dynamics when the family has decided to take a particular type of 
financing, are analyzed.  




Economic conditions: global and 
national 
Two levels: Family and 
Business 
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4.2.1 External factors 
The economic conditions in which companies operate, whether family companies 
or not, are factors that all companies must take into consideration when finding and 
deciding on the most appropriate capital structure.  Even though the external factors that 
follow could apply to any type of company (family or non-family), they must be 
considered because they are factors that contributed strongly to the decisions about 
capital structure and have influenced in some way the dynamic of the shareholding 
families included in the sample. 
Reading the environment and the context in which family companies operate 
becomes of utmost importance.  One sample interviewee said: 
 “Undoubtedly, one of the most important assets of an entrepreneur is the ability to 
read not only the national economic environment but also the global environment, 
and take a financing stand in regards to it.... Even though [the founder] exercised 
very restricted practices in his work, and applied principles that were kept intact 
during his management, in the long run the stubborn founder did accept change, as 
long as it obeyed context needs or specific moments in a financial or economic 
situation.” (P33:244-244).   
In this instance, economic conditions refer to the global economy on one hand, and to the 
Colombian economy on the other.   
4.2.1.1 Global Economy 
In the case of Whole, according to AW, reading the context implies studying what 
happens not only in Colombia, but also abroad, in order to understand what has to be 
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done in regards to the capital structure of the company. For Whole, the answer lay in 
including a strategic international partner. In AW’s words:  
.…” This meant, first, to study and understand what was happening around the 
world, in countries that were experiencing similar economic opening processes. 
Although, thanks to President Gaviria’s administration (1990-1994), Colombia 
was entering a world full of new opportunities, it was also exposing itself to a 
voracious contingent of competitors, many of them with multinational power. 
After several trips and much global research, the Board understood that one of 
the first effects of an economic opening process was that local players must face 
external harassment and unfriendly takeovers, amongst other challenges. All this 
had happened in countries such as Argentina, France, and the United States, 
cases that were examined in much detail to make our decision of bringing in a 
partner” (P33:295-295). 
4.2.1.1.1 Global economy and international alliances 
 
Another interviewee from Whole (BW), comments on the role international 
competition played in their decision to bring in this capital strategic partner: “Since an 
economic opening was taking place around the world, large companies started to look at 
emerging countries with special interest. Our non-family manager …began to receive 
information that we were going to be eaten alive by foreign companies. That is why we 
started to think seriously about bringing in not a local partner, which we already had, 
but a global partner that would give us a good foundation to project the company 
towards the future” (P35:053-053).  
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When talking about globalization and competition, it is also important to take into 
account the global strategic partners that help to confront the great challenges of the 
competition, as was in effect done by Mortgage Group. Its president said: “I am 
convinced that the business has been globalized, and I don’t know where we would be 
going if we were alone, by ourselves” (P26:050-050). Another interviewee, manager of 
one of the financial companies from the same group, comments on banking agreements at 
a global level: “I think that Basel and the changes coming in the near future, including 
the arrival of Colombian banks to American funds and to the US stock exchange, are 
going to be an enormous pressure for our business to grow, and hence our debt” 
(P9:085-085).  
4.2.1.2 Global economy, bond issues and trade financing 
 
The quotes below demonstrate how the global economic environment affected 
several of the sample companies’ capital structures, and in turn, how that economic 
condition shaped the way those companies chose to finance their operations. Even events 
such as 9/11 affected the different types of financing that were under preparation at that 
moment. The Energy family, for example, who were preparing a public bond issue to be 
sold via the stock exchange, explains: 
“In 2001 we almost issued bonds in the stock market. But, as the saying goes, 
‘There’s many a slip between the cup and the lip.’ The credit rating was B+, and 
this was around the time of 9/11 when investors were more cautious. The 
financial system told us, ‘it is not worth it to burn the company’s image and not 
be able to place the issue’... And since we had bank credit available at reasonable 
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interest rates, we decided to abort the issue and take the bank credit instead” 
(P6:053-053). 
Energy’s finance manager adds that the international oil price situation made 
Colombian companies reluctant to be financed with external providers of parts and raw 
materials, because of the risk of a high devaluation of the peso currency. “With the news 
regarding the US surplus oil inventories and the possibility of oil barrel prices falling to 
USD20,00, the effects on our companies are very complicated, and we are already 
witnessing them…. Because of that, times are uncertain for our accounts payable in US 
dollars, and for our general financing strategies” (P8:042-042). 
4.2.1.2 The Colombian economic crisis and capital structure 
In every interview, when talking about financing and capital structure, the 
country’s economic and political environment at a certain moment is also present. The 
Colombian economic and legal context, as well as the country’s stock exchange situation 
is considered here, as these are elements mentioned in interviews that relate to company 
financing decisions and to capital structure.  The country’s situation at the end of the 
1990s and the beginning of the following decade affected all companies significantly and 
at the same time had an impact on family dynamics. One interviewee recalls:  
“Colombia, as the majority of Latin American countries, suffered one of the most 
profound economic crises of all its history during the years 1998, 1999, and 2000. 
At that time, when the UPAC [constant value unit] system was in place, with 
galloping inflation, an unemployment rate of nearly 20%, and increases in 
interest rates reaching levels of 40% to 60%, all of this contributed to a large 
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scale chain of mortgage loan defaults by buyers of real state, making financing a 
very complicated topic for our companies” (P23:5-5). 
Another interviewee added: 
“The company’s second difficult situation was in the year 1999… Interest rates 
reached 80% that year, and to make matters worse, at the end of 1998 the 
government launched a fiscal reform that created a sales tax for our product and 
imposed a 16% rate…This, plus a 30% annual inflation rate from the year before. 
This entire situation within a few months meant that the business was on the verge 
of disappearing, and our financing became very complicated due to the fear of 
banks and investors” (P1:103-103). 
Another interviewee, the CEO of Mortgage Group, made the following comments 
regarding the competitive context during that period of time: 
“The pressure of the ‘competitive context’ was one of the main drivers of the 
capital structure change in our company. Towards mid-1998, when Banco de la 
Republica [Colombia’s central bank], noticed a very large flight of capital in 
foreign currency, it started an exchange rate defense by establishing an exchange 
rate control system, something that drastically increased interest rates and made 
us think very seriously about capital structures” (P23: p4). 
Those high interest rates, said AL, right-hand of Lunch’s CEO, dissipated the companies’ 
future credit appetite. “On the other hand, our fear of credit comes from a long time ago 
as a result of the high interest rates that Colombia had at one time,” he explains. “When 
interest rates were 3.5% a month, debt was prescribed in our case. Today, we still keep 
the custom of no debt” (P4:44-44). 
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AM of Mortgage adds that many banks in the country had to turn to special 
credits from the government. “Of course, a financial crisis in 1999, especially in the real 
estate sector with the old UPAC system……few of us remained alive. We asked for 
credit, we turned to Fogafin [a lending fund for banks],” AM said. ” All of this left a 
mark on the family stress.  ’Our company’ is an animal of a certain size; it has its 
dynamics, when it turns to the wrong side it can take the whole group down with it” 
(P26:021-021). 
4.2.1.2.1 Economic crisis and the social aspects of Colombia, and their effect on family 
dynamics  
 
The economic crises that the country has experienced have had both positive and 
negative effects on family dynamics. In one of the sample cases, it led to the second 
generation showing solidarity for the family company. In another case, it exacerbated 
family conflict, and in another, economic crisis led to family panic.  
In effect, one of the sample companies that had never allowed any member of the 
next generation to get involved in the family business considers the country’s economic 
policy changes to have created a good opportunity for the second generation to join the 
company, by invitation from the first generation: 
“I couldn’t have joined the company at a more disturbing moment, since 
Colombia as well as our company were experiencing radical internal 
transformations. On the one hand, in 1990, the country was experiencing the first 
changes produced by the neoliberal politics of President Gaviria, which would 
eventually lead to a new political constitution, and an impetuous opening of the 
economy... It was, then, a time of discoveries, especially in regards to our own 
selves, both in our capacity as Colombians and as entrepreneurs” (P33:291-291).  
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And at Tasty, one of the family members who had decided to take a sabbatical came back 
hastily to run one of the operations at a time of economic crisis and high levels of debt, 
said an interviewee.  “One of my brothers who had decided to take a sabbatical to travel 
the world, when he saw this difficult situation, he said ‘I come back to the company and 
take charge of this operation,’, and he has been running it since. This is to illustrate the 
impact that an economic crisis has on family dynamics (P1:119-119).” 
However, the effect of an economic crisis which leads to internal funding and 
high levels of debt can also be seen in family conflicts: 
“When there is money everyone in the family smiles, when there isn’t any and 
dividends cannot be distributed then people become different.  And maybe that 
circumstance, the crisis of 1999, came at a time when it helped us identify and see 
that when there is an economic crisis, this produces a company crisis, which can 
lead to a family crisis, and the family crisis can lead to the end of the company…” 
(P26:015-015). “The crisis in 1999 affected us tremendously, because the 
company crisis produced a family rupture that could have eventually led to the 
end of the company” (P26:013-013). 
Moreover, economic crises can also produce family panic: 
“Anxiety, and in some cases almost panic in the family. The most recent crises that 
I’ve experienced have been the one in 1997 when the construction sector collapsed, 
and the one in 2008 – 2009 when sales crashed down in our business in the United 
States. There was panic due to a lack of liquidity, and a series of consequences that 
resulted from this, such as an increase in the level of debt. It was a great concern 
for the family” (P25:30-30). 
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As a consequence of an economic crisis, family dividends may be suspended or reduced, 
and this produces family angst. At the same time, the family shows solidarity to the 
company in this difficult situation: “If a company is not doing well, and dividends are not 
paid, then there is a risk of having a load on your back... and that kind of pressure is very 
strong” (P14:036-036).  
Generally, values and principles affect the way family faces the crisis.  One 
interviewee family member said, “obviously, the reaction of the family in the meeting 
was of concern and uncertainty about the country’s situation, but they also accepted the 
proposal of the Board of Directors to stop dividend payments for about a year, while the 
company EBITDA stabilized itself and the level of debt went down. This, to show 
solidarity to the company and to the employees who had also not received a salary 
increase” (P25:078-078).   
Worth mentioning here is that, in Colombia, there is an additional very important 
aspect that has had clear effects on the dynamic of entrepreneurial families and in the 
capital structure of companies, and that is the lack of public safety that the country has 
experienced for the past 50 years. This fact has caused many members of the young 
generations to go study abroad, which means that some of these youngsters have not had 
a lot of contact with their family companies; thus decreasing the sense of commitment to 
the company by this absent generation. AM, one of the interviewees, says the following: 
“My father’s kidnapping changed our lives forever. Violence has many different 
manifestations in this country. My children believe that here you need to have 
bodyguards. That is the country that they have experienced. They went abroad to 
study and distanced themselves from the country” (P26:103-103). 
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Due to these circumstances, many family members live abroad, and this makes the 
decision-making process very difficult, and decreases the level of commitment these 
family members have for their family company. 
4.2.1.2.2 Colombian legal context and capital structure. 
 
The legal environment mentioned by the interviewees also affects the capital 
structure of companies. For example, one sample company founded by immigrants 
explains why its capital structure included at first several people that were not relatives of 
the founders.  “At the end of the ‘70s,” they said,” President Lopez left a very particular 
law stating that if a company had foreign shareholders, then the company was considered 
foreign and that meant double taxation for the companies. As a result, many international 
or multinational companies at that time had to be nationalized, and became Colombian 
with friends and/or front men as shareholders in order to solve this taxation problem” 
(P18:031-031).  
While the previous statement reflects the historical effect of the legal environment 
on company, legal issues remain a consideration in structuring a company’s finances. 
Currently, for example, consolidating the debts of business groups in Colombia becomes 
a legal obligation in time, an interviewee says. “Now with IFRS [International Financial 
Reporting Standards] we have to consolidate the balance sheets from all our companies. 
Being a business group, we have to consolidate debt, also applying IFRS. Each company 
is independent and has its own Balance Sheet and P&L statement, but we have the 
obligation to consider the consolidated debt. Anyway, we see that we have to understand 
the consolidated business, which doesn’t mean that we don’t notice certain small things 
in the separate companies” (P3:27-27). Moreover, the “thin capitalization rule” now in 
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effect makes the cost of bank credit more expensive, and makes company capitalization 
become more important, says one of the interviewees: 
“Our business is highly leveraged, and now we have a complicated situation with 
the government because they created a “thin capitalization rule”, which means 
that companies can only deduct interests according to a certain debt to equity 
ratio; i.e., you can only have debts for n times your equity, [and] if you exceed 
this ratio then those interests are not tax deductible. Obviously, this has been hard 
on us because this project is highly leveraged, which means that our net profit 
will be seriously affected if we don’t capitalize” (P3:17-17). 
4.2.1.2.3 Colombian stock exchange and capital structure. 
 
Trading shares and listing the company in the stock exchange has not been easy 
for the companies analyzed, because in Colombia, capital markets are not significantly 
developed.  In the words of one interviewee, “I hope this doesn’t sound derogatory, but 
we do not have a Stock Exchange, nor do we have a stock market; we have a ‘tiny 
exchange’ and a ’tiny market,’ it doesn’t have volume, nor depth, nor professionalism. 
What has happened in the last years in regards to the stock market activity is a shame, an 
embarrassment; it shows an absolute weakness” (P13:143-143).  
Following is an example of one company’s experience (Whole) with the stock 
market not as well developed at the US or some European markets…:  
“At that time, the beginning of the ‘90s, when we floated the company, the 
national stock market was incipient and shares worked in a very clumsy way. 
Actually, the selling process was quite rustic, because it meant that a buyer, 
accompanied by the company’s CEO and CFO, would approach a seller. The 
   116 
 
former would define a price and make an offer, and the latter would accept or 
reject it. Those dynamics were tremendously rustic, especially because they lent 
themselves to unscrupulous shareholders buying massive quantities of shares at 
prices favorable to their interests, but not necessarily to the seller’s interests” 
(P33:309-309).  
And the Colombian stock exchange logic does not appear any less controversial today: 
“The Colombian stock market today has a logic that one doesn’t understand. As a 
result of acquiring a business ’abroad,’ our company results were not the best, 
and evidently the share price had to go down due to that investment. It has been 
two or three years since that, the “abroad” business is doing well now, and 
currently the company situation is very different. The first semester of this year 
was spectacular, and in spite of that, the share price does not go up.…. It is a 
thinly traded stock and we cannot explain what happened…We already fixed the 
company and the stock price does not go up” (P27:25-25).  
In the opinion of another company in the sample, Bricks, floating a 
company nowadays -- not only a family company but any company -- will depend on the 
perception that people have regarding the conditions provided by the Colombian Stock 
Exchange. “I don’t think the Colombian Stock Exchange works well,” the Bricks 
interviewee says. “There isn’t enough liquidity, the companies that trade there feel that 
it’s not a sufficiently developed market” (P25:073-073). Thus, BB says, one must look 
for a different type of financing. “Instead of floating the company or acquiring more 
debt,” BB says, “we decided to bring in a strategic partner that invests in new related and 
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non-related businesses. They have a very interesting network to open new paths and 
opportunities for us in new businesses and to make acquisitions (P22:048-48). 
4.2.2 Internal factors 
Some internal factors significantly influence the type of financing that the 
companies in the sample look for. Amongst these internal factors are values, different 
family dynamics, and the current generation of the shareholding family. However, as AW 
of Whole points out: 
 “In regards to the subject of the capital structure of companies, there is not much 
written about family companies because the great majority of business literature 
is dedicated to searching and explaining ways to maximize company value 
without considering other very important issues, such as what happens within the 
family when these types of decisions are made. Nevertheless, there are no 
textbooks that concentrate on ways to make this process something more real …” 
(P33:357-357). 
4.2.2.1 Values as an internal factor in the development of the capital structure  
As the patriarch of one of the companies analyzed succinctly states, “Among the 
key issues worth discussing when talking about capital structures of family companies, 
are how the family’s values are represented in management, risk, debt levels, liquidity, 
and the desirability of IPOs” (P80: p10). As an example, another interviewee brings up 
the issue of the way in which the family chose a strategic partner that modified the capital 
structure of one of their companies, which demonstrates the importance of values in the 
decision making process on the part of both parties: “In regards to the strategic partners, 
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I don’t think it was a difficult sale in so far as they saw, on one side, that the values and 
the way of doing things in both companies were aligned, and on the other, that there was 
an added value which was complementary to what we could offer them, in particular, our 
own values and a mutual complementarity” (P25:066-066).  
4.2.2.1.1The concept of values. 
 
First, it is important to determine what values are which is established by the 
consistency of their general meaning as defined in literature according to Koiranen 
(2002). Some of these definitions are: 
• “A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, of the desirable which influences the 
selection from available modes, means and ends of action” (Kluckhohn, 1951, 
cited in Rokeach, 1973, p. 10). 
• “By values we mean ideas about what is desirable” (Athos & Coffey, 1968, p. 
100). 
• “Values are desirable end-states” (Guth & Tagiuri, 1965, p. 125). 
• “Values are global beliefs about desirable end-states underlying attitudinal and 
behavioral processes” (Conner & Becker, 1975, p. 551). 
• “Values are generalized, enduring beliefs about the personal and social desirability 
of certain modes of contact or end-states of existence” (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5). 
• “Values are the bedrock of any corporate culture” (Deal & Kennedy, 1983, p. 21). 
• “Values refer to people’s reasons for acting and judgements about such reasons” 
(Ozar, 1997, p. 645). 
Further, the previous literature distinguishes between: 
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 Lived vs. espoused values (Gatrell, Jenkins, & Tucker, 2001, p. 164). In the 
interviews, the values mentioned that are related to capital structure are the values 
that the interviewees currently adhere to, not those they aspire to but do not live by 
at present. 
 Material vs. spiritual; societal vs. individual; co-operative vs. competitive values 
(Parikh, Neubauer, & Lank, 1996, p.3). 
 Explicit (open) vs. implicit (hidden) values (Bjerke, 2001, p. 35). In the case of 
this research, the values might not be explicit per se, but they become explicit through 
the interviewees’ attitudes and behaviors. 
4.2.2.1.2 Values that stand out in entrepreneurial families, and how they relate to the 
different types of financing  
The table on the following pages describes the main values that emerge from the 
analysis of the interviews, and how they relate to a type of financing. The column on the 
left presents the theoretical concept of each value experienced by the families. The 
column on the right describes some of the behavior adopted by the families when 
considering the use of financing and shows the behavior of families in relation to the 
different types of financing. 
Table 7. Values, definitions and illustrative quotes 
Value Concept Type of financing/illustrative quotes 
Trust: “…a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of 
another” (Rousseau et al. 1998) 
1. IPO: “As long as there are holders of 
company papers it means that someone 
valued them, and considered them to be a 
good investment. They trust the company, 
and the family who owns the company” 
(P14:65-65).  
2. Private Fund: “The void that NN’s death 
left in my father’s head unconsciously 
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turned into a lack of confidence to 
continue running the business directly, 
and suddenly turned into an incentive to 
diversify the risk when he felt he no 
longer held the reins of the company” 
(P7:24-24).  
3. Debt: “Banks trust the way we manage 
our companies, and that is the reason they 
call on us to buy their services” (P20: 
116-116).  
4. Alliances: “Friends and partners have 
been with us from the beginning and have 
respected our leadership based on trust” 
(P26: 33-33 / P34: 45-45).  
Business ethics: “…rules, standards, codes, or 
principles which provide guidelines for morally 
right behavior and truthfulness in specific situations. 
Individual actions conform to justice, law, fact, 
reason, or truth” (Lewis, P. V,1985). 
1. Financing outside the banking sector: 
“Ambition leads to ruin. The family is not 
interested in a market which lies outside 
the banking sector, nor in deals outside 
the law” (P9:173-173).  
“We finance ourselves with institutional 
resources, not with resources from 
outside the banking sector” (P09:095-
095).  
2. Alliances: “During the Due Diligence 
process we confirmed that our allies have 
had an honorable track record for 
generations, and that gives us 
confidence” (P14:71-71).   
Privacy: “refers to bits of information that, for one 
reason or another, are kept hidden or controlled so 
as to elude attention, observation or comprehension. 
In a sense, secrecy is a necessary strategy in 
excluding one's opponents from information so as to 
generate the conditions for efficient governance. On 
the other hand, privacy protects us from the 
possibility of an unfair exchange of self-disclosures, 
criticism and vulnerability. Privacy provides 
security” (Wexler, M. N.1987).  
1. IPO: “In order to protect privacy some 
entrepreneurial families prefer not to 
float their companies in the Stock 
Exchange” (P25:077 / P74:049-049).  
 
2. Alliances: “It is acceptable to have a 
partner at the company level, not at the 
holding company level, due to issues of 
control and privacy” (P25:77-77).  
 
Open-mindedness: “beliefs relating to the way in 
which members approach the views and knowledge 
of others, and incorporates the beliefs that others 
should be free to express their views and that the 
value of others’ knowledge should be recognized” 
(Tjosvold & Poon, 1998) 
1.  IPO: “In order to float the company in 
the Stock Exchange it is necessary to 
have a new mentality, training for it, 
and the ability to adapt to regulations” 
(P13:121-121). 
 
2. Alliances: “In Colombia, the 
multinational was looking for an 
institution with an open mind to take 
advantage of and adopt quickly their 
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contribution in terms of processes, 
methods and risk management, decrease 
process time, and improve the 
productivity and efficiency of the 
operation” (P23: p12).  
Justice: “consistency of the procedure across 
persons and across time. Suppression of bias by the 
decision-maker, accuracy of information, 
correctability (e.g. appeal procedures), 
representativeness (all phases of the allocation 
process must reflect the basic concerns, values and 
outlook of all individuals), ethicality to conform to 
all personal standards of ethics and morality” (Van 
der Heyden, L., Blondel, C., & Carlock, R. S. 
2005).  
1. ESOP: “To act fairly with company 
partners, paradoxically brings about 
conflicts in the family” (P12:107-107)  
“Our family company honors the 
commitments with our partners by not 
applying our majority rights in cases 
where we could apply them” (P2:20-
20).  
Social Purpose: “refers to the inclusion of social and 
environmental concerns in business operations and 
in interactions with stakeholders. It encompasses 
transparency, stakeholder dialogue, sustainability 
reporting together with value creation, 
environmental management, environmental friendly 
production systems, and human capital management 
(Van Marrewijk, M. 2003).  
1. Alliances: “Protecting the employment 
of our workers is criteria we use to 
choose alliances” (P34:063-063). 
2. IPO: “In our decisions we always have 
the expectations of our shareholders 
present; ordinary people who trust that 
our management will add value to their 
shares” (P28:039-039). 
3. Internal financing: “We increased the 
salary of our employees, and in order to 
do it we did not pay dividends that 
year” (P22: 27-27).  
Education and development: personal development 
involves mental, physical, social, emotional, and 
spiritual growth that allows a person to live a 
productive and satisfying life within the customs 
and regulations of their society. This is achieved 
through the development of life skills. (Muchena, 
K., Howcroft, G & Stroud, L. 2015). 
1. “The third generation is not yet 
involved in the business, some of them 
study in Europe and in the U.S; they are 
getting an education to become 
professionals or directors and to be 
able to make better decisions” (P2:74-
74). 
2. “We have a career and a training plan 
for our employees so that they can make 
better decisions” (P13:73-73). 
 
Valuing Stakeholders: “Valuing and respecting 
minority shareholders includes protection against 
conflicts of interest in three dimensions: 
transparency in transactions between binding parties 
(transparency index) accountability of managers in 
the case of damaging transactions between binding 
parties (directors’ accountability index) and the  
shareholders’ ability to sue directors and officers for 
misconduct (Ease of shareholder suits index) 
1. External partners: “The partners have 
completely trusted our management 
style, we have also been very respectful 
of the minority shareholders; in some 
cases, when there has been a 
management mistake, they have been 
compensated at our cost.  We have been 
generous partners; we have never 
   122 
 
(Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & 
Shleifer, A, 2008).  
applied our majority rights” (P2: 20-
20).  
2. Alliances: “We offered the partners that 
we would take charge of the production 
process in Colombia, build the plant, 
contribute with our know-how, very 
good conditions for them” (P16: 46-
46).  
Respect for the culture: organizational culture, is the 
pattern of basic assumptions which a given group 
has invented, discovered, or developed in learning 
to cope with its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration, which have worked well 
enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be 
taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those 
problems (Schein, E. H.1989).  
 
1. Trade financing: “The respect that 
suppliers and insurers had for our 
organization was so strong that after 
the fire they trusted our employees to 
specify how much inventory had burnt 
down” (P33:130-130).  
 
2. All types of financing: “My parents 
founded the company and they 
established it under very clearly defined 
values that we, members of the second 
generation, have continue to apply 
when looking for financing” (P1:51-
51).  
Accountability. ‘Being answerable to audiences for 
performing up to certain prescribed standards, 
thereby fulfilling obligations, duties, expectations, 
and other charges. Accountability creates 
identifiability by linking individuals to their actions 
and resulting outcomes. In family firms, when 
individuals do not feel their identity is compatible 
with the task, possibly because it does not use their 
knowledge, skills and abilities, they are less likely 
to feel obligated to perform at a high level, and are 
more likely to use the excuse that circumstances 
interfered with their control over the performance 
outcome. (Guidice, R. M., Mero, N. P., & Greene, J. 
V.,2013) 
1. Internal financing: “Once, the family 
decided to stop the payment of dividends 
so that our employees could keep their 
jobs” (P21:082-082). 
2. Debt: “My parents taught me the value 
of the responsibility of banks. It is 
preferable to become poor, but to honor 
the clients’ deposits. That is worth 
gold” (P35:124-124).  
3. Trade financing: “Our suppliers are not 
worried if we owe them money. None of 
our companies has gone bankrupt or 
defaulted on its debts, in spite of having 
had difficult periods” (P18:132-132).  
 
Low profile: “…to avoid ostentation, behaving in a 
simple way, naturally, spontaneously, rejecting 
protocol and preferring informality.  Simplicity 
helps to do business with realism, accepting risks 
and not collapsing in the face of adversity. Not 
standing out does not mean having low 
performance; it means having a great ability to 
learn, listen, and value what other people are, say 
and do.”   (Gómez-Betancourt, G., 2005).   
1. Internal financing: “We are frugal; we 
do not get into debt in order to pay 
dividends; we reinvest for new 
projects” (P4:030-030).  
“Our financing is done with the 
company’s internal resources. If we 
distribute dividends we are damaging 
the company’s internal generation of 
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resources to continue growing” 
(P8:046-046). 
 
Tradition: “Tradition refers to the stock of 
knowledge, competencies, materials, manufacturing 
processes, signs, values, and beliefs pertaining to 
the past” (Messeni Petruzzelli & Albino, 2012). 
1. Alliances: “A good strategic partner for 
diversification is another 
entrepreneurial family that shares 
values and long-term investment 
perspectives” (P7:081-081).  
“The partners saw in us an alignment in 
values and management, as well as a 
complementary added value to their 
business” (P31:066-066). 
2. IPO: “I am not interested in selling the 
company to buy luxury things. I love 
working in it, it is my reason for being, I 
have great friends here” (P18:088-
088). 
 “The family must float a minority 
interest to reduce risk and to continue 
with the family tradition of having 
control” (P28:39-39).  
Loyalty: “…commitment to a person, cause, 
country, or ideal, stemming from natural kinship, 
personal attachment, collective purpose, or common 
identity” (Roth, J. K., 1995).  
1. Alliances: “The AM family chose this 
partner because it offered to protect 
the jobs and loyalty of their people” 
(P34:063-063).  
“As a principle, we had the loyalty of 
our partners who would support the 
business even with their own capital” 
(P32:045-045).  
Prestige: “…feeling of pride for belonging to an 
organization that is believed to have socially valued 
characteristics and may feel inclined to bask in its 
reflected glory. This is expected to occur most 
strongly when members believe that important 
outsiders (such as customers or shareholders) see 
the organization in a positive light. Perceived 
external prestige influences organizational 
identification. The more prestigious one perceives 
one's organization to be, the greater the potential 
boost to self-esteem through identification” (Smidts, 
A., Pruyn, A. T. H., & Van Riel, C. B.,2001). 
1. ESOP: “There were some small 
shareholders. When my father founded 
CASH, he would give shares to 
important people to make the company 
prestigious, and he would do the same 
with the Boards of Directors” 
(P3:032-032). 
2. Debt: “There are entrepreneurial 
families who tarnish their reputation 
by receiving funds from money 
laundering activities in order to solve 
a crisis, or to achieve growth” 
(P14:056-056). 
“We have had, and still have, a very 
good reputation with banks and as 
debtors; banks give us credit smoothly 
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when we need it, but we don’t like 
having big loans” (P:65:045-045).  
“Banks give us very competitive 
interest rates. Historically, we have 
always complied with our payments, 
and that is our characteristic” (P8:34-
34). 
3. IPO: “To list the company on the 
Stock Exchange is a matter of 
reputation for some people, and even 
if there are other good financial 
alternatives, prestige is their main 
motive” (P14:067-067). 
Entrepreneurship: “an entrepreneurial firm is one 
that “engages in product-market innovation, 
undertakes somewhat risky ventures and is first to 
come up with proactive innovations. It applies 
strategy-making practices used to identify and 
pursue opportunities arising in the environment. The 
entrepreneurial orientation is a combination of 
innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-taking 
(Garcés-Galdeano, L., Larraza-Kintana, M., García-
Olaverri, C., & Makri, M.,2016).  
1. Debt: “Companies must make long-
term bets and go into debt, and for us 
innovation is part of the philosophical 
values of entrepreneurship, of creating 
companies and financial and social 
value in an environment” (P22:22-
22). 
 
2. Financing in general: “In my 
experience, the objective is to have a 
strong, solid company to develop the 
business ventures of our children. 
Today we have a more independent 
society, our children are more open, 
in part because we gave them the 
opportunity to travel and study 
abroad. The world is more global for 
them and they have a different spirit, 
and I’ve begun to perceive that all 
those ideas and expectations they have 
are going to be more personalized” 
(P9:145-145). 
Cultural Diversity: “Harmonization of cultural 
diversity requires knowledge about the culture they 
interact with (language, traditions, beliefs, rules, 
etc.), personal skills (clear communication, correct 
understanding etc.) and personal orientation 
(empathic interaction, emotional reactions, 
tolerance, etc.). The identity of an enterprise is 
given by its culture, because it gives it a unique set 
of features and personality, that distinguish it from 
other organizations” (Popescu, S., & Roata, 
S.,2012).  
 
1. Alliances: “Diversity is important, but 
with cultural affinity between partners” 
(P26:35/P21:130). 
“Cultural diversity in alliances enriches 
the family” (P35:91-91/P34:65-65). 
Long-term orientation: “Long-term orientations 
could be defined as priorities, goals, and most of all, 
2. Asset Shedding: “The money from a 
sale is saved for a possible future 
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concrete investments that come to fruition over an 
extended time period, typically, 5 years or more, 
and after some appreciable delay. Long-term 
priorities include good stewardship aimed at 
reducing risk or building up resources. Long-term 
goals are more specific and might involve achieving 
enduring quality—or innovation leadership” 
(BretonMiller, L., & Miller, D.,2006).  
investment, like a war chest” (P26:55-
55). 
3. Trade Financing: “We have created 
alliances with foreign suppliers because 
we manage significant inventories, and 
you need to have credibility to make 
transactions without letters of credit” 
(P20:126-126).  
 
4.2.2.2 Family dynamics and capital structure, and vice-versa 
As  posited in the literature review chapter, when referring to family dynamics I 
include various aspects of family behaviors that affect the business and the ownership of 
the business,  such as: emotional pressures and stress (Craig & Lindsay, 2002); team 
dynamics and family relations (Astrachan, 2010); decision making processes (Gersick et 
al., 1997); family control (Anderson & Reeb, 2003); family system behavior (Poza, 
2010); family power (Miller & Le-Breton Miller, 2006); family entrenchment (Kroll, 
Wright, & Theerathorn, 1993); ownership schemes (McMahon & Stanger, 1995); 
ownership dilution (Schulze et al., 2003); family and conflict (Pieper, 2010); and so on. 
4.3 Types of financing. Influence of internal factors. 
Below is a description of internal factors (family dynamics, values, and 
generations) with their respective influence on the different types of company financing, 
including the interview quotes and the documents that describe those behaviors. 
Likewise, the right column describes some effects of the different types of financing on 
family dynamics, values, and the generations in charge of running the company. 
4.3.1 IPOs giving up control 
      IPOs giving up control refers to the company or companies in the sample that 
relinquished control by floating the company on the Stock Exchange. The illustrative 
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case below is the company, Whole. The table describes and explains the family 
dynamics, values, and some generational aspects that were noted in the interviews and 
that led to the decision by the family to sell the company on the stock exchange; it also 
describes some of the effects on the family’s dynamics as a consequence of said flotation. 
The table also describes some family conduct that has led other companies to avoid 
flotation on the Stock Exchange, according to unquoted but related comments by some of 
the other sample companies who have not relinquished control.  
Table 8. IPOs giving up control 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
Family dynamics that lead to IPOs Consequences of IPOs on Family Dynamics 
Family Dynamics 
. There was neither business 
emotional cohesion nor family 
cohesion among family members, they 
only had some financial business 
cohesion given by dividends. 
P35:043-043 Avoid conflicts by giving dissatisfied 




Family focusing more short term than 
long term,  
P32:105-105 Had a disintegrative impact on the 
family as it was persuaded to not 
consider where it was to be in the long 
term 
P32:105_195 
Shareholders are not unified in their 
goals for the business and their 
responsibilities to others 
P32:93-93 
P22:41-41 




Different goals from different family 
branches 
P32:53-55 Contributes to family cohesion, 
emotional health of the family 
P33:357-357 
P32:93-93 
  IPOs maintain justice perception 
among family members 
P33:357-357 
Family stress due to company growth P3:58 IPOs create conflict due to different 
vision from external shareholders and 
from the family  
P22:041-041 
P70:045-045 
Conflicts originated by selling shares 
within the family 
P32:075-075 Family feels at ease because shares 




Low motivation of female family 
members, and of new generations 
P33:091-091 
P32:105-105 
Floating the company dissolves the 
entrepreneurial family as such, due to: 
•One-person, absolute leadership 
without any shared vision or 
objectives; 
•Succession has not been planned by 
the family; 
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Previous partners formalize company 
governance before flotation  
P35:026-026     
Entrepreneurial family has short-term 
vision. Succession issues are not 
discussed 
P32:105-105     
Lack of emotional link to the 
company on the part of the women 
and the second generation of the 
family 
P35:079-079 Break-up of entrepreneurial family, 
each member follows their own path 
P32:091-091 
Values 
Privacy. To protect their privacy some 





Prestige. Looking for prestige, the 
family decides not only to list the 
company, but also the Stock Exchange 
on which it is going to be listed 
P74:067-067 
P35:026-026 
Listing the company on the most 
important Stock Exchanges gives 
prestige to the family, and the 
possibility of having other sources of 
financing in the future 
 P14:63-63 
Business venture. Look for resources 
to finance personal projects, diversify, 
and reduce risk 
P32:93-93 It encourages individual business 









    
Lack of training from new generations P35:079-079     
First generation seeks peace of mind 
via liquidity 
P75: 075-075     
  Family members feel more secure and 
at ease as a result of company growth 




Second generation has no family 
connection nor is it linked to the 
business: sees the company as an 
investment to grow and sell 
P32:53-55     
Aging first generation P75: 075-075     
Knowledge of previous generations 




    
 
 
4.3.1.1 IPO Giving up control and family dynamics 
In the case of Whole, a company that relinquished control to external parties via 
the Stock Exchange, the purpose when the family company was created was the well-
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being of the family, but there was no long-term vision or plan for a family company; this 
definitely influenced the family’s decision to list the company on the Stock Exchange and 
sell their shares: 
“When the company was created there wasn’t a real entrepreneurial family 
purpose. That was a very big error. Apart from creating a business that could 
provide comfort to the family, there wasn’t a long term projection on the part of 
the founders.  They didn’t think about mechanisms that would allow the next 
generations to continue, in a structured way, with the flag that they had raised... A 
very valuable ownership and management scheme could have been preserved, 
and it was lost. I said it many times, but they didn´t like for me to say it. It was as 
if I were criticizing them” (P32:105-105). 
The family’s short term vision instead of looking in the long run had an effect on their 
capital structure decision to sell the company on the stock exchange; but, at the same 
time, the IPO also had a disintegrative impact on the family as it was persuaded not to 
consider where it was going to be in the long term. 
Additionally, the different family branches had very different interests, and they 
thought that the Stock Exchange was criteria to value the company: “In the future, some 
of them (especially members of the second generation) would want to leave and this was 
going to constitute a problem in order to value the company. What criteria were we going 
to use to value the company?  The buyer’s criteria, or the seller’s criteria?...” (P32:53-
53) In this case, the cause of placing the company in the stock exchange was not only the 
need for an independent valuation of the shares but also the differences in goals of family 
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members. These causes also imply lack of cohesion and even poor communication 
among different generations as the following quotes make clear. 
Since there had already been a family conflict when a private sale of shares had 
taken place, everyone wanted to prevent this from happening again: “A few months later, 
the seller said that “he had been hit on the head,” even though the buyer was the same 
family. That could have damaged the family relationship, which wasn´t very close, but it 
was good” (P32:075-075). The above quote also implies that IPOs avoid damaging 
family relationships and cohesion, which occurred when internal stock selling happened 
among family members. 
Being listed on the Stock Exchange also provided an easy way out for those 
relatives that wanted to sell, some of whom did not have any interest in nor training to 
continue running the company. There was neither business emotional cohesion nor family 
cohesion among family members; they only had some financial business cohesion given 
by dividends. The lack of knowledge about company matters combined with the lack of 
long term goals for this non-cohesive family were also important issues in the decision to 
go through the stock exchange. According to BW: 
 “We saw that strategically it was important to list the company on the Stock 
Exchange, and we worked towards that end. But we were also aware that the 
different family groups were only interested in their dividends, because they had 
no training, because it was comfortable to receive money, put it in their pocket, 
and sleep peacefully. None of them was a business person nor had they any 
training to run the business. They thought it was more important to have their 
   130 
 
shares listed, and to have the Stock Exchange as a vehicle to sell their shares at 
any time. If not, it [selling shares] would have been impossible” (P35:043-043).  
Liquidity and the possibility to trade the shares in a fairer manner also motivated 
this decision. At the same time, the IPOs maintained justice perception among family 
members: “Once the company has been valued, that wealth has to be tradable for the 
partners. The creation of an exchange mechanism is necessary in order to make equity 
something interchangeable. That was the objective of a group of shareholders, but not all 
of them. Nevertheless, the great effort made by the Whole family benefitted everyone” 
(P33:357-357). Thus, in the second generation, the company is no longer considered a 
family business; it is now seen as an investment that needs to increase its value in order 
to be sold. Said one interviewee, “The company was considered more as an investment; 
how much dividend is it paying; how much is its value going to increase in the future, 
because for many family members the goal was to increase its value and sell. They did 
not have any impact on the company, they were not on the Board of Directors, and they 
did not make any decisions” (P35:079-079). In other words, second generation family 
shareholders were only investors. They did not consider themselves a family business 
because there was not cohesion as business family. 
BW sheds more light on the family cohesion dynamics that brought Whole to this 
point in its history. “During the 90’s” he said, “my uncles wanted to transfer their 
responsibility to the second generation, but none of the sons from that generation had 
any interest in the company. I am the eldest nephew, and in reality I had no link 
whatsoever to the company” (P32:049-049). Moreover, female family members had no 
motivation because they were excluded from any business issues:  
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“Furthermore, in spite of my uncle being very generous with some family 
members, there were others that were not even allowed to go into the stores: the 
wives. His sisters-in-law were not allowed to work in the company, and they could 
never visit their husbands during working hours. Neither was it expected that they 
would give their opinion about the business. And if they did, they were met with 
such scolding that they learned never to do it again.  Where they could ask about 
some business topics, very superficially, was at home where they had a bit more 
authority” (P33:091-091). 
This lack of involvement on the part of the women combined with the lack of 
competencies on the part of the second generation acted as triggers to listing the company 
on the Stock Exchange: “We analyzed many circumstances to see what could be the best, 
not only to increase the value of the equity, but to preserve the company in different 
hands in the long-term…. We reached the conclusion that the best thing was to list the 
company on the Stock Exchange” (P32:53-55). Whole’s situation makes clear the 
importance for family shareholders to be educated in business matters and/or shareholder 
responsibilities if they want the company to be transferred to next generations. 
This family considered it more convenient to sell their shares on the stock 
exchange not only to increase the value of their equity, but also to solve shareholders’ 
liquidity issues, the second generation’s lack of interest in running the business, and the 
first generation’s interest in having financial security. Floating the company provided not 
only liquidity for shareholders, but also allowed the family to turn their investment into 
cash. The members of the first generation who had initially capitalized the company and 
had all their money invested in it could not continue to contribute additional funds needed 
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for growth; by selling, they were satisfied.  “Maybe the founders felt more comfortable 
having financial resources after having invested and capitalized during all their lives. 
The older members were already very old. I would say that was the fundamental reason 
to sell their shares on the Stock Exchange” (P32:075-075), says a cousin who was a 
member of the Board of Directors. Lack of succession planning by the first generation 
was another reason for the family to sell because there was no knowledge transfer as a 
consequence of bad communication among different generations.  
In Whole’s instance, listing the company provided enough money to maintain 
family cohesion, promoted individual family business ventures, diminish risk, and 
improved the family’s emotional health. The company grew, and its government became 
stronger, something that supported new, subsequent issues. Moreover, they maintained 
family cohesion: 
“The only family members interested in continuing were the family directors, no 
one else was interested. There was an ongoing issue about diversification because 
to be concentrated in only one sector, in only one company, was not very sound 
financially. They wanted to remain in Whole, but not with 100%, because there 
could be a turn in any direction. All of them sold to diversify, start their own 
business ventures, or make investments.” (P32:93-93). Being in the stock 
exchange gave the family peace of mind. “…Several share issues followed this 
one. The mechanism to float the company on the Stock Exchange was decisive. 
The improvements in the corporate government were an indispensable tool to 
make the company management more confident” (P32:089-089). The IPO gave 
the management more confidence to continue growing because of better 
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governance. “…The family remained on the Board of Directors until we decided 
that the cycle had come to an end, and we decided to sell all our shares to a 
multinational company. It was a painful sale, but we maintained the family unit” 
(P32:191-191) 
In other words, giving dissatisfied family shareholders a route to exit favored family unit.   
Some additional comments some interviewees made regarding listing a company 
on the Stock Exchange are worth mentioning.  First, a decisive element for a successful 
flotation is to have had, before the floating process, foreign partners in the capital 
structure, “…strategic partners that helped to manage the company, well-known 
individuals, important members of the business world” (P35:026-026). Second, with 
regard to listing on the Stock Exchange, the Brick family comments they learned a great 
deal from a previous generation’s experience regarding participation in the stock market, 
which influences their decision not to do so again:  
“When my grandfather’s company became public it started to lose, because it 
started to concentrate on the short-term, in meeting the needs of short-term 
investors, and it missed the opportunity to undergo a technological reconversion 
to turn it into an efficient company, to diversify, to integrate forward or 
backwards. ...And that is when, during the 70’s, this company went from being the 
biggest company nationwide to the slightly medium-size company that is today, 
with a lot of problems, with a tradition and an enigma... As a result of that 
experience, amongst others, listing the company nowadays is not an option for 
us” (P22:041-041). 
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According to BB, Stock Exchanges do not understand the meaning of being a 
family company, and it is not clear how to balance the interests of external shareholders 
with those of family shareholders: 
“In an organization, I wonder how to balance long-term bets, such as a 
technology spin-off, with the short-term bets of minority shareholders on the Stock 
Exchange, who are interested in seeing their share price skyrocket in a matter of 
hours... to win with a share value increase. They (the Stock Exchange) do not 
understand the skeleton inside, the flesh and the muscle of a family company, 
what really makes it valuable, its ability to create value, which for me is not the 
share price, but the capacity that a machine made up of technology and human 
beings (family and employees) has of working well, of generating cash and being 
able to reinvest it, and of growing making short, medium, and long-term bets” 
(P22:045-045).  
4.3.1.2 IPO Giving up control and family values 
Family values in some way influence, positively or negatively, the decision of 
listing the company on the Stock Exchange. For example, in regard to privacy, listing 
Bricks today would not be an option, especially if referring to the holding company, due 
to privacy issues and to the fear of losing the balance between short and long-term 
investments, says CB, a family member who sits on the Board of Directors: 
“I don’t know, but I believe the second generation would be worried if the listing 
on the stock exchange would be at the holding company level, because there 
would not be a family vehicle to retain control and privacy. They would be 
concerned that listing the company would make it a target for a takeover, or that 
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the share price could plummet, and the mentality regarding investment terms and 
executive incentives could change. There are serious consequences, which is why 
we need to be prepared, and know to what extent we can mitigate the 
consequences of an eventual listing on the stock exchange” (P25:077-077). 
Furthermore, says CG, family privacy and detaching himself from the management 
would be elements that his family considers important to avoid floating the company at 
this time:  
“I would say that listing a company in the stock market is not the best financing 
mechanism for a reason: Companies must have transparency protocols in regards 
to the market. Many family companies don’t want this because they would have to 
share private company information. It’s like getting naked, in other words, “what 
you see, is what you get. Buy me” (P14:049-049). 
Listing the company can mean prestige for the family, and the possibility of 
having other sources of income in the future. As CG explains, “Financial experts said that 
it was best to go to the London Stock Exchange because it was cheaper and there was 
more liquidity. This family thought that reputation-wise it was better to be in the New 
York Stock Exchange, a decision totally based on reputation… (P14:067-067).  And a 
Whole family director adds,” It was a simple mechanism, not very elaborate, but it 
allowed Whole the power to access capital markets in a stronger way further down the 
line” (P32:081-081.) 
Regarding the effect of entrepreneurship on giving up company control, AW, a 
Whole family director, said, “The only family members interested in continuing with the 
company were two cousins, no one else was interested. There was an ongoing issue about 
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diversification because to be concentrated in only one sector, in only one company, was 
not very sound financially. They wanted to remain in Whole, but not with 100%, because 
there could be a turn in any direction. All of them sold to diversify, start their own 
business ventures, or make investments.” (P32:93-93). And in terms of family dynamics, 
it would also imply that they were not unified in their goals for the business and their 
responsibilities to others; they wanted to pursue their separate interests more than their 
joint interests in the business.  
4.3.1.3 IPO Giving up control and generational aspects 
In terms of generations, the first generation at Whole was not interested in listing 
the company on the Stock Exchange: 
“While Whole founders still had total influence in the company, they never 
thought about the Stock Exchange or anything similar to obtain funds, or 
negotiate the shares because there was no need; they had enormous quantities of 
cash, very well managed, strong in commercial terms, and the shares on the stock 
exchange didn’t move very much” (P35:031-021). “…The company had no need 
to use the Stock Exchange, because it had good cash which allowed them to 
finance their own growth and any financial requirements” (P35:035-035). 
The second generation, however, had more interest in the liquidity produced by 
investment on the Stock Exchange, and in having the necessary income to establish their 
own business ventures. A second generation member says, “One of the first things that 
came to our heads was that we should register the company on the Stock Exchange” 
(P35:041-041). 
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4.3.2 IPOS not giving up control 
Unlike Whole, in the case of School, the family did not want to lose control of the 
company. They were even less open to losing control of the family holding company, 
even though several family members who were interested in listing the holding company. 
The shares issued on the Stock Exchange were preferential shares with a minority 
participation right. The following table shows a summary of family dynamics and their 
influence in regards to listing the company on the Stock Exchange, but without giving up 
company control. It also shows how listing the company influences family dynamics and 
presents the values that influence the decision to list the company, and the generational 
dynamics for or against doing so. 
Table 9. IPOs not giving up control 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
Family dynamics that lead to IPOs Influence of IPOs on Family Dynamics 
Family Dynamics 
  Avoids conflicts by giving 
dissatisfied shareholders a route to 





Cohesion. The lack of financial 
and emotional cohesion 
mechanisms motivates listing the 




Expedites valuing the company, 
and facilitates conversations 
regarding the price and sale of 
shares, if needed. 
P27:015-
015 
The family’s strong participation in 
the company motivates listing it, 
but without giving up control 
P80: p2     
The family’s sense of belonging to 
the company motivates listing it, 
but without giving up control 
P80: p1-2     
Ensure the family’s power in the 
decision making process when 
maintaining control. Fear of losing 
control 
P27:22-22     
Values 
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 4.3.2.1 IPOs not giving up control and family dynamics 
In School’s case, the situation is different from Whole, because after floating the 
company, the family did not give up control of the subsidiary, and the family has 
maintained a strong link to the company.  The family has a strong tradition of many years 
running the company, and many of its members work in it. The family company has a 
family and a corporate governance, and the family has a great sense of belonging to the 
organization.  Nevertheless, says one interviewee, “the liquidity issue” and the “ease of 
valuing the company” equally influenced the decision of listing one of the subsidiary 
companies. In many ways, family members saw floating the company as a rehearsal. “It 
was trying out a way of financing where we had certain concerns, but in one of the 
subsidiaries, not the holding company, without running a big risk, and just to see how it 
worked” (P27:15-15). In terms of liquidity, one family member proffered the benefits of 
Prestige. Fear of using the stock 
exchange because it may give the 
impression of wanting to change 
the company’s identity for cash, a 
negative image for the company 
and the family 
P80:p8 A minority listing on the stock 
exchange has complicated a little 
the way company decisions are 
managed by the family  
P27:22-
22 
Tradition. Minority flotation, 
reduces risk and continues family 
tradition of control and total power 
P28:039-039 Responsibility. The family 
company and the family managing 
the company take on a new 
responsibility towards external 





The founding generation is not 
inclined to finance the company 




    
Members of the second and next 
generations are more inclined to 
float the company. For the elders it 
is too complicated  
P28:115-115 
P35:041-041 
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being in the stock market: “The family always thought it was a good idea to float the 
company because there is this idea that the stock market can provide a company valuation 
faster, and that it is an easy way to obtain liquidity in the sense that if I need to sell my 
shares I can do it more easily” (P27:015-015). The idea of having the company on the 
stock exchange gives the family unity in some way, because it gives liquidity without 
having to go through an evaluation process for the shares. The shares are sold at the stock 
exchange price. In the Whole company, it is clearly mentioned that when a family 
shareholder wanted to sell before they were in the stock exchange, there was conflict 
because of the price settlement: “What criteria were we going to use to value the 
company:  The buyer’s criteria, or the seller’s criteria?” (P32:53-53). 
Maintaining control and responsibility means that the family has freedom to 
continue making many business decisions, even if its subsidiary company is listed on the 
stock exchange: 
 “Since the holding company is closed, we manage all the other subsidiaries with a 
lot of freedom in many aspects. We don’t have to ask permission from anybody. The 
Board of Directors meets, discusses, decides, and that´s it. When there’s a listed 
company it’s not like that. At the holding company we look at a group of private 
companies, and then we look at one that is listed; it’s like a ’different child.’ When 
we discuss any issues, there is always the question... and what are we going to do 
with the company that is listed on the stock exchange? It forces us to follow other 
procedures, it’s different” (P28:039-039).  
For example, floating the company has created a big responsibility from the family 
towards the external shareholders. As one interviewee remarked, ” ...Anyway, when I 
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walk on the street I feel a big responsibility because there are people who come up to me 
and say ’You are the new company president; I bought shares at this price and now it’s 
falling, don’t forget about us, please maintain the price’” 3 (P28:039-039). 
At Bricks, according to family history, the lack of family cohesion mechanisms 
resulted in an earlier generation of the family that was very easily convinced to float the 
company: 
“Another reason that led one of the big ... Colombian companies to lose its flag 
could have been that [listing the company on the stock exchange]. What a pity 
that my grandfather is not alive to have these conversations about a disunited 
family. A disunited and disconnected family is very easy to convince of following 
a certain path, and maybe the path to float the company was a mistake. Could it 
be that they didn’t know how to manage that path because they were a 
disconnected family? Very possibly. Intuitively I would say that yes” (P22:42-42). 
School’s president agrees with the importance of a united or cohesive family. 
Having shares in the family company should provide some type of visible and frequent 
return, however small, he says, to maintain cohesion. However, he believes there must be 
other types of cohesion mechanisms, not only financial: 
“Managing family cohesion is difficult if we want to maintain ownership within 
the family, it is complex. I’m always concerned about these people (shareholders), 
I want them to think that what they receive from the company is worth it, that they 
like it. If not, they go and sell their shares because what is the point of having 
them, if they don’t represent anything? That’s why I keep saying that we have to 
                                                 
3 The share price on the Colombian stock exchange was falling to levels that were much lower 
than the IPO prices. 
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invent other things to distribute to shareholders, without putting much financial 
pressure on the holding company” (P27:49:49). 
4.3.2.2 IPOs not giving up control and values 
The reputation of the School family was considered when discussing listing the 
company on the stock exchange. “School has been investigating the possibility of going 
public with individual operating companies or the entire holding company to gain a large 
infusion of cash…”(P80:p8),  said an interviewee. He described the widely varying 
opinions expressed by family members.  “Multiple family members recalled one of the 
patriarchs was adamantly opposed to taking the holding company public. Others, 
including family-council members saw benefits in a large initial public offering (IPO) for 
the holding company. The family approached the IPO discussion very carefully, largely 
to ensure that they preserved School’s strong reputation in the community by avoiding 
the perception they were willing to trade the company name for cash (P80: p8). 
4.3.2.3 IPOs not giving up control and generational aspects 
First generations are not very convinced about listing their companies on the stock 
exchange, and they prefer to manage them in a more family –oriented way, as asserted by 
some of the interviewees. For example, AP explains, “They didn’t have the dimension or 
significance to go into the capital markets. They always considered that the company was 
only to be managed in a family-oriented way” (P18:082-082). And CB from Bricks 
declares, “I don’t think they [the first generation] would‘ve accepted it, even less in the 
situation the stock exchange was at the time, and it isn’t better now. It didn’t work 
efficiently, and didn’t have the transparency mechanisms or offer the protection they 
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were looking for” (P31:068-070). In fact, when a young member of School proposes 
floating the company, he is met with opposition: 
  “My perception is that in every Board of Directors there are members who have 
more influence than others. Generally, they are older people, and those who don’t 
want problems; they always find a negative example to knock everything down. 
They tell us “look at the case of this big local company with extraordinary results 
and yet its shares are not traded. Why would you want that, and the employees? 
One can say that it is a particular case, that we have to make sure we do not 
resemble that company too much, nor think that that company represents all the 
companies in this industry” (P28:115-115).  
4.3.3 Different levels of debt and internal factors 
As in previous cases discussed, some internal factors influence how much debt is 
acquired by entrepreneurial families. Amongst those factors are: family dynamics, family 
values, and the family generation presently running the company. Likewise, the debt 
level of companies influences family dynamics. The table below shows the influence that 
family dynamics, family values, and the generation in charge of running the company 
have on the acquisition of debt. The table indicates how high or low company 
indebtedness influences family dynamics.  
Table 10. Debt 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
 
Influence of family dynamics on debt 
Influence of debt on family dynamics 
Family Dynamics 
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Financial crisis of a family 
member 






Financial cohesion: Acquire debt 
to distribute dividends and keep 
family unity 
P16:13-13 High indebtedness demands 
mortgages and higher interests that 
produce stress in the family 
P1:103-
103 
Family fears the arrival of 
competition 
P72:029-029 High dependency on large banks 
produces fear of default and the 








Fear of losing control of the 
situation leads to low debt 
P22:040-040 Low levels of debt in the holding 











Bad experiences with high debt 





High indebtedness strengthens the 






Fear of a financial crisis within the 
company. War chest anticipating a 
crisis  
P25:99-99 High indebtedness guaranteed by 
land mortgages. Risk for the family 
P16:9 
Values 
The family´s peace of mind leads 
to low indebtedness 
P54:034-034; 
P31:074-074 
High indebtedness produces humility 
within the family 
P23: P7 
Reputation. Favors credit and low 




High indebtedness produces respect 





Reputation leads the company to 
low levels of debt 
P26:091-091   
Family tradition leads to low 




 Prudence leads the family to low 
levels of debt  
 P34:151-151  
 
Generations 
   144 
 
First generations are usually 
averse to the risk associated with 
high indebtedness. They would 
rather sleep debt-free 
P18:047-047 In partnerships between siblings 
there is dialogue in regards to debt, 
and the freedom to accept debt 




In the First Generation, the Pater 
Familiae decides about debt levels 
P72:059-059   
INTERNAL BUSINESS FACTORS 
Insufficient previous studies P6:8-8   
Modernization processes, 
equipment 
P72:029-029     
Company’s financial crisis P12:23-23   
 
4.3.3.1 Family dynamics and debt 
Succession and family crises are decisive factors of the capital structure of family 
companies, particularly of debt.  One interviewee said these factors may include “difficult 
family situations, such as when a patriarch dies, or when a partner leaves, as was our 
case, or when there is a crisis that force you to finance the company with debt to bear the 
crisis” (P12:23-23).  Nevertheless, in some instances, higher debt can provide solutions. 
For AL, for example, debt solved some succession issues. “To deal with the problems of 
succession, we ended up acquiring more credit. We solved the problems of succession, 
but acquiring debt is not to the family’s liking” (P4:092-092). 
Family conflict can also lead to debt. In one company with a very high level of 
debt, conflicts between siblings grew so intense that taking on more debt to buy out one 
brother seemed to be the only way to resolve the issue. “The company has a very high 
debt because it acquired loans to buy out a brother who couldn’t stand the others. The 
company wouldn’t have such debt if the owners hadn’t been a family” (P15:19-19). 
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On the other hand, the family’s fear, whether it be of a financial crisis or of an 
attack from the competition, can also lead toward taking on debt, especially when there 
are open bank credit lines. One interviewee recalls, “The EBITDA decreased during the 
second half of 2008 and the first half of 2009, and with the uncertainty regarding the 
financial system and not knowing if our credit lines would remain open, the Board of 
Directors decided to use all the lines to the fullest, and thus increase our cash cushion” 
(P25:078-078). CB agrees, and considers debt as an opportunity to anticipate the 
availability of resources for an eventual bank crisis: 
“At the end of 2008 we were over-indebted, in part due to a conscious decision 
taken by the Board and by the management to use all available credit lines in 
order to increase our cash cushion, because we didn’t know which other banks 
were going to fail and if liquidity sources were going to dry. Our leverage 
increased very much but most of the funds were in cash as a preventive measure 
in case all credit lines dried out... The family Council was very worried. I don’t 
think we reached a 3.5 net debt/EBITDA, I don’t remember the exact figure, it 
was over 3, which was high enough to generate fear” (P25:99-99). 
In AG’s case, the family’s fear of an attack from the competition, led to the 
company acquiring debt. “Another milestone of debt is fear, the fear we have as a family 
company of the arrival of fierce competition.” To prepare, he said, “and to strengthen and 
anticipate ourselves to the arrival of new competitors, we opened credit lines to tackle 
those alleged crises in a better way” (P12:029-029). 
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Finally, in terms of low debt levels, peace of mind, and family tradition, fear of 
losing control and prior bad experiences with high debt play important roles as family 
dynamics that influence some companies in the sample to keep debt low: 
“The policy of AM’s father is that the less debt you have, the more peace of mind 
you have. On the other hand, that situation has been true for a long time as a 
result of the high interest rates in Colombia. When interest rates were 3.5% per 
month, debt was prescribed in our case. And… We maintain that tradition on until 
today” (P4:034-034).  
As far as fear of losing control and prior bad experiences: 
“The family has a conservative policy relating to debt. Eight years ago we had a 
financial crisis and we had a high level of debt with sales going down. Since then, 
we understood we have to have covenants in our company to maintain low levels 
of debt” (P22:040-040). 
On the contrary, worth mentioning is that, in several of the family groups analyzed that 
were organized through a holding company (Lunch, Mortgage, Brick, Energy, and Parts), 
debts are very low or null to give peace and unity to the family (P34:151-151; P34:087-
087; P32:039-039; P31:74-74; P26:91-91); however, in all of them except for Lunch, the 
owners are second-generation siblings, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
In the case of debt, some other quotes from interviewees speak to the feedback 
loop from capital structure to the family.   For example, most people think of the negative 
consequences of debt (more stress and more fighting) as claimed by AC, who says, 
“…But obviously, debts generate a lot of concern for families because they feel that they 
can no longer sleep peacefully at night, because a debt is a debt” (P9:113-113). Or as the 
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CEO of School says, “Financial results were very poor during many years, a very high 
level of debt, and that situation in any family business would not work because it creates 
fights that when they ignite, they start to take a different path” (P28:029-029). 
  BC gives a warning regarding the risks of debt, saying, “...but when difficult 
times arrive, a high level of debt can lead to a very complicated family and company 
crisis” (P10:039-039). That kind of high level of company debt produces a lack of trust 
between family members: 
“From the moment the company has a high level of debt, the family managers had 
to leave the Board of Directors. The General Manager and any other manager 
could not be on the Board. This created a company standstill, not only because 
the situation did not allow the start of new projects, but also because politically 
there was no desire or enough confidence to explore other type of business 
opportunities. It was a psychological effect where we stood still with our 
expertise, and didn’t explore new things due to the lack of confidence produced by 
the high level of debt” (P16:18 -19). 
Still, some interviewees like AT mention the positive consequences of debt on 
family cohesion. He says, “without a doubt, in 34 years of history there have been 
difficult moments when the debt capacity of the company has been limited, and it has 
required a family effort. This in some way has positive impacts within the family, such as 
the return of my brother who had moved abroad. He came back to support us” (P1:059-
059). And AB’s situation was similarly positive, for “the debt problem brought us 
together and forced us to make a decision together, which was to think about the future of 
the company and of the family, because at the end they are both aligned. That was a 
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difficult decision that had a positive impact, because it brought us together around a very 
difficult decision” (P21:144-144).   
A variety of other interviews contained positive feedback related to high debt and 
some aspect of family dynamics. For example, AM, president of Mortgage group, says, 
“the crisis and the high level of debt made us humbler, and that attitude was critical for 
everything that happened afterwards in our group” (P23: P7).  And the CEO of School 
says that, despite the high indebtedness, ”… there is a lot of respect for the legacy that 
was left to us; the family has been respectful. In other families this would have meant a 
big problem. In this case, I don’t know if it has been God’s fate, or principles, or religious 
beliefs that things are going to get better, but something has prevented it” (P28:014-014). 
  The president of a School subsidiary predicts that family dynamics prevents the 
family from selling, in spite of the dividends paid which, due to the high indebtedness, 
are not what the family could get if they had another type of investment: 
“This level of debt has forced the family to deal with a difficult situation, but there 
is too much respect for the legacy, for what we have received from my father, my 
grandfather, the founders. Any member of the family could say, for example, if 
this yields 2%, why not sell and go invest where I can get 10%. Anyway, the 
probability of a family member selling his shares is very low. In any other family 
the members would have run away. Not here, due to values, to family legacy. It is 
something unique” (P28:021-021). 
In the case of Harvest, the bank understood that they had to lend money to the 
company to maintain the financial cohesion between family partners and to keep the 
company operational: 
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“The company had a loss during one or two years. It was impossible to distribute 
dividends because there was no profit. It was necessary to negotiate with banks so 
they would accept something unusual: that the company had to acquire more debt 
in order to be able to give something to the partners, dividends that had not been 
generated.... with the understanding that if the family could not live off of the 
company, then it would be impossible to sustain the partnership and the family 
unity” (P16:13-13). 
4.3.3.2 Values and debt 
 The image of the family and its reputation contribute to obtaining credit, and to 
lower interest rates when negotiating bank loans. The president of Energy claims, “an 
interesting fact about this company is that it has had a very good name within the 
financial system and very good credits approved. We never default or fall behind on 
payments. I think that has made easier the possibility of having credit at reasonable cost 
conditions” (P6:52-52). And the president of Mortgage says something very similar, that 
also leads to low indebtedness: 
” The Mortgage name is worth a lot to us. People admire the story of Mortgage. 
Someone very close to me, to the Superintendent, and to the president of Banco de 
la Republica (Colombia’s Central Bank) came to me and said “people believe 
what you say, you are the only one they believe in.” I learned that from my father. 
If you play dirty, the day you need banks they are not going to listen. At the time 
of Mortgage’s crisis when we had to go to Banco de la Republica, they always 
believed in us. Image is fundamental” (P26:91-91).  
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Furthermore, BM, a member of his board also states: “They are very cautious when they 
take debt. They always look at the indebtedness in a very cautious way” (P34:151-151) 
On the other hand, as the result of the bad reputation of a partner, Harvest had to obtain a 
loan to buy out his shares in an effort not to have the reputation of the company affected:  
“We ended up with an intruder inside our family company overnight. This created 
a huge conflict, starting with a total break-up with the family group that sold the 
stake to the intruder, and it also brought an enormous problem from a legal, 
reputational, and governmental point of view” (P16:036-036), (P15:036-036).  
Generational aspects and debt 
  First generations are usually averse to the risks associated to debt. It is worth 
illustrating that statement with the following quote from an interviewee: 
“Regarding the level of debt, that depends on each person. My father and my 
uncle only studied until first and second grade, respectively. For them it was very 
important when I graduated from university, ’finally a member of the Parts family 
graduates, he is a professional.’  In some moment I said, ’Dad, our own money is 
very valuable, it is better to use borrowed money.’ Banks at that time lent money 
quarterly in advance, but our business produced more than that.  After attending 
university and spending some time in Boston, I considered that one’s own money 
is more expensive than money borrowed from a bank. I gave a lecture to my 
father, and I remember he said: ’Son, I am impressed; you know a lot and you 
have learned, and I feel very proud of you. But, what I am going to tell you is that 
there is a very important ingredient in business which is to be able to sleep 
peacefully, and I sleep peacefully as long as I don’t owe anything to anyone, and 
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as long as I can pay everything that I owe.’ That policy has always been 
maintained in our group” (P18:047-047). 
Also, the decision-making process in regards to debt changes if the next 
generations are already involved in the company, say CG from Gown. “In the first 
generations where there still is a Pater Familiae......., the person that has been successful 
is used to doing whatever he pleases in regards to debt, and finds it very difficult to share 
the decision-making process with the second generation” (P12:059-059).  “…Typically, 
there are some siblings or nieces/nephews that are inside and others outside. Let’s say 
that, since it’s a question of ascending authority, if the Pater Familiae is not present, then 
what you have is a relationship between three peers who might say ’I’m not going to 
acquire debt, I don’t want to compromise my shares, if you want to do it, then do it with 
your own shares” (P14:39-40).  
4.3.3.3 Internal business factors and debt 
In one case, the over-indebtedness was the result of an uninformed decision made 
without proper preliminary research: 
“In my opinion, the preliminary studies were not done with the precision needed 
to make this decision and this purchase; I don’t remember the details, but that 
purchase had a very high leverage component” (P6:8-8). “…Banks understood 
this. Obviously, they demanded all types of guarantees and precautions for 
repayment, and eventually the situation was overcome, but those were very 
difficult years that produced many consequences for the family and the company. 
Therefore, we saw the need to strengthen the decision-making mechanisms, 
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because we could not repeat an investment of such scale without proper analysis, 
just because someone thought it was a good idea” (P16:14-14). 
4.3.3.4 External factors specific to debt 
There are a couple of external factors that are specifically related to debt. These 
factors refer to the subject of guarantees and the size of banks in Colombia.  The first is 
mortgages. During difficult financial times in Colombia, banks lent money aware that 
clients would not be able to repay their loans; thus, the important thing for banks was to 
have a mortgage or a significant part of a property as guarantee. This, of course, created a 
lot of stress for the family. One of the founders interviewed comments about the 
collateral required for bank loans, “Look, these machines for you are just old junk that 
you will not be able to sell, they are very specialized and have no market.... Basically, I 
need you to renew this credit for two more years and I’ll show you that I can repay it” 
(P1:103-103).   
 The second external factor is bank size:  
“In Colombia, bank credits are still very common, but the financial sector is very 
small. If you have a company with a debt of COP [Colombian peso] 500,000 
million, approximately USD 200 million, which for many banks abroad is not a 
significant figure, here in Colombia you need a 10-bank syndicate to finance it. 
Since the market is so small, companies tend to depend on the most important 
banks, and banks have a lot of power. If they know that one of them changed the 
terms of a client, or demands payment instead of refinancing, or does not lend to 
that client anymore, then all the other banks are going to do the same, and that 
company is no longer going to have any financing in this country” (P14:32-32). 
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4.3.4 Private equity fund giving up control 
Food, one of the companies in the study, chose a private investment fund to 
finance itself at a certain point in time, and somehow gave up control via a shareholders’ 
agreement where most of the important decisions were left to the fund. In the following 
section, the internal family factors that influenced that decision are examined, as well as 
the consequences of having chosen this type of financing. 
Table 11. Private Equity Fund giving up control 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
Influence of family dynamics on Equity Funds Influence of Equity Funds on family dynamics 
Family Dynamics 
Lack of confidence from the 
patriarch to run the business by 
himself influences the decision to 
bring in a fund 




Succession, strengthen the skills of 
new generations 
P7:024-024 Minimum contribution of knowhow 
from the fund produces family stress 
P7:029-
029 
    Conflicts of interest between the 















Open mind to accept investors P26:83-83     
Family reputation. Attracts 
investment funds 
P23: P.12     
    Reputation. Having top of the line 
companies as allies brings reputation 




Lack of trust from the first 
generation towards the second 
generation 
P7:029-029 Intergenerational conflict. Founders 
want to continue participating, but 
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4.3.4.1 Private Equity Fund giving up control and family dynamics 
In one sample company, Lunch, the death of a patriarch and a lack of confidence 
in the second generation’s readiness to step into the leadership void the death created led 
the remaining patriarch to bring in a private equity fund; the hope was that doing so 
would improve management and help the company achieve better financial results.  
While the arrival of the fund does bring positive effects for the family, strengthening the 
trust and improving communication between family members, the different investment 
perspective between the family and the fund also produces negative effects in the family. 
A clear conflict of interest between the family vision and that of the fund became 
apparent, and resulted in bringing in an external manager. BL recalls the evolution of 
events: 
“Normally, in the course of my father’s business life, despite him being the 
visionary, the one who structured deals, the one who saw potential and took the 
decision to enter or not, he was always accompanied in some way by his brother 
who, unfortunately, died.  His death left a void in my father’s head that 
unconsciously turned into a lack of confidence to continue running the business 
directly, and suddenly turned into an incentive to diversify the risk, because he 
didn’t have the reins of the administrative management “(P7:024.024).  “… 
confidence came back when the outsiders arrived to propose the deal, due to the 
two reasons that I mention: diversify risk, and the arrival of professionals to run 
the business. This gave my father peace of mind. What you don’t realize at that 
moment is that those private funds have financial expertise, but operation-wise 
they bring little or nothing” (P7:029-029). “…From the beginning we realized 
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that the investment perspectives were different. We, as a family, thought more in 
the long-term, sustainability, our clients, our employees, they thought about 
figures and returns” (P7:031-031). “…I moved to the Family Office, and we 
brought in an external manager” (P7:033-033).  
According to an advisor to Lunch, “BL’s exit from the company management didn’t 
produce major problems in the sense that for the family, it was better that he steps aside 
because his double role as shareholder and manager, having a fund as partner, and other 
additional partners, was not a convenient situation. It was a relief for everyone when that 
situation happened” (P4:98-98). 
On a positive note, the family who had been distant in a certain way, now 
becomes closer and there is cohesion as a result of the arrival of the fund:  
” This situation brought us closer; we realized how such difference in perspective 
should bring us closer as a family. My father gave me his full support in this. It 
brought us much closer than what we used to be before the Fund came in... Then, 
all family members became more allies in trying to design a strategy that was 
convenient for the business in general, but also for the interests of the family” 
(P7:036-036).  
The effect of bringing in the fund was then the unity of the family, although the 
patriarch is still convinced that he can continue running the business as he did before the 
arrival of the fund: 
“Unity came as a result of having to talk and discuss often what was happening. 
We have our discussions with my father because he thinks the family is still 
running the company.  They demand results from us without realizing that our 
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hands are tied, we can no longer manage the company because that role is now 
performed by a third party. I cannot give orders to the managers’ subordinates. 
That is impossible. That shade of grey has not been understood by my father; he 
cannot digest it because he wants to solve the problems that he sees, but we 
cannot act directly. We have to go to the General Manager and make these 
observations, and maybe the results cannot be seen as fast as my father would like 
(P7:086-086). 
4.3.4.2 Private equity fund giving up control and values 
     AM from the Mortgage family believes it important to have an open mind to receive 
capital investments and grow the business as needed.  “There may come a time when our 
family loses the control” says AM, “and we have to open up this, receive people and have 
the capital to undertake big projects that we have not been able to do so far.”  (P26:83-
83). Moreover, having an important and well-known investment fund increases the 
reputation.  “In 2007, after analyzing several investment options in Colombia,” AM 
recalls, “a very prestigious international firm looked proactively for Mortgage, and at 
that moment decided to buy 49.7% of the holding company. For us it was as if you were 
invited to the White House, or as if you receive the news that your daughter is going to 
marry the prince of England” (P23: P.12). 
4.3.5 Private equity not giving up control  
Several companies in the sample have brought in private investment funds and 
retain control of their companies without giving it up to the fund. This case includes 
Cash, Mortgage, and Bricks. As in previous cases, there are some internal family and 
business factors that influence the decision to have a private investment fund in the 
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capital structure of the company, but in this case, the fund does not acquire control of the 
company. Within the internal factors mentioned are family dynamics, values, and the 
generations that influence the decision making process. Likewise, it can be seen how 
making this decision affects family dynamics.  
Table 12. Private Equity Fund not giving up control 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
Influence of family dynamics on Equity Funds Influence of Equity Funds on family 
dynamics 
Family Dynamics 
Fear of debt leads the family to 
desire a fund as an investor 
P21:053-053     
Family aware of risks wants to 
diversify its shareholding 
P22:053-053     
Family cohesion to make 




Exit mechanisms make the family 







    A partner’s crisis forces the family to 
accept 100% of a debt risk, when 
their shareholding is only 50% 
P16:5
4 
    A majority shareholder made the 
family negotiate the sale price 
causing a division 
P33:3
73 
    High degree of emotional stress in 
the decision making process 
P20:1
76 
Family accepts the Fund at a 
company level, not at the holding 
company level, for fear of losing 
control 
P25:77     
Values 
Prestige and experience of the 
firm and the family attract 
investors 





  Pride and commitment P3:04
2-042 
    Partners with ill-reputation or bad 
behavior damage the company and 
expose it to a loss of prestige 
P16:2
1-21 
    Funds interested in a quick return 
offer little knowhow. This produces 
angst in the family 
P28:9
9-99 
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The Fund is accepted when the 
family is well-organized 
P21:49     
    Short-term vision of the Fund 




New generations prefer allies 
more than partners 
P7:57-58     
INTERNAL BUSINESS FACTORS 
Funds bring in a different culture 
that contradicts the local one 
P20:176   
Growth required new capital P22:053-053     
    Turn the Fund into a strategic ally P21:0
53-
053 










    Bring in knowhow, expertise P31:0
34-
034 
    Change the business vision P57:1
13-
113 




    Access to additional credit P3:04
0-040 
    National and international guarantee P3:04
0-040 
    Acquisition of other partners P10:1
29-
129 
    Funds with long-term vision favored 
diversification, strengthening, and 
autonomy 
P3:40 
    Business becomes professional P25:1
35-
135 
    Better option than IPO in terms of 
control, diversification, and 




4.3.5.1 Private equity fund not giving up control and family dynamics 
The family’s fear of debt leads to the arrival of a fund. The family feels uneasy in 
regards to leverage, and a way to grow without leverage is with the entrance of a private 
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investment fund. This can be deduced from a comment made by a member of a family 
who decided to include a private equity fund as a company shareholder, in spite of the 
differences in vision between the family and the fund:  
“In 2013, it was decided that to comply with the vision and the strategic focus, it 
was necessary to obtain an amount of capital higher than the one available from 
the family and the company. It was not deemed convenient to increase the level of 
debt so we started looking for a strategic partner... Then an important percentage 
was sold to an Equity Fund... Thus, they are our partners in one of the 
businesses” (P21:053-053).  
The family did not want more debt, but it traded the concern of additional debt for 
the tension of a different vision. “It doesn’t mean that because we have a partner with a 
short-term vision there isn’t any tension between the short and the long-term. It’s 
inevitable, but the family didn’t want any more debt. We could’ve continued growing in a 
moderate way, but the family wanted to grow at a faster rhythm, so we needed new 
capital. The organization made the decision fully aware that there were very clear 
threats” (P22:053-053). Additionally, investment funds many times bring in “expertise,” 
and that fund member” expertise” is valued by the family. And while the business vision 
may have a more short-term focus, the fund brings peace of mind for the family as a 
result of not having more debt:  
“The business vision changes, but behind that short-term vision there are studies 
that have helped us… those studies have been carried out by the member of the 
Board who comes from the fund, reassuring us in regards to the figures. 
Obviously, debts generate a lot of concern for families because they feel that they 
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can no longer sleep peacefully at night, because a debt is a debt, and the fund 
reassures us with its capitalization” (P9:113-113). 
In the case of a fund investing in a family company, there should have in place an 
exit strategy for the fund at the end of the agreement, with which the family is at ease. 
For example, a possible exit might be a flotation on the stock exchange: 
 “When dealing with private equity funds, exit strategies are important... Exit 
mechanisms have to be very clear to the partners, conditions, criteria, price... In 
deals with foreigners we have formulas and criteria, the way in which the 
investment is valued. That prevents conflicts... For us, the exit mechanism is also 
important, so when it happens there will be a flotation, and if they want to 
continue they can, but our exit mechanism is already decided, how much did I 
earn, and good-bye” (P26: 114-114). 
In addition, the fund might be limited to investing in one of the operating companies, not 
at the family holding company level, as mentioned below: 
“The family is open to the arrival of a fund. That’s why we decided to bring in a 
private equity fund. From the beginning, it implied that we had to be comfortable 
with their eventual exit. As long as what is floated is a company below the holding 
company, the family has no problem, [and] there are certain advantages” 
(P25:073-073). 
The arrival of a fund also supposes a common understanding among family 
shareholders, and in this particular case where there is an external manager with a 
shareholding in the company, a common understanding between this external manager 
and the family, as was the case at Cash: 
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“We arrived at the conclusion that we had to give them a participation without 
ever giving up the majority. They didn’t think about having it either. There is a lot 
in the shareholders’ agreement between Cash and AC. We need to continue 
together, that is part of the subject.” (P3:042-042). 
The Brick family also describes the common understanding among family 
shareholders, and the way this common understanding was achieved: 
“In order to sign the protocol stating that the fund alternative was validated by 
most of the family, we had to discuss it for a long time. I would say it was 
discussed during 2 or 3 years. It matured. Looking at the company’s strategic 
plans, we considered that it was convenient for its growth. We agreed that the 
company should grow, and to do it we needed external capital. It wasn’t enough 
to acquire debt or risk the company’s financial health, then we had to look for 
capital, and that is why we made the decision that we made” (P21:068-068). 
BC adds that the arrival of the fund has represented a source of pride for the 
family, that the work carried out to bring in the fund was very big, and that the family 
feels satisfied at what the private fund thinks about them after the relationship they have 
had so far:  
“... and then they were the ones who came, so it was a source of pride for us; even 
more, what we showed them during the year were our skills and what we had 
achieved, and they realized it. It’s an acknowledgement of our work, that’s why I 
say it’s an issue of pride, and then the challenge of doing the deal. One thing is 
“they approached us. Now, close the deal” (P3:042-042). 
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Becoming formal is another effect on the business and the family. “In fact, the 
biggest decision we have ever taken in regards to the capital structure has been the arrival 
of the fund. It has been an important step, from the perspective of owners, to provide a 
higher level of demand, of professionalization, to the family and to the company” 
(P25:135-135). The arrival of a private equity firm fostered discussion and 
implementation of more formal structures important to guiding and building the business 
including “... a family commitment to a very clear and defined corporate government 
where things are supremely transparent...Then, the Corporate Government has helped us 
a lot, even to become more formal as a family. Additionally, ...it is a seal of seriousness, 
of sustainability, of transparency, not all companies have that, and if we have the fund 
inside it’s a way of saying that it is a company that’s doing things right. It has also given 
us the possibility to access additional credits...” (P3:040-040). 
 Additionally, the partnership with the fund has benefits in terms of acquiring 
other partners. Said one interviewee, “The fund has more than 20 companies like this 
worldwide, we are the “jewel in the crown” in terms of the way we have been working 
and adding more partners to our company” (P10:129-129). 
4.3.5.2 Private equity fund not giving up control and values 
Cohesion: 
“I would say the decision was always made by consensus. Something that has 
distinguished us is the capacity to generate consensus. We’ve never voted, 
although there is the possibility of doing so. These are decisions made by 
consensus” (P21:72-72). 
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4.3.5.3 Private equity fund not giving up control and generational aspects 
According to one interviewee, in hindsight, some of the new generations 
would’ve preferred an ally that contributed more than just capital: 
“I wish one could find professional corporate allies that have knowledge of the 
business, that can contribute something more besides capital, maybe knowledge, 
relations, or whatever, but that contribute a bit more and could be more stable in 
the long-term” (P7:57-58). 
4.3.6 Partnerships giving up control 
The arrival of a partner and giving up control supposes some premises on the part 
of the family; for example, that the partners will contribute more than just capital, i.e. 
knowledge, relations, stability, and an increase in the value of the company. Some 
internal factors contribute to the partnership between some of the companies in the 
sample and other companies, be they family or similar that contribute to the development 
of the strategic plan of said companies. As in the previous cases, family dynamics and 
values were observed as were some internal factors that were related to the deals. 
Table 13. Partnership giving up control 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
Influence of family dynamics on Alliances Influence of Alliances on family dynamics 
Family Dynamics 
When there is family unity it is 
easier to get allies. It ensures 
continuity 
P26:033-033 Align with the partner’s culture P35:091-
091  
Family needs complementarity 
with other partners 
P35:081-081  Family learning  P6:050-
050 




Bad family relationships and lack 
of interest in the company 
P26:033-033 
P35:079-079 
 Family discipline  P6:050-
050 
Values 
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Cultural diversity from the 




Open mind as a condition to 
receive new allies 
P34:053-053     
Company and family reputation to 
create trust before the partners 
P26:35-35 
P21:130-130 
    
Compatible values P21:130-130     
INTERNAL BUSINESS FACTORS 
Search for capital, knowledge, 
relations, and stability 
contributions, and a value increase 
P55:058-058 Alliances contribute knowhow, value 
and growth to the business 
P35:081-
081 
Positioning, contact network are 
offered to allies 
P21:130-130     
4.3.6.1 Partnership giving up control and family dynamics 
The arrival of a partner and giving up control supposes some premises on the part 
of the family; for example, they may expect that the partners contribute more than just 
capital, i.e., knowledge, relations, stability, and an increase in the value of the company. 
As one of the interviewees says, “One can find professional corporate allies who have 
knowledge of the business, that can contribute something more besides capital, maybe 
knowledge, relations, or whatever, but that contribute a bit more and can be stable in the 
long-term” (P7:058-058).  And in the case of a multinational as an ally of Whole, “We 
bet on the multinational to provide us with their know-how, and to help us improve all 
aspects of our company, and to value our company more. With that capital we started our 
own development, growing in terms of stores, buying land, and building facilities” 
(P35:081-081). 
In addition, other factors may influence the decision to seek a partner. These may 
include, for example, a bad family relationship, lack of interest, or lack of sense of 
belonging to the company. AM states, “If tomorrow we fight again, we are going to 
destroy the business, let’s take advantage of this situation to find a partner, we thought” 
(P26:033-033). And BW of Whole states:  
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“For them (the second generation) the company becomes secondary. It is 
considered more as an investment; how much dividend is it paying; how much is 
its value going to increase in the future, because for many family members the 
goal was to increase its value and sell. They did not have any impact on the 
company, they were not on the Board of Directors, and they did not make any 
decisions. The different family groups thought only about the value of the 
company in the mid-term and that’s why they wanted a partner, to increase the 
value of the company” (P35:079-079). 
But to have an ally means to align yourself with the partner’s culture, and for that 
it is necessary to have a previous learning experience about cultural issues. As explained 
by BW, difference of cultures does not make a good match for alliances 
“It wasn’t easy. The issue of cultures is difficult, but the company manager not 
only learned very well the topic of mergers and acquisitions, but also knew how to 
do them, because he had read extensively about the subject. It seems that 
worldwide, in many cases there have been enormous failures due to cultural 
problems in companies, and here we managed to do it, and I believe it was 
successful" (P35:091-091). 
When the AM family decided to find a strategic partner, one of the candidates was 
rejected precisely due to cultural differences. They said, “We thought that the culture of 
our potential partner who wanted to acquire us didn’t fit well with Mortgage’s culture. 
We saw all that, the qualitative aspect” (P34:65-65). On the contrary, family companies’ 
alliances have demonstrated that they give learning, discipline, and internal trust to 
family companies: “…. The alliance process has been very interesting, the change for the 
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family has been amazing in learning and discipline. It has been a learning process for 
us…” (P6:050-050). In the case of Mortgage, the family is more relaxed with the 
partnership: “… all my family is more relaxed with the new partners, we are good and 
serious, but these people have a vision we did not have before. Now we believe we can 
do things in a better way” (P26:057-057). “…. we sleep better with the partners we have” 
(P26: 058-058). 
4.3.6.2 Partnership giving up control and values 
An open mind: “… in the case of AM’s family, all generations involved in the 
business needed to have an open mind as a condition to welcome new partners, be they 
alliances or private investment funds. AM’s father, first generation, didn’t have any 
problems in opening his mind to new possibilities, in spite of his advanced age” 
(P34:053-053). 
Family reputation: The reputation of the Mortgage and Bricks families makes the 
potential partners feel confident enough to enter into the partnerships, as does the cultural 
match between them: 
“One day a representative of an international firm comes knocking on our door. 
It’s as if your daughter married the prince of Denmark, better impossible. These 
gentlemen come and do their due diligence. They check everything personally. I 
tell my siblings that in this type of deals it is not only about the figures adding up. 
They’ve checked our character, and the seriousness of the company, and we have 
passed, because for these investors it is not only the figures but also to know with 
whom they are dealing ... We’re dealing with the Mortgage family, not with 
anyone” (P26:35-35). “Also, the fact that we are a family group with a good 
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reputation, with credibility, with values that match theirs as a family company. 
We also offer a way of being, a way of acting in accordance to what they are, and 
in fact we’ve been partners for more than twenty years. I think it’s because of 
that. We offer them our position here, our network of contacts” (P21:130-130). 
4.3.7 Partnerships not giving up control 
Within the companies analyzed, several of them have entered into partnerships at 
different moments of their lives. In this case, we will see the partnerships where company 
control has not been given up. 
Table 14. Partnership not giving up control 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
Influence of family dynamics in Alliances Influence of Alliances in family dynamics 
Family Dynamics 
Cohesion. Consensus leads to the 
search of a partner 
P21:063-063     
Values 
The family and business culture is 
offered to the partner 
P21:132-132     
The family wants to agree on 
values such as reputation and 
credibility 
P21:130-130     
The family searches for family 
companies that share their values, 





    
Partners have respect for company 
values and for minority 
shareholders’ rights 
P2:20-20     
We take responsibilities, and offer 
compensation to partners 
P2:20-20 
P16:43-43 
    
Open mind and long-term vision 
 
P34:053-053     
Generations 
Third and fourth generation more 
open to new partners 
P21:063-063     
First generations interested in 




    
INTERNAL BUSINESS FACTORS 
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Consider the career path of 
partners and their value 
contribution  
P31:058-058 Knowledge, international 
performance, networks, tax issues 
lead to partnerships 
P31:058
-058 




    Allies made an important 
contribution to the company 
management and perspective 
P35:045
-045 
    A share exchange with a large 
industrial group gave strength to the 





4.3.7.1 Partnership not giving up control and values 
Just as in the previous case where company control is given up in a partnership, 
the family’s culture plays an important role, in addition to their relations and knowhow 
about the business. Being successful with minority shareholders also implies having a 
series of values where they are respected, and where the majority partner also earns the 
respect of the minority partners. Values play an important role in the culture of partners. 
According to AB, “We’ve had an excellent relationship with our partners because we did 
our homework searching for a strategic partner with whom we had an affinity of values” 
(P21:57-57). 
And those values must be compatible, continues AB: 
“Also, the fact that we are a family group with a good reputation, with credibility, 
with values that match theirs as a family company, all this benefits our 
partnerships” (P21:130-130). “…51% of Brick and 49% of a big store 
organization joined forces with an important multinational entrepreneurial 
family. They are family companies that partnered with a Colombian family 
company, and who joined their capital, knowhow, and values. That is the reason 
why we have been able to grow” (P21:027-027). “…We also offer our partners a 
   169 
 
way of being, a way of acting in accordance to what they are, and in fact we’ve 
been partners for more than twenty years. I think it’s because of that. We offer 
them our position here, our network of contacts” (P21:132-132). 
CB agrees, and says, “In regards to the strategic partners, I don´t think it was a difficult 
sale. They saw on one side an alignment in values and in the way we do things, and on 
the other that there was a complementary, added value in what we could offer them. It 
was very evident” (P31:066-066). 
In addition to the partner’s values, there is also the career path, reputation, and 
complementarity.  CB continues, “Besides the partner’s values, we consider the career 
path, reputation, and ability to add value in the business where we operate. We took 
advantage of the fact that our partner added an important value in regards to the local 
context of that country, which is difficult not only culture wise, but in relation to taxation 
which is very complex” (P31:058-058).  
And AH explains: 
“Some very interesting businessmen came to us, successful in the production and 
processing business, a company with many years in the business, very well known 
in the international market, who were interested in having a partner with a strong 
presence in a tropical country in order to complement their product offering” 
(P16:43-43). 
The third and fourth generations of a well- structured family firm supported the 
idea of seeking a partner to fund the company growth in the long run, and in a display of 
strong family cohesion, decisions are taken by consensus of family members to receive 
such a partner: 
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“This wasn’t done out of need; it was a decision well thought by two generations, 
the third and the fourth. We thought in the long-term. We started talking about 
this and in the protocol it was expressly written that part of the shareholding 
could be in the hands of a partner.  It was very important to include it in the 
Protocol. That allowed us to decide at a certain moment in time to go and look for 
a strategic partner. The possibility had become institutionalized. The second 
generation was no longer present” (P21:063-063). 
Mutual respect also figures into a successful working partnership: 
“There hasn’t been any negative impact whatsoever, any difference; they have 
been very comfortable partners, very calm, have completely trusted the way we 
manage the business, and we in turn have also been supremely respectful of their 
minority position. In some cases, when there has been a difficulty due to a 
management mistake, we have compensated them at our own expense. We have 
been very generous partners; we have never applied our majority rights (P2:20-
20). 
4.3.7.2 Partnership not giving up control and generational aspects: 
 “The founders, at the beginning, were interested in having important partners or 
allies. They were more commercial, with the vision of advanced entrepreneurs, 
but they had very important partners such as xx who were the industrial allies... 
Then, Mr. xx had commercial shrewdness, knowhow to manage people, his way of 
coordinating the company, and Mr. xxx, his partner, the ability to implement 
ideas in the companies. It was a very important combination, says CP” (P20: 059-
059). 
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“I don’t think they were closed to the idea of having strategic partners, but they 
had not thought about having financial partners… on the other hand, they wanted 
an added value that was complementary to what we could offer them. In the case 
of xx it was very evident” (P31:066-066). 
The Pater Familiae’s opinion also depends on what he considers as complementary: 
“AM’s father was still alive. He wasn’t in favor of a partnership. He had the 
notion that xx was in a completely different type of business, and had nothing to 
do at Mortgage. The idea of complementarity was sold to him and he accepted it. 
His capacity was already diminished, and he had been formally replaced in the 
company, but he was the Pater Familiae” (P34:053-053). 
In several cases, the second generation tries to forge their own path through 
entrepreneurship. Different generations have different outlooks, vision, and attitudes:  
“The Whole family of the early ‘90’s was much bigger than the one who started 
the company, and already had a second generation visible and active. New voices 
and perspectives started to appear little by little, some of them eager to 
participate with greater influence in corporate decisions, others not so much. 
While some of us never got tired of examining commercial topics in relation to 
Whole, other members of the second generation said they wanted to leave the 
company to create their own business ventures or projects. At the same time, 
many of my uncles were starting to suffer the ravages of time and show the 
exhaustion of many years of hard work. Such is the nature of family companies, in 
which heterogeneous outlooks, ages and attitudes live together (P33:299-299). 
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4.3.8 ESOPs 
Giving shares to some employees as part of their remuneration, as reciprocity for 
managing the companies, or as a way to stand out in society are some of the reasons why 
there are external partners, non-family members, in the capital structure of some of the 
companies analyzed. There are internal factors such as family dynamics, values, and the 
different generations that have influenced the capital structure of some of the companies 
analyzed. In this particular case, in some of the companies there are employees and 
members of the Board of Directors who are partners in the companies. At the same time, 
the fact of having partners who are employees or members of the Board influences the 
dynamics of these families. 
Table 15. ESOPs 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
Influence of family dynamics on ESOPs Influence of ESOP son family dynamics 
Family Dynamics 
Succession. The founder gave 
shares to the company manager so 
he would support his daughters in 
the business 
P3:28-29 Succession: Managing partner 
supports the family in the business 
P3:28-
29 
Gender discrimination on the part 
of the Founder 
P3:028-029     
Founder’s lack of confidence: give 
shares to important individuals so 
they would help with the corporate 
government 
P9:123-123     
Values 
Prestige: For the founders to give 
shares to important members of 
Colombian society and to personal 
friends is a source of prestige for 
the family and the company 
P3:32-32     
Trust and Respect. From the 
beginning, friends and partners 
accept the leadership of the family 
based on trust 
P26:33 
P34:45 





Founders give shares to regional 
directors 
P6:36-36  
Partners remain for a long time 
P6:36-
36 
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New generations from technology 
companies are more inclined to 
offer shares as part of an 
employee’s compensation plan 
P28:115 The fact that older generations do not 
accept giving shares as  
compensation affects the relationship 




4.3.8.1 ESOPs and family dynamics 
The process of succession for management positions and prestige for the family 
and the company are two elements that are decisive in family dynamics to explain why a 
percentage of shares are in the hands of third parties in some of the family companies in 
the sample. For example, the need for the family to stand out in society led the founder to 
have some important partners. As a result, minority shareholdings were given to 
important members of Colombian society, and even to personal friends, with the aim of 
bringing prestige to the family company and to the family. CC comments:  
“There were some small shareholders in our family company. When my father 
founded CASH, he would give shares to important people in order to bring 
prestige to the company and to the family, and he did the same with the boards of 
directors. In fact, even former presidents of the country were here as 
shareholders. That’s what my father was looking for: prestige for the family and 
for the company. There were some friends of my father, but in very small 
percentages. We bought their shares afterwards” (P3:32-32). 
In regards to the dynamics of succession, there are some comments that reveal 
some of the reasons why a father decided to bring the company manager into the capital 
structure of the company. There is the cultural issue of sexism, and the way the founder 
wanted to protect his children, all of them daughters: 
“That’s part of my father’s history. He always searched for someone to be his 
second in command. Somehow, not having sons, this is my interpretation because 
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I never asked about it; I imagine that as a male entrepreneur, he didn’t want the 
business that he was leaving to be run by us, women. We were not men, and it was 
also a way of protecting us, I think, he managed both issues, and all my life since 
I can remember he was always looking for ’my second in command.’ Then, he 
tried and hired Pedro, but he was not good enough; then he hired Juan, didn’t 
work as well, until he finally found Pablo…. and since my father was the 
manager, he would hire them as assistant managers, they didn’t talk about 
presidents at that time. Then, he found AC and my father thought he was the most 
suitable one, and that is the reason he is a company shareholder now” (P3:028-
029). 
And the manager of Cash adds: 
 “... Many years ago, the founder decided he needed to give some shareholding to 
businessmen and important members of society, and of the country to help him 
promote his business. He ended up giving out a minority shareholding, I could be 
wrong, but I think it was probably 6 or 7%. He brought them into the Board of 
Directors. That was his first experience in regards to opening the capital 
structure, a very valuable experience. He did it with the aim of expanding his 
business, of having people who could help the organization through the Board of 
Directors...” (P9:123-123). 
 4.3.8.2 ESOPs and values 
According to BM, trust and respect have been built with the founding partners, 
and has been maintained since the company’s beginning:  
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“Mortgage is a partnership with a large number of shareholders, including 
traditional friends and family, and the latter control the company. They have 
oriented and managed this company successfully to the point that other friends 
and family happily accept and support this leadership without any controversy 
(P34:23-23). “…Shareholders’ meetings are pleasant and quick because the 
shareholders approve the management. The same founding families from 60 years 
ago are still shareholders” (P26:33-33). “…At a Mortgage subsidiary, the 
holding company is the most important shareholder, but not the dominant one. 
Nevertheless, by consensus, by acceptance, the other shareholders have delegated 
the management leadership to the holding company even if it doesn’t have the 
majority” (P34:45-45). 
4.3.7.3 ESOPs and generational aspects 
The first generation gives shares to individuals who manage the company in 
different locations: 
“Generally, there was someone on the way who was going to manage the business 
in that location. He had been given a shareholding. In other locations it was my 
father. From the beginning he was with my uncle, then it was our turn; we started 
to receive company shares” (P6:036-036). 
The second generation might think differently than the first generation, and in any 
case, the thoughts of members from this generation are also different. For example, BS 
from the second generation states:  
“I have employees who have relatives working at Apple, and they receive shares. 
That is a decision from the Board of Directors. My perception is that some people 
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have more influence than others. They are older people and those who don’t want 
to complicate themselves; they always find a negative example to knock 
everything down” (P28:115-115). 
And another member of the second generation comments: 
“I think the company nor the family would be willing today to create a stock 
option as in the US. Phantom stock might be the way out, I wouldn´t have much of 
a problem. Some family members who do not work in our company, but in 
technology companies promote that scheme which looks natural to them. They are 
young and advise us to do so since it creates incentives. We who have spent years 
here want to slow down. We know that it is an issue that starts out in the company 
technology division and services, and starts knocking on the door, but we have not 
discussed it thoroughly yet” (P27:33-33).  
4.3.9 Internal financing 
Internal financing refers to capitalization through the retained earnings of a 
company which has a low distribution of dividends. 
Table 16. Internal Financing 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
Influence of family dynamics on Internal 
Financing 
Influence of Internal Financing on family 
dynamics 
Family Dynamics 
When family members are 
financially independent from the 
family company they are more 
willing to receive less dividends 
P82:109-109 
P78:44-44 
    
Cohesion. Decision by consensus 
on the percentage of dividends to 
be distributed. Not reduce the 




If dividends are not distributed, and 
all profits are reinvested in the 
company, this creates family 
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Lack of cohesion leads to 
prioritizing the distribution of 
profits leaving company 
capitalization on a second place 
P35:79-79 Financial cohesion. If there are 
dividends, unity is easier 
P28:29-
29 
Commitment. The sustainability 
and well-being of the company 
prevail over personal interests 
P21:88-88     
Values 
Family’s Sense of Social 
Responsibility. Employee salary 
increase meant postponing 
dividend payments 
P22:27-27     
Frugality, focus on working and 
saving money for a good quality 
of life in old age. Capitalization, 




    
Reinvest and be united even if 
there are better rate of return 
offers in the market 
P28:21-21     
Generations 
First generations saw results, not 
dividends, and they capitalized 
everything. Second generation 
starts to see dividends 
P11:109-109 
P6:080-080 
    
New generations educated abroad 
lose identity and participation, 
there is no social or financial 
capital investment  
P2:74-74     
 
INTERNAL BUSINESS FACTORS 
Stop payment of dividends until 
EBITDA stabilizes and debt level 
decreases, and capitalize 
P68:78-78     
 
4.3.9.1 Internal financing and family dynamics  
The subject of company financing with the internal resources of the same 
organization depends in good measure on the family’s commitment to the company and 
on family cohesion, as stated by some of the interviewees. First, it is worth mentioning 
what AB says in regards to making the decision about dividends:  
“The family has never ’milked’ the company to finance its lifestyle.  By consensus, 
the family established a Family Protocol. According to it, every year we meet in a 
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Family Assembly, where all family members older than 18 participate. We are 
talking about shareholders and non-shareholders. At this Assembly, we decide 
what percentage of profits is going to be distributed as dividends, according to 
the company’s cash flow” (P21:051-051).  
And the same family adds: 
“When the dividend issue is discussed in the Assembly there is no voting because 
it has already been well digested and recommended by the Board of Directors, 
and supported by the Family Council. Thus, there is a solid consensus from the 
people who are most involved with the company and the family council” 
(P31:042-042).  
In difficult times, the family’s commitment to the company prevails when 
deciding about the reinvestment of profits: 
“When we had to make the decision to freeze dividends it was a very difficult 
decision. That was around 2009 when global conditions were very difficult. There 
was a global crisis. We had made wrong decisions. A very expensive plant was set 
up and it didn’t turn out to be productive. Debt indicators went through the roof 
and reached very dangerous levels” (P21:088-088). “Obviously, the family 
reaction in the Assembly was of concern and uncertainty about the future, but 
they also accepted the proposal from the Board of Directors to stop dividend 
payments for a year in order to stabilize the EBITDA and reduce the level of 
debt” (P25:078-078). 
BB from Brick emphasizes the positive aspects for the family and for the 
employees of stopping the distribution of profits: 
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“… …continue supporting the organization. When the crisis of 2008 hit us, if I’m 
not mistaken, a decision was taken to send out a compelling message of the 
family’s commitment and responsibility to the organization. Everyone working for 
the organization had their salary frozen, without a raise due to the crisis. The 
family decided to cut dividends by half for a year. This powerful message made 
clear that the family’s commitment to the organization is for the long term. But 
…this was a winning sacrifice” (P22:027-027). 
However, when the family’s commitment to the business is low, and there is no 
sense of belonging to the company, the financial aspect of the dividends becomes the 
only factor of cohesion, and may be the only incentive that the family has to continue in 
the company. The latter is seen only as an investment, and then, reinvesting the company 
profits is not even considered: 
“The company was considered more as an investment; how much dividend is it 
paying; how much is its value going to increase in the future, because for many 
family members the goal was to increase its value and sell. They did not have any 
impact on the company, they were not on the Board of Directors, and they did not 
make any decisions. To reinvest was not even a consideration” (P35:079-079). 
When the family does not need the dividends to make a living, it is easier to think 
about the company’s internal capitalization, as is the case of the family who owns 
Energy: 
“None of us makes a living from the company except the two that work there, but 
they don’t receive dividends; it is their job and they make a living from their 
salary. We are all professionals, and many of us have business training, so I think 
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it is different in regards to the distribution of dividends and the company’s 
internal capitalization” (P15:109-109). 
As CG from Gown states, there is a tremendous pressure from the family on company 
directors for the distribution of dividends:  
“If the company isn’t doing well and dividends are not paid, there is a risk of 
having a weight on your shoulders, especially if there are non-family partners...., 
and this pressure is very strong for us managers, due to the lack of cohesion it 
generates within the family if dividends are not paid as usual” (P14:066-066). 
To prevent family stress due to the non-payment of dividends, the president of 
one of the companies in the sample, School, established that dividends have to be 
maintained no matter what, because to stop them when the family has a high standard of 
living is very complicated. Thus, if the company cannot pay then there has to be another 
way to do it:  
“I have found a series of retail spaces that are rented and produce an income, 
separate from the company, so I can tell the family members that I am giving them 
their dividends from the family company, according to the usual philosophy, and 
that philosophy we are not going to change” (P27:044-044). 
And, he continues: 
 “The company’s financial results were very poor for many years, a very high 
level of debt, and that situation in any family business wouldn’t work, because it 
produces fights, and when those fights escalate they take a different path. It 
usually ends in a lawyer’s office. Not here. The formula that we have would have 
been a great problem in any other family. There is always the family member who 
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is loud, but who can be controlled with a dividend check. The problem starts when 
there is no such check” (P28:29-29). 
The topic of capital becomes complicated in closed family companies where 
growth depends in good measure on the reinvestment of profits:   
 “Historically, since the company has always belonged to the family and is not 
open to external investors, then the subject of capital becomes more complex. We 
have had to reinvest most of the company profits to finance its growth, and have 
never asked the partners for money. Instead, we have told them “I’m not going to 
give you a huge amount of dividends because most of what the company produces 
it’s going to remain here to finance its growth” (P27:9-9). 
4.3.9.2 Internal financing and values 
Frugality and lifestyle create a mindset of hard work in the family, and of saving 
for future generations. On interviewee says: 
“I don’t know what follows from here on. With our children, we tell them that they 
have to work, save, and capitalize. For me it’s very hard to see so many people 
that were close to my father, and who had a good standard of living when they 
were young, now going through hard times in their old age, really ugly hard 
times. Your old age should be the same or even better than your youth. It’s 
important to save to cover the needs that come with old age and to be able to live 
with peace of mind...” (P6:111-111). 
And, at Mortgage, a member of the Board of Directors says: 
“The dividend distribution policy has been very conservative, and thanks to this 
they have been able to amass a great fortune. This policy wasn’t only from AM’s 
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father and the other relatives in the company. Everyone had the same vision. By 
distributing very little dividend, and capitalizing most of the profits they have 
arrived where they are today. We maintain the same policy at present” (P34:27-
27).  
And AM adds: 
“Besides the COP500,000 that the partners contributed initially when the 
company started, there has never been the need to increase capital; everything we 
have is the result of reinvesting profits. And that amount was agreed by the initial 
shareholders who didn’t have enough means. I’m also an advocate of saving” 
(P26:82-82). 
4.3.9.3 Internal financing and generational aspects 
First generation: “Before, when my father was alive, we knew that it was the family’s 
equity, but we only saw the results directly, not the dividends” (P11:109-109). 
Second generation: “At Energy, since there are external partners there has been a 
distribution of dividends. Let’s say that the second generation has seen real dividends in 
the past decade, or less.” (P6:080-080).  
4.3.10 Asset shedding 
In some cases, families have opted to sell some assets to finance growth and 
capitalize their companies. Other times, the growth of some companies comes from the 
sale of subsidiary companies. 
Table 17. Asset Shedding 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
Influence of family dynamics in the sale of assets Influence of the sale of assets on family dynamics 
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Family Dynamics 
    Succession. Sale of fixed assets to 
pay for succession expenses 
P13:161-
161 
    Sale of assets causes a family crisis, 
but returns as benevolence and 




    Sale of assets pays a high debt. 
Family feels sadness, but relief at the 
same time 
P11:79-79 
    Long-term vision. Keep resources as 
a war chest 
P26:55-55 
INTERNAL BUSINESS FACTORS 
    Growth. The sale of low return fixed 
assets finances company expansion 
P1:47-47 
    Some businesses are capitalized with 
the sale of others 
P15:21-21 
 
4.3.10.1 Asset shedding and family dynamics 
The sale of non-core assets is mentioned sometimes as in the case of Food, when 
it is not acceptable to sell a shareholding, or when bank debts become complicated: 
 “It is not attractive for shareholders to sell 20% or 30% of the company for such 
multiples. It is preferable to eventually liquidate some fixed assets which at the 
moment have a low return on investment, and in that way free some capital to 
maintain the investment rhythm, and use these resources for the acquisition of fixed 
assets with a higher rate of return such as real estate” (P1:047-047). 
The sale of family assets to decrease debt and grow brings sadness, but at the same time 
relief because they are now able to pay the debt. “Making painful decisions like selling 
external assets, which have been built over the years, in order to have peace of mind in 
the future and reduce debt levels. We are synchronized in that this is part of the solution 
(P11:079-079). 
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It is painful as well in the case of a succession: ”I have seen many borrowing, 
pledging what they are going to receive in order to be able to pay the cost of dismantling 
the succession assets. It is more an issue of bank credit or sale of assets. Funeral costs are 
very high, and medical treatment for terminal illness, and if there is no health insurance, 
heirs suffer very much…” (P13:161-161). 
The option of giving some family assets to the bank as part of a debt payment can 
cause a family crisis, according to the president of the board of directors of one of the 
companies, but at the same time, it is given back as benevolence and respect towards 
siblings: 
“I suspect that AM’s brother wanted to hand over the company to the bank, and 
AM didn’t want to. If it is true, since AM’s thesis won, all the more so, there is 
benevolence on the part of AM towards his brother, and on the part of the 
brother, there is respect towards AM. As a result of this disagreement, one of the 
brothers left the company and caused a serious family crisis” (P34:131-131). 
Simply because it is a family company, a business may be capitalized with the 
sale of or results from other businesses. In one interviewee’s opinion, “The company has 
been capitalized with income from the real estate business. This wouldn’t happen if it 
weren’t a family company” (P15:21-21). 
4.3.10.2 Asset shedding and values 
With the income from the sale of assets or of some of the companies, the family 
can take a long term view, and have those funds at their disposal for the future expansion 
or growth of the company: 
   185 
 
“I always told these gentlemen that my aspiration was not moving to Paris. I said 
that we should leave that money abroad, even more with the devaluation that we 
have in Colombia. That money is there to be used for acquisitions. Our partners 
know that we have that money to support our future growth” (P26:55-55). 
4.3.11 Trade Financing 
This type of non-bank financing which allows companies to negotiate payment 
terms of 30, 60 or 90 days with their suppliers is a common practice, because then there 
is no need to allocate so many permanent resources (own funds) and long term debts to 
finance the productive cycle.   
Table 18. Trade Financing 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
Influence of family dynamics on Trade Financing Influence of Trade Financing on family 
dynamics 
Family Dynamics 
We have important credit lines with 
our main suppliers due to the good 
reputation of the family who runs 
the business  
P2:32-32 When there was a fire, the suppliers 
show their solidarity to the family 
and helped them rebuild the 
business. They showed the level of 
trust and respect that the company 




We are good payers. We are not the 
company that delays payment 
thinking “since the supplier doesn’t 
cost, then make him wait.” In 
difficult times we talk to our 
suppliers, and delay payment just a 
little bit  
P6:66-66     
Paying on time and being 
accountable has resulted in 
discounts for prompt payment from 
our suppliers 
P8:34-34     
A principle from our organization is 
to pay suppliers before the due date 
P20:118-
118 
    
When there is trust there is no need 
for letters of credit or payment 
against delivery. We pay 30-60-90. 
P20:126-
126 
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We even receive goods on 
consignment 
The organization has built a 
reputation with suppliers of being a 
serious company. They feel at ease 




    
INTERNAL BUSINESS FACTORS 
In the retail business, suppliers 
credit is common; in the industrial 
sector it is different 
      
During the economic crisis, those 
suppliers that we paid in 30 days, 
on time, we had to delay their 
payment to 90 days  
P1:103-103     
Suppliers’ credit in our case is very 
expensive because we import goods 
and equipment. Foreign exchange 
risk is very high; thus we prefer to 
be cautious in our use of this type 
of credit 
P2:34-34     
With suppliers we take advantage 
of seasonality, low exchange rates, 
and we pay with bank credit. Those 
are specific requirements 
P2:36-36     
We try to obtain the best terms, to 
the extent that it’s possible, but 
mainly the best discounts for 
prompt payment 
P4:20-20     
Importers that finance themselves 
with suppliers’ credit in US dollars 
have great risks 
P8:33-33     
Factoring is an expensive method of 
financing with suppliers 
P12:81-81     
Some companies have their own 
business to do factoring with 
suppliers. In addition to paying 
later, they pay 90 instead of 100.  
P14:31-31     
At the beginning, profits only came 
from the discount given by 
suppliers. They sold at factory 
prices and made a profit from the 
wholesale discounts  
P32:17-17     
 
4.3.11.1 Trade financing and family dynamics 
Suppliers are important stakeholders in organizations, and a relationship of trust is 
built with them through time facilitating the company’s liquidity, better prices, provision 
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quotas, and above all, a financial cushion in case of financial difficulties. They are a 
source of non-banking funding with important players in the market, as explained by CE 
of Energy who says, “We don’t have multilateral credits; we have very generous bank 
credit lines and only use a fraction of them; we also have very important credit lines with 
our main suppliers” (P2:32-32). 
The relationship with suppliers is symbiotic. When there is a crisis and the 
relationship is well-established and based on trust and reciprocal collaboration, then 
suppliers will provide real support to the company, as stated by AW from Whole: 
“When there was a fire, our suppliers showed their solidarity with the family and 
the company and help to rebuild the business. They showed the level of trust and 
respect that the company had amongst the public at the time” (P33:130-130). 
4.3.11.2 Trade financing and values 
Being accountable and honoring payment agreements refuels the good 
relationship with suppliers. As stated by AE of Energy: 
“We are good payers. We are not the company that delays payment thinking 
’since the supplier doesn’t cost, then make him wait.’ In difficult times we talk to 
our suppliers, and delay our payments just a little bit” (P6:66-66). “…Paying on 
time and being accountable has resulted in discounts for prompt payment from 
our suppliers” (P8:34-34). 
To suppliers, paying on time or before the due date shows the culture of the organization. 
CP of Parts says,” A principle from our organization is to pay suppliers before the due 
date” (P20:118-118).  
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Accountability and trust are reciprocal values. A relationship of trust visibly 
reduces the use of control mechanisms and loan guarantees, as observed by CP of Parts, 
who says, “When there is trust, there is no need for letters of credit or payment against 
delivery. We pay 30-60-90. We even receive goods on consignment” P20:126-126. 
Accountability and trust also build the prestige of the organization.  An interviewee says 
that suppliers prefer this type of client because “The organization has built a reputation 
with suppliers of being a serious company. They feel at ease and prefer that we owe them 
money” (P20:132-132). 
4.3.11.3 Trade financing and internal business factors 
Even though suppliers’ credit provides liquidity to companies, it also has its risks, 
amongst which are the exchange rate fluctuations in the case of imports of supplies and 
equipment. CE from Energy states, “With suppliers we take advantage of seasonality, 
low exchange rates, and we pay with bank credit. They are specific requirements” 
(P2:36-36). And in the same sense, BE points out, “Importers that finance themselves 
with suppliers’ credit in dollars run very high risks” (P8:33-33). 
Some companies add Factoring to their suppliers’ credit, obtaining an extension in 
the payment terms and a discount when buying the same invoices that it issues to its 
suppliers. CG of Gown says, “They are financing themselves with suppliers, because 
instead of paying them 100 they pay 90, thus decreasing their liabilities, and instead of 
borrowing 10 from the bank, they decrease it by financing themselves with the supplier” 
(P14:31-31). 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
     The previous chapter presented the results produced by this research, and therefore, 
the interviewees “talked” without being influenced by the existing literature. In this 
chapter, I explore, first, the affinity of this research with concepts from grounded theory; 
second, I discuss how the interview results illustrate how internal and external factors 
influence the capital structure of the companies and vice versa and how these factors are 
debated in the extant literature with a clear application to this research; then, I compare 
and extend the findings; and third, I reveal the practical application of this research. 
Finally, I explain the limitations of this work and suggest new courses of action for future 
research. 
5.1 Affinity of this research with grounded theory concepts  
As posited in Chapter 3, Strauss and Corbin (1998) maintain grounded theory 
research provides an improved understanding of a phenomenon about which little is 
known, as indeed is the case with family dynamics and its influence on the capital 
structure of family companies and vice versa. Very little is known because, to a large 
extent, prior research has produced a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical 
insights only on how publicly held rather than privately held companies’ capital is 
structured in different geographical regions, depending on cultures, governance codes, or 
investors’ protection (Chen, 2004).  
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Chapter 4 is precisely the result of how the fundamental principles of grounded 
theory described in Chapter 3 were applied. First, the sample was specifically selected, 
not randomly selected, because it was chosen so that the interviewees had a direct 
relation to the subject (different ways of financing and their relations to family dynamics) 
and could freely express their opinions on the matter. As I gathered information through 
the interviews and secondary sources, I proceeded to code and interpret it. Then, as the 
ideas for the codes and code or sub-code families started to emerge from the information 
being analyzed, I then decided what additional data were needed and which additional 
people needed to be interviewed in each company. It was a constant comparison process 
from the very beginning of the interview process. 
In each interview, I analyzed how the interviewees’ family dynamics influenced 
the capital structure and, vice versa, how the capital structure influenced family 
dynamics. Similarly, I sought new categories to explore until the interviewees began to 
repeat themselves and no new subjects emerged. I realized at that moment that I had 
completed the interviews because I had reached theoretical saturation. In addition, 
although the capital structure was the original core category chosen when the proposal 
was first formulated, I could clearly observe how some internal and external factors 
influencing capital structures emerged during the interviewing process For example, a 
new category of internal factors such as values flourished as a precedent to changes in the 
capital structure; this was a category that was not considered when the literature review 
was conducted but began to emerge during the first interview I completed.  
Following the grounded theory structure provided by Corbin and Strauss (1990), I 
uncovered relevant internal factors such as family dynamics, values, and family 
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generations in the different family businesses of the sample and explored how the 
interviewees responded to different contexts and conditions to finance their family 
companies; then, I observed the consequences of their financial decisions, and vice versa, 
how these financial decisions influenced family dynamics. Following Gioia, Corley and 
Hamilton’s (2013) methodology, based on the conceptual ideas that emerged from the 
interviewees, I added rigor to the research with regard to how the interviewees managed 
them and how I interpreted them. In addition, following the Glaserian concept (Glaser, 
2001, p. 145) that all data are relevant, I also gathered information from the Colombian 
Superintendence of Companies, the companies’ annual reports, some newspapers and 
magazines, and even some information supplied personally by the interviewees, in this 
manner following the grounded theory structure provided by Corbin and Strauss (1990). 
In other words, I applied the following validation criteria: 
 Theoretical sensitive coding, generating concepts that emerged from the 
interviews and related documents; 
 Theoretical sampling, deciding who should be interviewed in each company, 
generally in accordance with the company’s CEO; and 
 Observing the need to compare the contexts of the companies and of the 
interviews themselves so that the results were more appropriate. 
On the other hand, to meet the grounded theory criteria and considering the 
recommendation by Gephart (2004) and Suddaby (2006), I would like to specify the 
following: 
 First, the authors noted above suggest that this type of work should be part of 
an ongoing research program. In this regard, I think my dissertation will be part 
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of a future research program due to the importance of this topic for the 
different stakeholders in family companies. The importance of this topic is 
specified later in the chapter, and the reasons for this work will become very 
clear. 
 Second, although I reviewed the literature at the beginning of this work, I 
always remained open to new concepts, and as Gioia (2013, p. 21) suggests, I 
always kept a “willing suspension of belief.” Proof thereof lies in the fact that 
the internal factor “values” category that emerged in this process was not even 
initially noted in the literature review. Gioia et al. (2013) feature a 
methodology that enhances grounded theory development, and they advise 
initially consulting the existing literature without judgment to allow the 
discovery of new insights. Thus, I always kept an open mind to the new ideas 
that were emerging. The observed repetition of and consistent reference to the 
effect of internal and external factors on the capital structure and vice versa in 
the interviewees’ answers and in the different documents led to the 
development of different categories and subcategories that were subsequently 
organized with the help of the Atlas.ti program.  
 Third, according to the recommendations by Gephart (2004) and Suddaby 
(2006), I clearly establish the contributions of this research to the literature that 
addresses the capital structure of family companies, and I also explain how it 
may be useful for the different stakeholders in the next section of this chapter. 
 Fourth, as recommended by the above-mentioned authors, in Chapter 2, I 
explained in a simple but clear manner the different existing theories about 
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capital structure, and the reason there is a need to differentiate between what 
occurs at a family company as opposed to what occurs with the capital 
structure of public companies is clearly stated.  
 Fifth, in Chapter 3, I clearly explained the methodology based on Gioia (2013), 
Jorgensen (1989), and Seidel (1998).  
 Finally, I chose a grounded theory-influenced qualitative approach (Gioia, 
Corley, & Hamilton, 2013) to be conducted with selected family-owned 
companies in Colombia as the best fit for this project, taking into account the 
type and scope of the research. Stern (1995) also asserts that a grounded theory 
approach is appropriate for investigations of an uncharted area or to gain a 
fresh perspective on a familiar situation.  
Although public company financing is somewhat familiar, this grounded theory 
approach allowed for a more in-depth understanding of the relationships and processes 
involved in situations about which little currently is known (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) 
such as the capital structure and its influence on family dynamics and vice versa. 
Nevertheless, also following Gioia’s (2013, p. 21) recommendations of always keeping a 
“willing suspension of belief,” the beginning interviews clearly stated that family internal 
and external factors were an important precedent to the capital structure decisions of 
companies.  
The internal factor designated the values category emerged at my initial interview, 
which was with AT, when he was talking about the capital structure. After several 
interviews, I started to observe how internal factors arose repeatedly and how the values, 
family dynamics, and generations categories continued to be evident throughout the 
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development of this work. A brief excerpt from the AT interview indicates the internal 
factor of the “values” context and their importance in decision making:  
“This is a second-generation company, founded by my parents, who created the 
business and established it under very clearly defined values that we, the members 
of the second generation, have continued to apply. One of the main concerns, 
apart from the financial concern, has been to firmly observe these values in the 
decision-making process…” (P1:051-051). 
Regardless, from this qualitative approach, it is worth noting the valuable contributions 
from the external context and the internal situation of companies that help us better 
understand how financing decisions are made in the family companies in the sample. The 
emotional aspects and family dynamics involved, the emergence of topics addressed in a 
pre-established questionnaire, and the simple but illustrative anecdotes and contradictions 
that give color, weight, and meaning to this research must be noted as well. 
All of the above falls within the limitations of a study such as this, but it opens the way 
for new studies and developments for the future of family companies. 
5.2. Capital structure and internal factors. 
As can be observed from the different quotations and analyses in Chapter 4, the family 
dynamics in some way influences the capital structure that is chosen by the sample of 
family firms. In many cases, the opposite can also be argued: in the sample, companies’ 
capital structures influence these organizations’ family dynamics. On the other hand, 
family values and the generations in charge of the company are other internal factors that 
in some way contribute to the different companies’ capital structures at a given time. In 
addition, all of the interviews helped observe how the family businesses that were 
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interviewed are open systems with goals, relationships, values, and dynamics that make 
family and business considered to be a single system, which is in line with Basco and 
Pérez Rodríguez (2009). Additionally, it is precisely this interaction between family and 
company that makes these businesses different from other firms (Pieper, 2010). 
 5.2.1 Internal Factor: Family dynamics and capital structure 
In this research, by means of the grounded theory approach, I explore how family 
dynamics and behavioral patterns influence the selection of specific strategies for 
financing and structuring – in distinct proportions – the capital of the family business and 
vice versa. The interviews clearly establish why families, with their particular dynamics, 
prefer financing in one manner as opposed to another. In some cases, as shown in 
Chapter 4, when the interviewees recount their company financing, an inverse 
relationship between the capital structure and the family dynamics also occurs. 
These narratives clearly show how some family dynamics affect decisions 
regarding capital structure and simultaneously confirm, extend, or contradict existing 
theories. For example: 
 The emotional pressure and stress caused by crisis (Craig & Lindsay, 2002) be 
it the death of a patriarch, the abrupt departure of a family member or partner, 
or very specific situations to the socio-political context of Colombia such as 
the kidnapping of a family member, lead to decisions on additional debt, 
ownership restructuring, or a contingent succession process, involving a 
reorganization and remodeling of sources and amounts of financing, as stated 
by AG from Gown (P12:023-023). And while cohesion is achieved in 
business families owing to favorable financial results – "In a strong wind, 
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even turkeys fly" –  it can fall apart when debt is high, as expressed by several 
interviewees from the Cash company (P10:039-039; Q9:113-113). However, 
the effects of crises may also take a different direction, having a positive 
impact on cohesion and family unity, as in the case of Brick (P21 082-082), 
and full solidarity, as in the case of Tasty (P1:107-107), which contradicts 
one’s expectations. High debt served as a unifying factor, as AB from Brick 
clearly states, "High debt had a positive impact on us because it united us 
around a very difficult situation" (P21:144-144). 
 Relationships between family members also play an important role in the 
family business’s performance (Astrachan, 2010). Good relationships between 
family members help family companies be more competitive (Milton, 2008) 
and can somehow improve business productivity. The family members’ 
identification with a legacy, a brand, or a culture can lead to more 
competitiveness if that very identification is appropriate and corresponds to 
the positions of the family members in the company when they are employees 
(Milton, 2008). Good family relationships also lead to cohesion, which allows 
decision making to be easier (Pieper, 2007; Pieper & Astrachan, 2008). As 
noted above, the bond of the family members to the company generates a new 
type of relationship in which new hierarchies and roles are established and 
participation spaces are created, encouraging the development of leadership 
and the implementation of skills that do not always emerge within an ordinary 
family relationship.  
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The question here would be the following: how do family relationships contribute to 
a stronger capital structure in the company? How do those capital structures also 
contribute to improving relationships? Additionally, how do these capital structures 
contribute to or deteriorate family relationships? To demonstrate the above, several 
examples from the analysis of the interviews can be presented.  
For example, in the case of Mortgage, poor family relationships led to finding a partner 
who supported the business, as stated by the company’s CEO: 
"Tomorrow, if we fight again and have a family crisis, we will end up shutting it down 
(the company). Let’s take a chance and find a partner” (P26:033-033). 
In turn, finding a partner improved the company’s corporate governance and the security 
of all family members. In the case of Mortgage, the good practices that were adopted as a 
result of an increased company formalization from having found a strong partner 
contributed to the family’s peace of mind, helped adopt good governance practices in the 
other companies belonging to the family group, and somehow restored peace in the 
family’s relationships. 
 Decision-making processes (Gersick et al., 1997) applied to financial decisions are 
influenced by family dynamics with respect to who holds the authority to make decisions 
in the family. When the patriarch has control, he may privilege a particular source of 
financing, based on the perspective and power of one person. This occurred in the case of 
Lunch, in which an investment fund was sought to support the company’s growth without 
using the internal resources of the family, which is what the patriarch desired (Q4:140-
140). 
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Decision making is more complex when it becomes part of more formal meetings 
and when non-family partners are present. This circumstance requires families to deploy 
new relationship and negotiation skills to reach consensus; these often exhaust the family 
and are inefficient, according to CP from Parts (P20:176-176). 
On the other hand, having non-family partners on the board of directors alters the 
natural relationships among family members (father-son relationships or sibling 
relationships) established by birth order. In negotiations and discussions in the board of 
directors, this alteration allows the emergence of new leadership owing to the academic 
training and particular talents of new generations. Thus, these new generations participate 
with more professionalism and autonomy and gain respect from the founders, their 
siblings, and significant individuals. The latter has clear implications in the improvement 
of corporate governance, with people feeling freer to express their ideas and make 
contributions in a new meritocratic structure and not a hierarchical structure established 
by birth order. This phenomenon can be observed in companies such as Mortgage. 
 The need for control by the family (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) also induces particular 
types of financing, especially when it is a family holding company or an IPO. It must be 
borne in mind that family decisions, when based on a need to maintain control, can affect 
the potential of optimal leverage (McMahon & Stanger, 1995). Indeed, the founder of 
Gown warns of the danger that a family business may be reluctant to admit other partners 
under the pretext that doing so is complicated. It is a philosophical question of 
relinquishing the idea and behaviors that are derived from thinking that it is "my 
company," to embrace from a more open mind a company “that I am part of" (Q13:109-
109).  
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By focusing on the relations between financial decisions and control, Brigham 
(1992, p. 29) notes the following: 
“There is value to being in control, and that value is not easily measurable. As a result, 
we often observe small businesses taking actions, such as refusing to bring in new 
stockholders even when they badly need new capital, that do not make sense when 
judged on the basis of value maximization but that do make sense when seen in the light 
of the personal objectives of the owner.” 
Opening the company to external partners often means relinquishing total control. For 
this reason, some family companies considered an opening at the level of subsidiaries, 
not at that of the holding company, to be feasible; thus, good financial opportunities were 
lost in companies such as School and Brick (P27:10-10; P25:073-073). 
An alternative financing scheme via external capital, without the loss of administrative 
control, is SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles), which attract partners’ resources for specific 
projects. Although the family business has a minority participation, because of its own 
knowledge, financial strength, and credibility, it manages and makes decisions, as in the 
case of Cash (P3:17-17) and Mortgage (P26:89-89) 
Regardless, family firms may face difficult situations if they seek control but 
relinquish outside capital (López-Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 2007), and to maintain 
control, companies often reduce their source of financing, which can affect the firm’s 
development and chances of survival in the long run (White-Mazagatos et al., 2007). The 
projects that are accepted by these families will likely be chosen according to the 
independence in the manner in which they can be financed, even if the projects have a 
higher cost of financing (Zellweger, 2006). 
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 Family behaviors (Poza, 2010) and capital structure. Respect for the family legacy, the 
family’s religious beliefs, and its consistency in meeting principles and standards are 
factors of family culture that have helped it have control over debt levels and 
"appropriately" select sources of financing, as indicated by S from School (P79:014-014). 
However, these family principles are not always well understood or followed by 
external partners such as Investment Funds, which are guided by the interest of obtaining 
high returns in a short period of time. They exert pressure on the family to perform 
practices of human resources reengineering by reducing the company’s social capital and 
requiring performance parameters that they consider the only financial reference points. 
Thus, cultural and relational aspects are not taken into account, which ends up damaging 
the sense of ownership and co-responsibility of the family, as stated by AG (P12:085-
085). These funds are not even able to make great sacrifices, such as reducing or 
suspending dividend distributions to raise employee salaries and to avoid layoffs, as 
family businesses do, according to BB (P22:27-27). 
On the other hand, as expressed by AB from Brick, the family’s behaviors toward its 
external partners become important in the partners’ decision-making process because 
they are part of the capital of the family business: "When we make alliances, we also offer 
our shareholders a way of being, a way of acting, very much in line with what they are, 
and in fact, we have been partners for over twenty years. I think that's why they seek us” 
(P21:132-132). 
 Family entrenchment (Kroll, Wright, & Theerathorn, 1993) is defined as “the extent to 
which managers have the ability and incentives to pursue their self-interest and 
expropriate wealth from shareholders” (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009). Family members’ 
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incompetence, opportunistic behaviors, and/or ethically dubious actions can impede the 
firm’s success, potentially resulting in a scandal that can lead to the firm’s demise and a 
negative economic impact on employees, customers, and other stakeholders (Kidwell, 
Kellermanns, & Eddleston, 2012). 
In this study, some cases were highlighted in which the shareholders’ rights were 
affected because of entrenchment, which was noted in the literature. One of the 
companies was acquired through legal tricks through the participation of a non-family 
partner who abruptly withdrew, disregarding the right to preference of other partners 
(P16:24-24). In another case, the family decided to capitalize the company to dilute the 
participation of an investment fund as a strategy to gain control (P16:60-60). 
Additionally, in another company in the sample, to buy a shareholder’s stock option, the 
value of some lands was estimated at a lower value than that of the market, forcing 
minority shareholders to accept that value as a correlate of their shares, devaluing their 
assets (P15:39-39). The same literature on entrenchment is also verified in cases in which 
the family-controlled company decided to reinvest profits and reduce dividends or not to 
distribute them, harming the liquidity expectations of minority investors (P8:49-49).  
In the interviews of the companies analyzed, except as set out above, there is no 
evidence of entrenchment as a generalized behavior. On the contrary, a large proportion 
of the interviewees affirmed their responsibility to their partners and their management of 
operations in the interests of the companies rather than from their own personal interest. 
As an example of such behaviors, BM, a member of the board of directors of Mortgage, 
asserts the following:  
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"Mortgage is a company with a large and plural number of shareholders, 
but there are friends and family of the NNs, and they control several 
companies. They (the family) have successfully guided and managed the 
company to the point that other friends and family very gladly accept and 
support this leadership and there is no controversy. There is confidence in 
the managers (family members)" (P34:023-023). 
Here, it can be observed that the family’s respect toward its external 
shareholders is paid back to it with the confidence that these same shareholders 
place in the family. 
On the other hand, BE, the financial manager of Energy, states how the 
company is not capitalized with family resources but instead, resorts to 
banking resources to avoid attacking non-family partners through an increase 
in its equity holding and does not obtain any particular benefit for the family 
by increasing its equity holding (P8:18-18). Thus, it is not observed that when 
families have the greatest control of the firm, they have greater entrenchment, 
as suggested (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), which instead seems to depend on 
the same family values that are professed in the family. 
 Different ownership systems (McMahon & Stanger, 1995) influence financial 
decision making to prevent complex situations. These authors refer to small 
businesses, but the theory presented can easily be extended to family firms, 
even though their size is not small. Indeed, it can be observed how the Brick 
and Mortgage companies, which are of a significant size for the Colombian 
market, face possible liquidity problems in the same manner as expressed by 
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McMahon and Stanger (1995) for small businesses. In Mortgage, mention is 
made of a "war chest" accumulated over time as a preventive measure for 
possible future situations of illiquidity. Additionally, in Brick, high debt arises 
with the use of all open lines of credit approved to maintain a high cash volume 
at any given time, thereby preventing possible liquidity problems and low sales 
as a result of an economic crisis in the country.  
The theory of wealth maximization for shareholders, as the only motivation 
for work, does not clearly apply to family companies either, in which, although 
the ownership is handed on to different generations, additional elements are 
added to the utility function, as stated by McMahon and Stanger (1995). A 
concrete example is the case of Mortgage, which looked for a partner for one 
of its subordinate companies and found that the option that provided the best 
financial guarantees was not exactly the option that offered to keep its efficient 
and loyal employees after the partnership was created. For this reason, 
Mortgage did not make the decision to partner with that company but instead 
chose to partner with another that allowed it to keep employees who had 
remained efficient and who had been loyal for many years. Although this 
partnership did not solely consider the maximization of economic wealth, it has 
proven to be successful over the years, also proving for large family businesses 
the theory of McMahon and Stanger (1995) on other elements that families 
consider, despite not being the smallest businesses.  
Finally, it is appropriate to note here that in addition to consolidating capital 
to anticipate crises and to make new investments (war chest), various families 
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noted their willingness to reinvest profits, take on debt, capitalize the company, 
suspend sabbaticals, and postpone major investments, to keep the company 
afloat in times of crisis (6:111-111; P34:27-27; P26:82-82; P12:23-23). All of 
this indicates that wealth maximization is not the sole objective of the family 
firms in the sample. 
o Ownership dilution and its U-shaped effect on the use of debt when 
market conditions grow (Schulze et al., 2003). To analyze this theory, the 
ownership condition of the different companies in the sample must be 
understood; to do so, I use the ownership development described by 
Gersick et al. (1997). First, in two companies of the sample (Lunch and 
Gown), the patriarchs are still alive and are active in the business. In the 
first company, to date, the ownership has not been distributed among the 
children, and the patriarch has full control of the company. In the second 
company, the majority ownership belongs to the patriarch and his two 
sons, each having a minority share in ownership. 
On the other hand, the Energy, Tasty, Cash, Harvest, and Mortgage 
companies are sibling partnerships in which ownership is equally divided 
among siblings. The Parts company is a second-generation company in which 
the brother and the company’s CEO bought the ownership from his siblings in 
the company; as a sole proprietor, he divided the ownership among his nuclear 
family. The Brick and School companies are third- and fourth-generation 
companies (cousin consortiums); in the first case, their ownership is distributed 
proportionally to the family branches and, in the second case, with proportional 
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parts to the family branches but with significant ownership by a non-profit 
foundation. Finally, the Whole company was a first- and second-generation 
property when it was floated on the stock exchange. The members of the first 
generation were already seniors, and those of the next generation were very 
distant from the company.  
It is also worth noting that the Whole, Brick, Mortgage, Energy, and Lunch 
companies have closed family holding companies with various types of 
ownership (controlling owner, sibling partnerships and cousin consortiums) 
with a completely family-owned ownership and in which debt is not even 
considered as a financial alternative. These holding companies have allowed 
indebtedness; in some cases, it is moderate, and in others, it is high in 
subsidiary companies in which there are even external partners and/or private 
investment funds. 
It must be noted that in Colombia, models of succession establish that 
legally, children generally receive an inheritance that is equal parts of company 
ownership whereas, in other countries, the dilution of ownership varies in 
many ways, from birthright to equal distributions. In some countries, the 
tendency is to hand over a greater proportion of stocks to those working in the 
companies than to those who do not work in the family business, which does 
not occur in Colombia, at least in the companies in the sample. Because there 
is a very wide variety of ownership types in these companies and the study is 
circumscribed to Colombia, in which succession laws prescribe that succession 
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is most often evenly distributed, it is difficult at this point in time to establish 
an appropriate relationship in terms of debt and ownership dilution. 
 Family conflict and its impact on family business financing are one of the research 
trends that may deserve a deeper analysis as a result of this study, in addition to the 
impact of family relationships on decision making that is related to financing, as 
discussed above in this chapter. Thus, considering the definition of conflicts, i.e., “a 
situation in which seemingly incompatible elements exert force in opposing or 
divergent directions” (Heitter, 1990), it is well known how different types of conflict 
in families influence the behavior of family groups (Astrachan & McMillan, 2003; 
Kaye, 1996; Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004; Smyrnios, Romano, Tanewski, 
Karofsky, Millen, & Yilmaz, 2003; Sorenson, 1999). In addition, cognitive and 
process conflicts have been extensively studied (Jehn, 1995, 1997; Jehn & Mannix, 
2001), in addition to relationship conflicts (Pieper, 2010). On the other hand, conflicts 
that are related to the roles of family members (Danes, Leichtentrit, Metz, 
Huddleston-Casas, 200) and succession conflicts also appear to be related to one or 
another type of financing in family companies, as is observed below. 
The interrelationship between families and family businesses as a result of the 
relationship of both systems (family and business) is also clear (Pieper & Klein, 
2007). This is useful to understand because the dynamics of family life affect 
businesses’ strategic decisions (Brunninge, Nordqvist, & Wiklund, 2007; Craig & 
Lindsay, 2002; Dyer & Handler, 1994; Van Auken & Werbel, 2006). To broaden 
these concepts, AM from Mortgage clearly describes this interaction, in accordance 
with the above theories: 
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"When there is money, everybody smiles; when there is no money, the 
situation changes. And maybe that circumstance... when there is a crisis, 
the company’s crisis may lead to a family crisis, and a family crisis may 
lead to the shutdown of the company (P26:15-15). 
Thus, because of this interrelationship between both systems of family and 
business clearly explained in the above theories, a company’s financial strategy is 
affected by the conflicts that arise among families, as can be observed in several 
interviews that were conducted. Despite these interrelationships, to the best of my 
knowledge, there is no study to date that helps establish a clear link between 
family conflicts and the financing of family businesses or how company financing 
contributes to solving or worsening family conflicts. 
Some indications in this regard may arise from some excerpts of the interviews 
and from attitudes presented by the interviewees, in which it can precisely be 
observed how conflict induces some type of particular financing or, vice versa, 
how the capital structure can help solve some conflicts or family situations or 
even aggravate them. The following examples show a clear relationship between 
conflict and a specific type of financing. Some were already noted in Chapter 4, 
but to better understand the discussion, they are noted again, referring to the 
existing theory. For example, as stated by AG, cases of divorce or family 
breakups that are linked to crises are a turning point in debt, but they are very 
specific to family companies because divorces end up undercapitalizing or 
breaking the core of the company, which leads some of the parties to require 
financing (P12:125-125). 
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 Process and cognitive conflicts and capital structure 
As posited in the literature review, there are several types of conflict; they are 
categorized as relationship, cognitive, or process conflicts, with process and cognitive 
conflicts sometimes being beneficial to the business. Cognitive conflicts center on 
disagreements that are related to the work at hand and the strategies being pursued, 
whereas process conflicts involve discussions about who is responsible for which tasks 
(Jehn & Mannix, 2001). Thus, process conflicts refer to disagreements over how a certain 
task should be accomplished and how much responsibility individual group members 
should bear (Jehn, 1997). Relationship conflicts, on the other hand, refer to conflicts that 
are related to interpersonal issues, individual norms and values, and personal taste 
(Pieper, 2010).  
In the case of Harvest, the company went too much into debt and invested in 
diversification projects that ultimately did not produce any good results. Because the 
company was run by some members of the second generation who made decisions 
without consultation, the family decided to dismiss some members of the generation in 
charge of the company who had taken the company into debt; however, this high debt, in 
turn, led to conflict resulting from the changes in the administration (Schulze et al., 
2003).  
In many cases, however, conflicts somehow contributed to improving decision 
making in the business when there were conflicts resulting from tasks or processes. Some 
examples are shown below. At Energy a family CEO assumed the authority of the family 
without its consent – which is a factor that stands out in terms of process conflicts –. 
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However, it led to a more efficient method of making decisions. At Tasty, exercising 
birthright in financial decision making in a sibling partnership was a clear sign of an 
abuse of authority and a lack of awareness of the new relationships established in an 
organization, which are different from family businesses. This situation became an 
opportunity to improve communication among siblings and to a better role definition 
within the company  
When the Whole group sold most of its shares to a multinational company, 
preemptive rights (processes) forced the family to accept a company valuation that was 
below market expectations The multinational company did not consult the family to 
review the valuation, and delays forced partners to negotiate separately, not as a bloc, 
giving the majority shareholder greater bargaining power. This situation generated a 
considerable amount of tension in the family and stagnation for new businesses. In turn, 
this situation forced the family to think of better forms of negotiation. 
The abrupt departure of a family member of one company after a fight, which 
according to Beehr (1995) is possibly the most common organizational manifestation of 
work/family tension, causes an increase in debt as a result of the acquisition of its 
shareholding to maintain control in the hands of the family and to prevent the sale to 
external shareholders (P12:023-023). On the other hand, AH from Harvest comments on 
how a relationship conflict with one of the siblings forced the family to begin a process of 
stock valuation that obtained different results with insurmountable distances. What was 
thought to be the solution ended up making the conflict more complex due to the 
differences in the valuation of the shareholding (P16:025-025). Additionally, as the 
shareholding of the brother in question could not be bought by the family, he sold his 
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shareholding to an external, unknown, and undesirable shareholder, changing the 
company’s capital structure, which caused even greater family conflict. AH assures us 
that it would not have occurred if it had not been a family business (P15:19-19). 
The above examples also show the reverse impact of the capital structure on the 
family dynamics of conflicts and how these high costs tend to lock shareholders as 
Schulze et al. state (2003), making the conflicts that arise be more persistent and be a 
convergence of interests that is more difficult to achieve. This vicious cycle also implies 
high departure costs from the family business, given that it is necessary to make a stock 
valuation, initiate extensive processes, and reach consensus. Some are not achieved but 
rather create more stress and attitudes of exclusion of privileges and relationships to those 
who intend to leave the company. Family members who are dissatisfied with the 
company or who seek to develop their own businesses prefer to remain in the company to 
avoid further conflict that could affect the stock value. This is an example of how an 
unclear process contributes to creating greater conflicts that often also become 
relationship conflicts if they cannot be overcome. 
In contrast, there are other examples of how companies sometimes go into debt to 
maintain the family’s financial cohesion and keep it united: 
 "Banks decide to give credit to the company so that the company can deliver 
dividends to the family, with the understanding that the pressure on the family 
caused by the non-payment of dividends would disintegrate the family with 
serious implications for business continuity and therefore for the payment for its 
obligations to those banks. The loan for this payment of dividends somehow 
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produces greater financial cohesion in the family and allows business continuity" 
(P16:13-13). 
It is true that the socio-emotional costs are also high when a family member who 
is employed in the business leaves the company: the loss of intimacy, reduced status, the 
breaking of familial expectations, and the severing of family ties. However, this has a 
positive impact on family and business dynamics, with appropriate governance bodies for 
decision making being established (P:16:14-14).  
Conflict among shareholders regarding capital structure 
Divergence may exist, not with regard to how goals and strategies should be 
pursued, but with regard to which goals and strategies should be pursued, and conflicts 
related to differences in perspectives among members of a family business also have an 
impact on the different types of business financing or, vice versa, on the dynamics of a 
family of shareholders. When I refer to vision conflicts, these should be understood as 
“matters related to shared vision, values, principles and strategic planning that often lead 
to conflicts because participants may become irrational in seeking what they consider to 
be right” (Kidwell et al., 2012). Indeed, differences in vision between a private 
investment fund (short-term vision) and the company’s shareholder family (long-term 
vision) produce company stagnation, given that partners do not agree on the strategy to 
follow.  
For example, the different perspectives of two generations of shareholders led the 
Whole company to be floated on the stock exchange to sell the company. In this case, 
after many years, the first generation was interested in the marketability of its 
investments; on the other hand, it had never allowed the succession question to be 
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appropriately addressed in family conversations. They considered the company to be a 
method of keeping the family together but did not think about future generations as 
shareholders and company managers. Among other things, this lack of consideration 
produced a sense of detachment toward the company on the part of successive 
generations of the family. The second generation was more interested in its own 
investment projects, with a minimum belonging to the family business.  
Thus, in the Whole family, the decision to be floated on the stock exchange was 
also made to avoid a discrepancy in the company valuation (as occurred in School) 
because, previously, the family had had problems trading shares with the same family 
members when there was no procedure to determine their price. In turn and vice versa, 
being floated on the stock exchange provided better corporate governance to the company 
and greater peace of mind for both generations, though ultimately, the family may regret 
having sold one of the leading companies in Colombia and not having fully participated 
in the development of the company in the country.  
Thus, interviews confirmed what has been stated by Pieper & Klein (2007), which 
is that conflict has a great impact on the development of the company’s overall (in this 
case, financial) strategy, its implementation, its approach, and its ability to explore 
different alternatives. In addition, this kind of conflict can also impact family dynamics 
negatively or positively. For example, as BL from Lunch observes, external and internal 
differences fostered family cohesion around their business: "The inflow of the fund 
united us much more than we used to be before the fund was introduced (precisely 
because of this difference in perspectives between the family and the fund)" (P7:036-
036).  
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Role conflict and capital structure 
Role conflict is another type of conflict that occurs when the roles, powers, and 
responsibilities of family members are not well defined in the company or when one 
family member decides to overstep his or her duties. The most obvious manifestation of 
this conflict occurs in the intergenerational transfer of leadership, when the founders or 
the generation in charge do not easily hand over their power, conflicting with younger 
generations or external managers, partners, or allies. The meaning of "entitlement" is 
present in the mind of the founder for having created, directed, and participated in the 
great moments of the company. Examples from the sample companies include: 
 In the Lunch case, there is also a role conflict between the father and the son. The 
father wanted to continue his activity as a father in the company’s management. 
His son, who was in charge of the company, could not convince his father 
regarding the financial strategy for business growth. The father relied more on an 
investment fund, with an apparent greater expertise than that of his own son. However, 
the inflow of a private investment fund led to confusion of roles for the company’s 
founder, who did not easily accept that he could not directly intervene in the company’s 
management, as he did before the inflow of the fund. At Energy, the manager of the 
family business made borrowing decisions without consulting the family, which 
caused conflict with the rest of the family. The family then withdrew its support 
for the manager, causing even greater conflicts. 
 One of the siblings at Tasty took over the company’s management when the 
founder passed away, but he kept on exercising his role as the elder brother, his 
siblings’ administrator, taking on responsibilities he could share. One of the 
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projects he financed with the support of his father before he passed away did not 
work very well, and his siblings complained about the lack of consultation with 
them. As expressed by one of the officials of the company, if decisions are wrong, 
the impacts cut across the entire family, not only the person who makes them 
(P5:148-148). 
Agency conflicts and capital structure 
Agency theory and its relationship to family businesses, which has been much 
studied in recent years, has not given sufficient explanations for understanding how the 
psychology of families somehow influences behavior in company decisions (Pieper, 
2010). According to the literature, agency conflicts in family businesses occur because of 
the lack of alignment between the management and the shareholders in some cases, and 
between the management and the bondholders in other cases (Berger & Bonaccorsi di 
Patti, 2006). Thus, companies attempt to resolve such conflicts in different ways.  
One of the mechanisms used by some companies (Bricks and Parts) to align the 
management with the business objectives and to reduce monitoring costs was the 
introduction of indicators such as EVA, which are aimed at generating value and not only 
short-term profitability that tends to benefit management. On the other hand, the founding 
member of Gown, for example, implemented a mechanism that apparently reduced 
agency conflict by giving shareholding to the non-family manager of the firm. 
Accordingly, he had greater influence and authority over the family members who 
worked in the company, given his double role as managing partner. However, the 
opposite occurred; the family suffered from this situation because of the abuse of power 
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of the manager, so much so that the family members working in the company almost 
withdrew, with severe consequences for family relationships. 
Traditionally, when a company is taken over, a new manager, whom the buyers 
consider reliable and who shares the business perspective of the majority investors, is 
appointed. As described by the founder of Gown, some family businesses keep the 
manager of the company, given that he or she has the knowledge, expertise, and vision 
that gave value to the company. Family businesses cannot have such a broad and 
specialized social capital for managing all types of businesses. 
Succession and capital structure 
One of the elements considered to be central to the success of family businesses is 
the timely, participatory, and fair succession process of the family and organizational 
leadership, which, among other things, includes the transfer of knowledge, ownership, 
resources, and developed support networks. According to the president of Parts, access to 
the capital market aimed to strengthen the corporate governance of the company facing a 
succession. Following are some examples of how different families planned the 
succession process through different types of financing for their companies. 
In the cases of Whole and Parts, issuing an IPO would become significant in 
facilitating the succession process. In Parts, the process prior to the IPO would lead to a 
formalization of the company at a higher level to achieve a clear, orderly succession 
during the founders’ lifetime, thus avoiding possible governance conflicts and facilitating 
the training of successors other than the founders (P18:100-100). For some families, 
issuing an IPO thus resolves the issue of family members’ links to the company during 
the succession process. Family members, with or without experience and with or without 
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intentions to work in the company, would receive economic benefits when selling their 
shares and would thus be marginalized from the company’s governance and management. 
This would properly work in cases in which the following generations do not have the 
skills to join or are not interested in joining the company as owners or managers. This 
IPO would help in developing one’s own businesses without affecting the core business, 
as occurred in the case of Whole. 
In the examples below, two different situations show how families proceed 
regarding the ownership of the next generation, somehow having an impact on the capital 
structure. Tasty, a trust company that was created by the founder to manage the family’s 
resources remains involved in the financial decisions of the family, limiting investment 
and growth capacity as established by the founder (P1:23- 23). By contrast, in an exercise 
performed by Energy to identify the perspectives of the new generations regarding 
business continuity and growth, they warned that the perspectives of the young 
generation were very dissimilar. Therefore, the family decided not to force the issue of 
business continuity and the hiring status of the children. It addressed succession not from 
the perspective of business growth and financial goals but according to the behavior that 
must be maintained, coinciding with operational excellence, quality, and social 
responsibility. Accordingly, the family managed to maintain a significant business for 
new generations, not so much in growth and the financing of this growth. The family 
would thus be free to maintain pre-established financing schemes (P2:68-68).  
ESOP was an ingenious financing alternative used by the founder of Cash to 
ensure that his daughters could rely on the advice and support of a non-family manager, 
who was given a participation rate in the company as an incentive to stay in it and coach 
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the heiresses to the business. It is interesting to note that, according to one of his 
daughters, this decision by the founder not only intended to protect them from a high-risk 
environment but also reflected gender bias regarding his daughters’ management skills 
(P3:28-28). This family created a trust so that one of the sisters abroad could manage her 
resources in the country without having to participate in the company’s decisions 
(P3:25.25). 
In the case of Lunch, in the first generation, the company went through a major 
diversification process, but in the last years of the founder, assets were sold (asset 
shedding), focusing investment on the core business, reducing risk and attrition, and 
reassuring the founder by simplifying the legacy for his children. The manager noted that 
something similar occurred with Bavaria, a national beer company that was taken over by 
the Saab Miller group. The generation in charge in that company after the brewery was 
sold started a process to repurchase the same previously sold companies. Certainly, the 
second generation of Lunch will proceed to repurchase such assets; it is an oscillating 
process, according to AL (P4:142-142). 
5.2.2 Internal Factor: Values and capital structure 
The influence of values, as a whole and jointly with family dynamics, over the 
capital structure of family companies is a concept that emerges constantly from the 
interviews in this work. The consequences of human values are manifested in virtually all 
phenomena that social scientists may consider worth investigating and understanding, 
Rockeach (1973, p. 3). Therefore, the relationship between values as another internal 
factor that affects the decisions made by families regarding the capital structure of their 
companies is worth discussing. Values have been widely researched in relation to the 
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behavior of management in family companies by, among others, researchers such as W. 
Gibb Dyer (1986), John Ward (1999) and Guido Corbetta (1999). Although the 
background and the effects of values on corporate culture and decision making have also 
been explored to some extent (Hofstede, Neuijen, & Sanders, 1990), according to García-
Alvarez and López-Sintas (2001), more often they are merely noted rather than studied in 
depth. For the above-mentioned family business researchers and scholars, because values 
guide the behavior of managers in making decisions, in taking positions, and in leading 
others, studying the effects of values on the capital structure is important for the 
continuation of family-owned firms and for the families who own them.  
In addition, as an effect of values in the decision-making context regarding capital 
structure, it is worth noting that values, for example, in the case of an entrepreneur, are 
transferred into business practices (Hofstede et al., 1990). In these cases, values such as 
ambition, responsibility, honesty, and growth (Kotey, 1995; Casson, 1992) move the 
explanation of values from the families into the business through the decision-making 
process. Other values such as open-mindedness and the will to treasure the family legacy 
are related to long-term survival and to the growth of companies (Bird, 1989, p. 107). To 
maintain company control and to preserve equity, a synthesis of family and company 
values is crucial in the long term (Pieper, 2007), even though maintaining control is more 
difficult as the next generations move into ownership (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 
2003b).  
For example, trust facilitates making effective decisions because there is less need 
to defend positions or protect personal interests. In addition, trust and a good reputation 
facilitate access to sources of financing for new investments (Salvato & Melin, 2008). 
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Long-term aspirations allow longevity and trustful relationships with different 
stakeholders (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). Values that are related to legacy and long-term 
sustainability have been found in studies of families and multigenerational family 
dynasties (Nemilentsev, 2013c). Values that are related to sustainability extend beyond 
the company to the family and reflect the horizons of a family-shared responsibility in 
regard to the future of the company (Koiranen, 2002; Nemilentsev, 2010). 
Finally, it is worth noting that there has been research that shows an association 
between the values of growth and social responsibility and the use of debt and external 
equity. For example, Chaganti, DeCarolis, and Deeds (1995) find that entrepreneurs who 
are optimistic regarding the growth of their business tend to seek equity rather than debt 
financing. However, Van der Wijst (1989) observes that founders whose values are based 
on company growth tend to use a comparatively large portion of debt to finance business 
development whereas other entrepreneurs who feel a sense of social responsibility to 
maintain employment levels more often use the debt option. In this research, it is possible 
to appreciate in a more individual manner the influence of values on the capital structure 
of family companies. Among the implicit values found in this research with regard to the 
internal factors in making financing decisions, I would note, for example, the following: 
 Reputation: It is clear how financial decisions influence the reputation of family 
and non-family managers (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2011; Graham, Harvey, 
& Puri, 2011) and how, in turn, family firms are more concerned with the 
reputation of the firm and their family due to their sustained presence in the firm 
(Bopaiah, 1998; Anderson et al., 2003). Family firms frequently reach a match of 
family proprietorship with brand identity (Craig, Dibrell, & Davis, 2008), brands 
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bring recognition to the family (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), and families seek 
respect and reputation in the community (Ehrhard & Nowak, 2003; Khatri & Ng, 
2000). The significance of previous research is verified when, through IPOs or 
private investment funds, for example, families are recognized by society and the 
communities in which they live, as well expressed by the School and Cash 
families, for which they are proud and respected. Initially, with IPOs, families 
seek greater respect toward themselves; simultaneously, however, this respect is 
reflected in bank confidence and definitely helps attract new shareholders and 
obtain new loans with better conditions and lower interest rates (P18:45-45; 
Q6:52-52). In other words, it can be stated that sources of capital indeed affect 
future outcomes, according to Astrachan and McConaughy (2001). 
Thinking about which world stock exchange it should be floated on to have a 
greater reputation, even though the costs can be much higher, somehow reflects the 
significance of reputation for the family when there is an IPO, as is well expressed by BG 
from Gown. In addition, the companies in the sample are very careful when they assume 
the risks involved in a funded project because always "we think of the impact it may have 
on the reputation of the entire family when we do not honor undertakings with funders," 
as AH notes. The interviewees agree, saying that reputation is a value that is achieved 
over time and is nurtured through the generations by honoring their commitments, paying 
their liabilities on time or before the due dates, and maintaining transparent 
communication with lending institutions and shareholders. 
According to the families, reputation is a non-negotiable value. It is public 
knowledge that, in Colombia, there is a black market of sources of financing that offer 
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very favorable credit conditions, i.e., offering 10 units and requiring repayment of only 
eight, and many companies accept them. The business families of this study appeared 
clearly reluctant to accept non-bank credit from unreliable sources. Some companies are 
known for having accepted them, and the financial system has punished them by not 
granting them credit and by divesting (P14:73-73). 
 Risk aversion: As observed, family businesses also tend to hold conservative 
financing policies to shield their assets from risk and to hand them on to future 
generations (López-Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 2007). Therefore, behavioral 
theory predicts that decision makers, particularly family firms, prefer to avoid a 
loss even if doing so means accepting a higher risk or underperformance (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007). Moreover, family firms are typically risk-averse, and this 
proclivity makes them prefer less risky financial options (less debt) because an 
increase in debt increases the risk of loss of family control to banks or investors, 
with default on payments being the worst-case scenario (McConaughy, Matthews, 
& Fialko, 2001). Thus, the capital structure of small firms (not necessarily family-
owned enterprises) is partly determined by the interaction of the owner’s 
preferences for risk and return because most small business managers have most 
of their human and financial capital placed in the firm (Pettit and Singer, 1985).  
It is a fact that this is a behavior of the companies that were selected in the 
sample. In the company School, mention is made of a policy of having the value 
of all of the bank debt in hand. In Cash and Parts, they prefer to have a good night 
than to stay awake because of debt; in companies in which there is a family 
holding, debt is null or virtually null due to the fear of losing confidentiality and 
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the risk that it implies. Brick is not floated on the stock exchange for the same 
reason above. Here, the fear of losing reputation in case of nonpayment of debt or 
a drop in the stock price sold to outside investors (School) also applies. 
According to Kirchoff (1994), companies are an extended reflection of 
their founders, and the founders’ values (financial and non-financial) somehow 
define the operation of the company. In this regard, developing a quantitative 
research, Shariff and Peou (2008) also find a relationship between the values of 
entrepreneurs and company financing. This relationship can also be very clearly 
observed as a result of the interviews: the peace of mind that produces a low debt 
that the founders of Parts seek, with the second generation suggesting going into 
debt for the implementation of a project but the founders preferring to "sleep debt-
free"; the need for confidence in an administration that is considered more 
appropriate than that of the young successor, with the founder of Lunch seeking a 
private investment fund that apparently has more expertise in handling businesses 
than the young successor; the sexism of a founder who delivers a part of the 
stocks to his manager, in exchange for giving greater support to his daughters 
(Cash); and the austerity of the founder of Mortgage, who communicates this 
value to his relatives, friends, partners, and staff members to finance himself with 
savings and the internal generation of the company. 
Risk aversion is not a “congenital phobia” of business families; it has a 
historical precedent in all of them. Several families made investments that 
exceeded their capacity to pay; others undermined their assets as a collateral in 
businesses in which the partners did not assume responsibility for loans acquired. 
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Many had their dividends affected, or they were even forced to sell assets of great 
economic and historical value to meet loan requirements. From a 
transgenerational perspective and with a great sense of responsibility, families are 
afraid of making investments that can compromise the future of their children, 
their good name, and the possibilities that new generations will have better living 
conditions than those of the founders and the generation in charge. It is clear that 
this perspective regarding risk is tempered by the generations in charge, the 
structure and formality of corporate governance, experience, and the knowledge 
of financial issues and opportunities that arise in the economic circumstances. As 
is observed below, the perception of risk is different between generations, as in 
the case of Parts, in which the founder prefers not to acquire debt even though his 
son insists on the fact that the working capital of the company would be less 
costly if it were obtained through banks and not by using their own capital. 
When there is a strong and capable corporate governance, there is less risk 
of making investment decisions without sufficient research. The risk is greater in 
cases in which hasty, unwise decisions or those with inadequate information are 
made (Harvest and Mortgage). Energy was about to make a bond issuance, but the 
world situation after 9/11 presented significant risks. Ultimately, this transaction 
was not performed. 
Risk aversion may also be viewed as a positive attitude that favors saving 
capacity (Mortgage) and helps constitute reserve funds or a war chest, attract 
resources of available credit to anticipate crisis situations (Brick), more carefully 
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consider and be more selective in accepting partners, alliances, or external capital 
(Cash), and finance growth with retained profits (Energy).  
5.2.3 Internal Factors: generations and capital structure 
5.2.3.1 Generations and debt 
The ownership of a family firm generally goes through three broad phases of 
dispersion: the controlling owner stage, the sibling partnership, and the cousin 
consortium. According to the research, in the controlling owner stage, founders typically 
lack access to public markets; thus, investments are limited by the availability of funds 
that are internally generated (Romano et al., 2000). Indeed, in terms of the evolutionary 
development of the ownership, all companies in the sample have shown this behavior. 
Regarding the use of capital markets, what is shown in the Whole case is contrary to the 
theory of access to capital markets. 
Whole, which is also a company of first-generation siblings, acquired such a size 
because of its organization and development that it had a good acceptance in the 
Colombian stock market, which would not agree with the IPO theory in a first generation 
of the family. Instead, School, another company in the sample that is listed on the stock 
exchange, was already in its fourth and fifth generations when it was listed on the 
Colombian stock exchange. In the other first-generation companies of the sample, 
financing for growth and development was always internally obtained through the sale of 
assets and bank loans, in addition to money from the family and some family friends, as 
in the case of Mortgage, Energy, Cash, and Parts. 
First generations feel that austerity and saving must always be important sources 
of development and growth for their companies, and dividend distributions are difficult to 
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accept in this generation. Indeed, the founders hand on austerity values to their children 
and employees, and the expenses not only of the founders but also of their companies, are 
carefully measured. The culture and austerity of the founder of Mortgage are widely 
noted by all of the interviewees from this company (AM, BM, and CM). The three 
interviewees agree on this statement. Something similar occurs in Tasty, Energy, Whole, 
Parts, School, and Brick. The distribution of significant dividends is only effective in the 
subsequent generations and even works to produce the family’s financial cohesion in 
Harvest and School (P27:43-43; P16:13-13). 
In the sibling partnership stage, the principal shareholder is not the founder of the 
family firm but the siblings. According to different theories, siblings tend to be more 
conservative when making investments due to their sense of entitlement (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In this case, the use of debt seems to decline, favoring the use of 
equity capital and also producing low growth, according to the conservative theories of 
Miller, Le Breton, and Scholnick (2008) and Kaye and Hamilton (2004). One reason for 
this phenomenon may be that the agency conflicts within the family become too 
extensive as each sibling attempts to maximize his or her family’s utility. The firm may 
then be trapped in a status quo-like situation in which none of the siblings or the principal 
is willing to take on more debt and thus, more risk. Because most of the wealth of the 
family is invested in the company, risk taking is assumed to be minimized by the 
employment of less debt (Bjuggren et al., 2012). A result of this attitude can be lower 
debt for the company and a lower orientation toward firm growth because of a lack of 
external financing (Molly et al., 2010). However, in this research, these theories are not 
proven. To the contrary, as the number of generations increases, family members are less 
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“overinvested” in the firm and are more willing to use debt and bear the attendant risk to 
their individual wealth. Thus, the use of debt is favored by ownership dispersion across 
generations (Schulze et al., 2003). In this study, the first generation always took less 
risks, and while the founders survived, debt was very low. Giving some explicit examples 
from the interviews is sufficient to understand this point. In the School company, for 
example, debt was always secured by an equal amount in cash while the first generation 
was alive. Moreover, there was also a very clear debt policy in the sense that debt = cash. 
In this same company, when the policy of low debt and cash-secured debt was broken 
with the next generations, this policy break led to many difficulties in the family 
dynamics that were only overcome by the family’s values of solidarity and respect for 
legacy, which produced a strong non-financial cohesion in the family. In addition, in 
Lunch, the founder, who was already in his later years, did not want debt in his group of 
companies either. He agreed to issue an IPO and to obtain a private investment fund as a 
capital investor, which, in turn, also produced an effect of family cohesion, as explained 
above. In Tasty, once the company founders handed the company on to their children, the 
second generation initiated a diversification process that included new forms of 
financing, such as trade financing, to launch their products in segments such as 
superstores and institutional clients (P5:11-15).  
Finally, in the Parts company, when the second-generation successor suggested 
taking the company into debt based on its financial studies on equity costs, his father 
replied that he preferred to sleep soundly, though he highly respected his successor’s 
university knowledge – this despite the good arguments that were presented by the 
successor regarding the importance of the high capital costs of equity capital vs. the 
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capital costs of borrowed money, which would increase the company’s debt. In addition, 
there is an important issue to discuss here: in several of the family groups analyzed that 
were organized through a holding company (Lunch, Mortgage, Brick, Energy, and Parts), 
debts are very low or null, though in all of them, except for Lunch, the owners are 
second-generation sibling partnerships in which the theories noted as an effect of the 
defense of the siblings’ assets may perhaps apply (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, and 
Scholnick, 2008; Kaye and Hamilton, 2004). One may speculate and say that, when there 
are family groups after the first generation, the holding company of these groups 
maintained policies of very low debt (through holding companies), policies that were 
established by the companies’ founders. In some of these companies, there are SPVs 
(Special purpose vehicles) in which debt can be high but the family (in these cases, 
sibling partnerships) maintains control through administration and thus there are no 
majority shareholding (Cash and Mortgage) generations and ESOPs.  
The decision to allow the ESOP scheme not only responds to the family’s 
interests but is also the answer to a regulation of the Colombian government at the time 
(the 1980s) requiring a minimum number of partners to establish a partnership; for this 
reason, that number was obtained with the employees who were loyal to the company, as 
stated by executives from School and Parts. When noting ESOPs, despite the affirmation 
by Villalonga and Amit, (2009) that family owners may be reluctant to use ESOPs 
because of the concern over the dilution of the equity stake, the first generations of 
Energy, Cash, Parts, and Whole took their employees, directors, or even their friends into 
account to link them as initial shareholders in different companies without apparent fear 
of the dilution of the family’s equity. These shares were bought by the second 
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generations, who preferred to continue acting as sole shareholders of the companies, 
among others, to avoid subsequent conflicts with relatives of non-family shareholders 
(P6:64-64; P18:37-37). 
Even in the case of Cash, the founder was inclined to have the manager motivated 
to maintain a competitive advantage by means of giving him an important part of the 
company’s shares, aligning his interest and his shareholder’s intentions, which is 
according to Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2006), and where the external manager and 
shareholder of the company had given great help to the family and to the family relations 
(P3:28-29). Instead, the second generation (the sibling generation) in this company 
thought that this motivation could be maintained in managers through other mechanisms 
that did not involve direct stock ownership, i.e., through phantom stocks, mechanisms 
that, they say, would produce the same motivational effect without the consequences that 
this stock ownership in external hands could cause a fight or disagreement in the future 
with the successors of outside shareholders (P10:187-187). 
Additionally, regarding ESOPs and generations, the third generation of School is 
divided regarding the policy of linking its executives to the company’s shareholders, 
according to the interviews with the members of the same generation (AS and BS). In 
addition, no mechanism was found by which this policy could be implemented in an 
appropriate manner. The experiences of the younger generations in international 
companies set the stage for accepting shareholding as performance incentives and as a 
means to encourage permanence in the company, particularly in the technology sector. 
The discussion continues, and according to BS, a definition of ESOPs is required because 
some of the competing companies implement this policy in certain subsidiaries.  
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5.2.3.2 Generations and sale of shares 
Finally, to the extent to which generations progress, family ties decrease, which 
makes it possible that these generations tend to sell their shares, changing the company’s 
capital structure (Marchisio and Ravasi, 2000). In the cases analyzed, selling Whole on 
the stock market while the first generation of founders still kept active had nothing to do 
with generational family development. Instead, the detachment from the company that 
led to the sale came not as a result of the passing of generations but rather because of the 
second generation’s lack of belonging to the company, given its marginalization. It was 
also due to the lack of family rules for buying and selling shares within the same family, 
viewing the stock market as a "practical" method of giving value to shares and providing 
liquidity, avoiding pricing conflicts. In the case of School, also a large multinational 
company, selling a percentage of shares on the stock market had more to do with the idea 
of testing how the stock market and financing a new project would work and also as a 
valuation mechanism if someone in the family wanted to sell part of his or her shares. In 
the case of Harvest, selling part of the shares of one member of the family was related to 
relationship conflict with other family members, as explained above. The sale of shares 
was also related to the entrepreneurship of new generations, who view this initiative as 
more interesting and consistent with their capacities, given their fresh academic training 
and search for self-affirmation and differentiation (P16:108-108). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the sale of shares in the companies analyzed had nothing to do with 
generational passage but rather with the lack of belonging to the company and the need to 
finance projects and obtain liquidity. Family conflict also played an important role in the 
sale of shares of Harvest, as expressed in the previous section, 
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5.2.3.3 Generations and investment funds 
The risks of prompting the exit of this equity investor may reduce the involvement 
of the next generation of family members because their commitment and trust decline 
(Marchisio, Mazzola, Sciascia, Miles, & Astrachan, 2010). During this study, it was not 
possible to verify these assertions. The Brick, Mortgage and Cash companies, which 
maintain minority investments of investment funds, do not note the next generation’s 
interest in leaving the company for the reason presented above, let alone due to a 
decreasing commitment. Neither does the Lunch company, in which there is a controlling 
investment fund. On the contrary, what can be observed is the increasing commitment of 
the next generation to each other and to the company from the investment fund. In the 
case of Cash, which had a very positive experience with the investment fund, trust was 
strengthened and generated transparency and good results, owing to which the financial 
relationship that they had managed to extend beyond the time initially agreed upon. 
Perhaps we should increase the sample size to examine this theory in more detail. 
5.3 Contributions from this work 
When considering how the capital structure of a family business is determined, as 
Romano, Tanewski, and Smyrnios (2001) say, it is important to understand a variety of 
elements that are internal and external to the companies analyzed. Some important 
elements include, for example, the following: the years of business establishment 
(Stanworth and Curran, 1976); industry considerations (Carleton and Silberman, 1977); 
the business owners’ plans and objectives (McMahon and Stanger, 1995); the levels of 
ownership and management control (Ray and Hutchinson, 1983); industry considerations 
(Carleton and Silberman, 1977); and the owners’ business, social, and behavioral goals 
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(McMahon and Stanger, 1995). Additionally, and more specifically in terms of the capital 
structure, it is important to know the following: the tradition that business owners have of 
favoring a certain method of financing; the use of internal sources of finance; how easily 
owners relate to outsiders to accept certain types of business partners; and the family 
values and aspirations that may favor one type of financing over another. Similarly, 
several family dynamics affect financing decisions and how capital structure affects the 
family dynamics.  
Therefore, this dissertation contributes to the research on the capital structure of 
family businesses in a number of ways and in a very practical manner. First, the inclusion 
of internal and external factors in capital structure decisions suggests a new path for 
future research. The link between family business dynamics and the capital structure of 
family firms has heretofore not been established concisely or been studied in depth 
(Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010); this qualitative research has linked some internal factors 
such as family dynamic variables, family values, and generations so that their influence 
on the capital structure can be observed in an integral manner. Furthermore, samples of 
public companies have been used to derive conclusions about family businesses, and the 
use of data from listed companies to understand small and mostly private family 
businesses is controversial, and its results are often ultimately inapplicable (Astrachan, 
2010). This research sample includes only family businesses, and it makes it possible to 
observe how families in private companies behave when financing decisions are made. 
As Ang states, “the modern theory of corporate finance has not been developed with 
small businesses in mind” (1991, p. 1), and, according to Berger and Udell (1998, pp. 
615-616), “the private markets that finance small businesses … are so different from the 
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public markets that finance large businesses.” Moreover, Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) 
modern finance theory assumes that profit maximization is the only goal of a firm. 
Although the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller has relevance for public companies 
(Romano et al., 2000), these concepts have little application to family companies 
(Chaganti, DeCarolis, & Deeds, 1995) because family firms often have other (non-
financial) goals for their businesses (Berrone et al., 2010), as is the case with some of the 
families that are interviewed in the sample, whose goals are not solely of a financial 
nature. In this sample, it can be observed how the principles of modern finance theory are 
not entirely applicable to family companies. In fact, when there are no non-financial 
goals present in family businesses, the future results can be unfortunate for the 
shareholding family, as is the case of Whole, according to AW: 
“When the company was created, there was not a long-term projection on the part 
of the founders. They did not think about mechanisms that would allow the next 
generations to continue in a structured manner The founder would say, ‘You do 
whatever you want, don’t bother me with that.’ (P32:105-105).  
This lack of planning for generations to come may be the reason the company was sold 
on the Colombian stock exchange, and today, the family may regret not having a long-
term sustainability goal for the company.  
The insufficiencies of the current theories regarding the capital structure in family 
firms warrant a fresh, groundbreaking approach through a qualitative study. Therefore, 
the use of the grounded theory approach and a sample that was limited to family 
businesses in Colombia produced the results and the observations presented here. Given 
these findings, we can appreciate several elements of family dynamics and their influence 
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on the capital structure of companies simultaneously. Pieper (2010) suggests that greater 
importance should be given to the psychology of families to explain the behavior of 
family businesses. Indeed, many financing issues listed in the review of the interviews 
show a very clear link between the different forms of financing and the family dynamics 
that appeared in the families. 
5.3.1 Contributions for non-family managers 
This study can be a valuable tool for family business owner-managers and non-
family managers in identifying and promoting the internal and external factors that add 
value to firms without compromising next-generation family firm development. From a 
managerial perspective, an exploration of the critical family dynamics aimed at the 
capital structure in family firms can help create an awareness of both the strengths, which 
can eventually be implemented through family dynamics, and the weaknesses, which can 
help avoid damaging behavior if the capital structure produces disagreements and 
conflicts. Accordingly, family managers (who, in many cases, are also owners) and non-
family managers must be careful to observe capital structure issues that may possibly 
damage family harmony or that, on the other hand, may strengthen it. For practical 
application, these findings may offer informed advice for managers on how to craft 
capital structure to pursue certain strategies and how desired outcomes require certain 
capital structures. 
5.3.2 Contributions for family business advisors 
When consultants work with family companies, they should understand the 
benefits of identifying the family dynamics as their starting point. In this manner, they 
can better advise the family regarding decisions about the different capital options that 
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they may recommend. Similarly, they will have the opportunity to better predict the 
possible effects that a certain capital structure may have on the family. Otherwise, the 
solutions they offer, even if they are convenient for the business, may create family 
problems and conflicts. Thus, they will be able to offer tailor-made solutions that are 
related to capital structure, solutions that are convenient for the business and 
simultaneously convenient for the family. 
Financial consultants who work for family companies must bear in mind that 
selecting sources of financing for these companies not only is related to the capital and 
opportunity costs but also is linked to many other non-financial factors, which may 
increase or decrease the return on these investments. These are elements such as the 
characteristics of the directors, gender, age, the generation in charge, the relationships 
among family members, their level of experience and commitment, and the values that 
constitute the family business, in addition to other disturbing factors such as conflicts, 
divorces, rivalries, and personal interests. This study demonstrates how leading family 
companies in Colombia from different sectors of the economy have been financially 
successful and have maintained family cohesion using sources of financing that are in 
harmony with their culture and dynamics. 
Pecking order, risk aversion, and behavioral theory are theories that 
complementarily interpret the selection of sources of financing for family businesses. 
Given their transgenerational goals, their proclivity to control, their responsibility to 
legacy, and their deeper commitment to the company dynamics, they show more 
conservative attitudes to financial risks. Although this tendency is manifest in the study, 
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flexibility was also found in the selection of sources for financing business growth and 
competitiveness.  
These findings suggest that, in business consulting, it is important to have 
comprehensive knowledge of the wide range of sources of financing available on the 
local and international market, amplified by the different combinations between them, 
defining the advantages that they offer and the risks that they present in terms of control, 
decision making, management co-responsibility, limitations to links, capital costs, respect 
for culture, capacity to dialogue with the family, risk management, the commitment to the 
company’s values and mission, and the understanding and management of family 
dynamics.  
Regarding profitability, many family decisions are counterintuitive. They must be 
understood, given that they obey principles that cannot always be explained from a purely 
financial perspective. Going into debt to distribute a few dividends does not make sense 
unless it is understood that receiving something is an incentive, a method of harvesting 
and maintaining cohesion, hope, trust in leaders and thus gaining support for new 
challenges. It means bearing in mind the human condition, according to which 
capitalizing forever is impossible without seeing tangible results or having few resources 
to make a gift. This sensitivity to the companies’ non-financial aspects will facilitate 
communication with the family and the joint search for solutions. 
5.3.3 Contributions for the banking sector and investment funds 
Identifying financial risk is critical for a banking institution. Knowing the 
characteristics of an entrepreneurial family, its organization, its trajectory, its culture, the 
family’s degree of commitment to the company, and its family dynamics is essential to 
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make decisions in regard to amounts, interest rates, credit terms, or even the percentage 
of participation in projects that are developed by these types of businesses. The family’s 
prestige and ability to make sacrifices and offer reciprocal support are important credit 
guarantees. 
Entrepreneurial families are par excellence conservative with regard to risk. 
Moreover, the values and principles that govern and guide them promote compliance 
with their credit commitments. In a certain way, family companies have a path of trust 
ready, in advance, with financial entities for credit requests to finance growth and 
investment. Investment funds that consider investments or alliances with family 
businesses must bear in mind the family’s own dynamic, culture, and values to balance 
their return expectations and their different future perspectives, not necessarily opposing, 
so that mutual trust becomes a factor of transformation. The companies analyzed show 
different experiences and results from their work with private investment funds, with 
some being positive and some being negative. Their experience is a learning process for 
investors and families. 
5.3.4 Contributions for entrepreneurial families 
This research paper may be useful for entrepreneurial families to the extent that 
they can identify which sources of financing are most favorable for the company and for 
the family according to the dynamics experienced by the family at a certain moment in 
time. Similarly, they can know the advantages and opportunities that entrepreneurial 
families have in relation to other companies in regard to requirements from banks, funds, 
and other institutions to minimize the cost of financing. In addition, they should know the 
advantages and disadvantages of certain sources of financing for entrepreneurial families. 
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The values, culture, and dynamics of an entrepreneurial family are essential for its growth 
and sustainability. Its values are distinguishing elements that allow it to optimize its own 
resources and external resources and to generate trust to attract investors who are 
committed to the same culture, with the expectation of obtaining better returns in 
different timelines.  
As stated by Harris, Martinez, and Ward (1994), it is also shown in the interviews 
that the dynamics of the family may affect the relevance of non-financial (e.g., 
independence, employment for family members, prestige) and financial goals; over time, 
the performance of the company along financial (dividends, salaries, perks) and non-
financial (quality products, archives, corporate social responsibility) dimensions may 
affect the family’s emotional and financial cohesion dynamics as well (Pieper, 2007; 
Pieper & Astrachan, 2008). This study explores how values, culture, generations, and 
family dynamics were decisive in configuring the capital structure of important 
successful entrepreneurial families in Colombia. Finally, it is helpful to articulate the 
components of family psychodynamics with the capital structure to perceive their mutual 
implications, with a view to anticipating risk and/or determining the best course of action 
for company financing; at the least, doing so can help create and develop decision-
making mechanisms to select the sources of financing for entrepreneurial families.  
5.3.5 Contributions for clients and suppliers 
For these stakeholders, the entrepreneurial families in the sample honor their 
commitments and guarantee their credit even with their own equity because they have at 
stake the reputation of their company, their family legacy, and the future of their families. 
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It has been shown how the interviewees in this research link their family values and 
family dynamics with their financial decision making.  
5.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research. 
It is evident from the discussion of these results that the study of the link between 
family dynamics and the capital structure raises many aspects that need to be explored 
further. The relationship between them is complex, and other internal and external factors 
that were not been included in this analysis can certainly be found. This in itself implies a 
future challenge for family company researchers. The purpose of this study was to 
investigate how family influence and family dynamics affect capital structure decisions, 
explicitly focusing on the sources and levels of equity and debt financing. Secondarily, 
this research aimed to explore the reciprocal effects of capital structure decisions and 
firm performance on family dynamics. This study demonstrates the influence of internal 
factors on the capital structure of companies. Similarly, internal and external factors such 
as the company size, the generations running the company, conflicts and family crises, 
and definitely the context in which the companies develop were always present. 
Nevertheless, this study has its limitations. 
First, the study was conducted in Colombia, which represents a couple of 
potential limitations. In spite of the proposal stating that, according to González, 
Guzman, Pombo, and Trujillo (2012), Colombia is becoming a benchmark capital market 
in Latin America from a financial development perspective, and that the information that 
we had was that the Colombian stock market had become one of the best performing 
markets in the region (www.stockmarkets.com/exchanges/south-america/colombia-stock-
exchange, June 27th, 2014), several interviewees claimed otherwise and spoke negatively 
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about the situations of the country and of the Colombian stock exchange; this is precisely 
why they hesitate about floating their companies. Family businesses in Colombia are 
generally not seeking financing in the stock market, and those that are indeed listed are 
very large companies. 
Second, extending the observations of this study to other countries is not easy 
because, as King and Santor (2008) say, it is difficult to differentiate firm-level effects 
from country-level effects in capital structure studies due to the very different legal, 
regulatory, and market institutions. Simultaneously, a cultural aspect differentiates 
companies from the range of family-owned businesses depending on the national 
specificities (Zellweger et al., 2011). Because the dissertation was prepared in Colombia, 
it could be the case that, if it had been performed somewhere else, the culture and family 
dynamics could be different. For example, when describing “trust,” Fukuyama (1996) 
compares China and Japan and explains that their levels of trust are different. In Japan, he 
says, the levels of trust that people have are much higher than those in China. Thus, this 
research could be conducted in another country, and the results could be compared and 
contrasted to the results of this study. On the other hand, one always wonders whether 
local knowledge, or what works in one part of the world, can then be transferred as global 
knowledge to other parts of the planet.  
Third, Colombia’s economic perspectives at this moment are very difficult to 
forecast due to the country’s high dependency on oil and coal exports and the global drop 
in commodity prices, which has resulted in a significant local currency devaluation, 
making imports more expensive. The importers of goods or raw materials that use 
suppliers’ financing currently consider this type of credit to be very high risk due to the 
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exchange rate, which is the same assessment as those who use bank loans in US dollars 
who now consider them to be very high risk for currency hedging operations and a 
possible additional devaluation. Were this study to be conducted at another moment in 
economic time, the results might be different. 
Fourth, other sources of financing such as ESOPs have not presented a significant 
development in Colombia to the extent that researchers can conduct comparative studies 
that show the reciprocal implications between the capital structure and family dynamics. 
However, this research demonstrates that ESOPs have been used to show loyalty to 
employees and to keep good employees attached to the business. The globalization of 
capital markets will gradually open the door to new forms of financing that 
entrepreneurial families will explore to the extent that they generate trust and respect for 
their culture. The research in this field will remain open. 
Fifth, despite having obtained financial statements from the companies for the last 
three years, the interviews were all completed during the past year, and the information 
derived from them is based, on one hand, on the interpretation that the interviewees made 
of historic situations and, on the other hand, on their memories of what had occurred. 
Somehow, this information may have been influenced by the interviewees’ memory or by 
their own interpretation of what had occurred. Additionally, the interview data received 
and analyzed are very diverse in regard to individual variables such as age, sex, the 
generation in charge, the economic sector in which the company operates, the family 
members working in the company, or the family’s participation on the board of directors. 
Therefore, the results neither allow nor pretend to establish categorical or metric 
generalizations regarding how family dynamics affect the capital structure of 
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entrepreneurial families. Because it was not possible to interview all of the individuals 
proposed from different generations because many of them were absent, in the future, a 
sample could be selected in which the interviewees are from different generations and 
more time is dedicated to a new study. 
Sixth, there is another important boundary for this work which is the sample of family 
companies in each category of financing which might not be enough. For example, in the 
private equity category one of the findings was that it improves communication among 
family members; that might not be always the case. The same is true for the ESOP 
category where the positive impact on the family might be rare. Moreover, not all 
partnerships produce aligning of the cultures: the family culture and the partner culture as 
it appears in these results could not be aligned; not always do allies make important 
contribution to the family culture; on the contrary, they might destroy it. Not always are 
families so responsible as to treat minority shareholders with justice; on the contrary, they 
might be subject to “tunneling” by family members. Not all the families have long term 
orientation as to save money from asset shedding for future investments; family values 
are very different in different family businesses, etc. All of these limitations and 
concerns, in turn, offer great opportunities for future research. 
It is also worth noting the following: 
 Family dynamics is a concept that, in reality, is impossible to observe. What one 
observes is simply a person’s behavior at a certain moment, which leads one to 
suppose that there is a frame of reference in this person’s mind for making 
decisions. Therefore, a person’s behavior is merely a reflection of this frame of 
reference. In addition, the personal values of an individual are one thing, and the 
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values of a social group or of a family as such are another thing. The personal 
values of an individual are not necessarily the values of a family as a group. 
Furthermore, to understand a social system, we use models that, according to 
Hofstede (1996), are representations that we make of a situation, and these models 
also include the subjectivity of the person analyzing the answer at any given time 
– in this case, my own subjectivity.  
 It must also be taken into account that there are some family dynamics that 
develop or change over time and that may be different according to the 
generations interviewed. For example, the issue of austerity changed according to 
the generation, when dividends were paid. First generations always were more 
austere. In addition, different members of the same family may share the same 
values but not in the same proportion. Thus, a quantitative extension of this 
research could be convenient. 
 Pieper (2010) suggests that greater importance should be given to the psychology 
of families to explain the behavior of family businesses. Indeed, many financing 
issues listed in the review of the interviews show a very clear link between the 
different forms of financing and the conflicts that were appearing in families, and 
vice versa. Deepening these aspects is therefore necessary.  
 It would also be worth determining how the next generations of the companies 
analyzed will develop with regard to their family companies. Many members of 
these new generations have grown up in an atmosphere of insecurity that forced 
them to study and live abroad, with the specific question of whether they will 
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continue to belong to the companies of their family. Would they sell their shares, 
changing the capital structure of the company due to a lack of sense of belonging?  
I also have a concern, and it is the following: Despite having completed the 
interviews in an atmosphere of total trust and although the interviewees answered my 
questions in a calm manner after I guaranteed the anonymity of their answers, it is 
impossible to ensure the total credibility of these answers. This occurs in any type of 
research, but I feel that I need to note this issue as a concern. 
Additionally, if the sample for this research could be increased and the answers from 
the different generations could be compared, even interviewing more employees and 
making comparisons to companies in other countries, then a much better understanding 
of the subject could certainly be possible. For each family dynamics, if the family has 
certain types of family dynamics, there could be an instrument that may make it possible 
to more adequately predict what the possible capital structure would be, and vice versa. 
In addition, another family dynamic, value, or culture typology could be chosen, as I said 
before, which would allow a prediction to be made. 
Finally, in this study, it was assumed that the family was an entity with defined, 
predictable characteristics. The family business was explicitly defined, in addition to the 
variables that compose the capital structure. Today, the very essence of family is 
discussed in Colombia and in several countries with regard to whether heterosexuality is 
inherent in its structure, procreation is a necessary objective, or sustainability is a 
guarantee of its existence. Many factors have changed the face of the family, and in the 
future, it will be necessary to consider how various family figures make financing 
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decisions: gay couples, single fathers/mothers, childless couples, and families with 
adopted children, to name but a few examples.  
5.5 Conclusion 
     The overall purpose of this study was two-fold. On one hand, the thrust of this 
examination was to explore how family influence and family dynamics affect capital 
structure decisions (sources of equity and debt financing and levels of debt and equity 
financing). On the other hand, this research expected to explore the practical effects of 
capital structure decisions on family dynamics. In order to achieve that purpose, a 
qualitative grounded, theory influence approach was used. During 2015, I conducted 30 
interviews, and collected some other secondary information from 11 family companies, 
from different sectors, and with different sizes and family generations in command, 
located in Colombia, although, some of them were multinational. I also chose different 
types of financing among the family business sample to observe how each type 
influenced the family dynamics and vice versa. I also found how some external 
(economic conditions) and internal factors (family dynamics, values and generations) 
influenced the manner in which families chose different capital structures among the 
sample companies. The selection of the capital structure more conducive to satisfy the 
business scope is sophisticated and generally includes a mix of sources which capital 
intensity varies according to internal, external family factors.  
There are some external factors such as the global economy and the internal 
economy of the country and the effect of such events as the late ‘90s economic downturn, 
9/11, and the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007. These events prevented some firms from 
either going public, or issue bonds in the stock market since investors became more 
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cautious. Bank credit remained the main source of leverage instead. Currency 
fluctuations caused by the fall of oil market prices put pressure on accounts payable in 
US dollars. High inflation rates in the ‘90s caused stagnation and fear of banks and 
investors that would foreclose operational assets left as collateral. Families felt the stress, 
fear and, in some cases, panic. They reacted differently; some could not resist stress and 
broke up, while others showed resilience and solidarity focusing on restructuring debt, 
putting off projects, reducing or deferring dividends distribution, trimming expenses, 
shouldering higher and risky leverage and even shelving executive sabbatical years. 
Fifty-four years of political unrest in Colombia forged a climate of financial uncertainty 
that led family founders to send their offspring abroad to study. This generation grew up 
with certain detachment from their business and some did not even return to give a hand 
or find a professional career within the family business.  
Internal regulations also call for capital structure adjustments. Business alliances 
became a strategy used by foreign investors to do business in Colombia when in the’70s a 
government policy enforced high taxes for foreign shareholders. Partnering with well-
grounded Colombian family firms facilitated their entrance or staying in business. In the 
financial sector, new capitalization rules set smaller debt to equity ratios so brokers can 
only deduct taxes up to n times their equity. These measures spur creative forms of 
financing such as Special Purpose Vehicles and families among others.  
Furthermore, the selection of financial sources is influenced by internal factors. 
IPOs giving up control is an option for families in a more mature stage with several 
branches engaged in long term and costly ventures or for those whose members without 
proper training demanding resources for entrepreneurship, or spin-offs within a system 
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where shares are easy to trade. Some acknowledge that floating the company is a matter 
of prestige aside from securing resources for the future. Going public brings along risk 
reduction, cohesion and business diversification, but on the other hand, it takes away 
control, the sense of belonging and, in some cases, increases stress since decisions are 
taken together with external shareholders that do not necessarily hold the same values. 
Family privacy is compromised when firms become public. In the case of IPOs not 
giving up control, family members are more aware of their accountability towards 
investors and show more willingness to learn. It also prevents conflicts between family 
shareholders thanks to the ease of liquidity.  
As for internal family factors that show a significant effect on the selection of 
sources of financing, family values stand out as another criteria. Family firms expect 
value alignment between their own family and business partners, and compliance with 
codes of business ethics that include but is not limited to respect for the company culture, 
honoring agreements with employees and suppliers, valuing stakeholders, trust, 
accountability, cultural diversity, respect for privacy, open-mindedness, justice, social 
responsibility, self-development, entrepreneurship, prestige, and long term orientation.  
A most sought-after value for families is Know-How when it comes to 
partnerships and letting in investors. Family reputation is an important asset and 
instrument for negotiation before financial institutions. The fact is that they rarely default 
and establish long-term credit agreements with banks, obtain low interest rates, lower or 
no- collateral pledges and offer open credit lines. 
As Behavioral Theory predicts, family firms prefer to avoid a loss even if this 
means accepting a higher risk or underperformance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Risk 
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aversion traits are present in all families in this study; however, it is more evident in first 
generation firms. It prevents decision makers from compromising family assets and 
reputation in risky businesses that may jeopardize the future of the family in case of 
default. Debt is not always an option; but it sometimes solves contingency issues in cases 
of divorces, abrupt succession, conflicts among family members that lead to buy the 
sibling´s share to prevent the entrance of an external shareholder, respond to sudden 
attack from competitors, and take preemptive actions when credit lines turn scarce.  
High debt causes enormous stress in managers and in the family as a whole. 
Distrust and scapegoating take companies to a standstill. Besides, there is a positive spin 
when debt is high: families come close together, learn from mistakes, and became 
humbler, committed personal assets to support the business, accepted cutting and putting 
off dividends distribution, and kept their investments within the business. Private Equity 
Funds offer family firms resources to support their endeavors and new ventures, 
formalize corporate governance, further strategic decision making and reduce risk. They 
are expected to enhance business operations with new Know How and networking. 
Although this paper also presents several limitations for the research done, the 
contribution of this enquiry will be useful to family business shareholders, managers, 
board directors and advisors of family businesses when making or helping to make 
decisions on capital structures for their companies, to foresee the effects that those capital 
structures can have over the family shareholders and vice versa. My goal was to apply 
capital structure, family dynamics, and capital structure concepts and theories to family 
business. In order to achieve that goal, I went through a very delicate examination of 
several tape recorded and transcribed interviews with kind and generous family members, 
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board directors and employees from the companies in my sample, who helpfully offered 
me their time and open information about their companies.  I hope this dissertation will 
be used by many people in the field, and inspire other researches to continue working in 
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General Questions 
1 How would you define a Family Business and what features make your firm one of 
them? 
2 Do you believe that family firms outperform non-family ones in your environment? If 
so, what family and business dynamics favor this advantage? 
3 What are the non-financial goals, the socio-emotional wealth pursued by the family 
firm? 
4 Which sources of financing are the sector and your business acquainted with? 
5 What sources are more available for your business type or in the nearby market? 
6 Is there any background on family ventures, or external capital investments that the 
family may rely on as model of good practices? 
7 Are the forthcoming generations willing to improve family involvement in ownership, 
governance and management and honor agreements?  
   
Family & Sources: Do family dynamics affect sources and proportions of financing 
sought? 
8 What is the purpose of financing? Growth, expansion, new markets, innovation, 
diversification, integration, entrepreneurship, keep competitive edge, technological 
renewal, defend from takeovers, maintain market share, accommodate more relatives, 
buying out a family member´s share with conflicting views, grooming for prospect 
selling, concentrating ownership in one branch of the family, others? Map out internal 
and external drivers. 
9 Family firms are traditionally seen as risk-averse. What would make your family take 
new external financial challenges? 
10 What type of sources is the family considering? 
11 Has the family pondered the different alternatives, the advantage of having one or 
several sources? 
12 How the longer time horizon of the family firm may further credit or investment terms 
with financial firms?
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13 How to make the family firm reputation a proxy for collateral? 
14 Do you believe that factors such as Parsimony (capital deployed sparingly and used 
intensively), Personalism (unification of ownership and control in the owner), and 
Particularism (families may employ alternative decision criteria than those based on 
pure economic rationality) is a value added to investors and obtain better lending 
rates? 
15 Which features among FB are sought after by investors to secure returns and reduce 
risks? 
16 What advantages or value added does being a family firm have in the cultural and 
business environment compared to non-family firms when looking for fresh capital? 
17 What issues of the family dynamics may discourage external investors and in what 
proportion such issues add or subtract to the value of the company, increase debt rates 
or tighten investment conditions? 
18 What is the general family Attitude towards debt? 
19 What family issues in your environment (family conflicts, in-laws, growth of family 
members, complex succession process, lack of interest in the business by new 
generations) posit a risk when seeking sources of financing  
20 Does the financing scheme selected match the life cycle of the family firm? How? 
21 How company age, tenure, generation in charge, gender of family leaders, family or 
non-family CEO, character of leaders, family attitudes toward risk, losing-control 
apprehension, pressing family needs, may influence the decision of seeking external 
financial sources. 
22 What correlations do you find between business planning and debt?  
23 To what extent an unruly or conflicting family firm is considered a handicap or an 
opportunity for investors? 
24 To what degree ownership distribution of the firm may affect investor´s perspective 
for financing its projects? 
25 If financing is intended for entrepreneurship, would it serve to support related or 
unrelated entrepreneurship? 
26 Is communication among family members and stakeholders, deep, transparent, 
frequent and pertaining to address the decision of seeking sources of financing the 
firm? 
27 Is this initiative of funding the family business influenced by the character of those in 
charge of taking decisions? Are they more prone to be adventurous, risk-takers, risk-
aversion oriented, conservative? 
28 Are the firm´s Mission and Vision taking into account as criteria for selecting a 
particular source or combination of financing sources? How to go about if there is not 
a match? 
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29 What personal and family characteristics (behaviors, patterns) and abilities are 
required to achieve a new direction on financing the firm? Is the family apt to this 
challenge? (Strengths, shortcomings) 
30 What Shareholder´s behaviors are conducive and which not for an eventual external 
financial leverage project? How to make improvements? 
31 In your own experience, have you gone through a debt service default, financial 
constraints or lenders pressure? How did the family face such situation? What did you 
learn? 
 Sources & Decisions: Do sources and proportions of financing affect strategic decision 
making? 
32 What criteria do you take into account for deciding on the appropriate type of 
financing leverage? 
33 In which opportunities did the firm change its capital structure? How was the decision 
made, which sources were considered which not and why? Any impact on the family 
dynamics? 
34 How non-monetary goals such as prestige, need of belonging, independence, intimacy, 
employment for family members and altruism are safeguarded when seeking external 
sources of financing?  
35 What financial and non-financial returns will the firm offer to investors as ROI? 
36 In your business environment, is Private Equity used to finance strategic projects or to 
make the firm over to create market credibility before going public? 
37 If equity investors decide to pull out, would be the family willing and ready to regain 
control? 
38 What made the firm decide for an ESOP scheme?  
39 Which financing source helps alleviate most fiscal obligations? 
40 Does your organization consider the tax advantages of borrowing when deciding on 
financing your projects? 
41 How to determine the scope (Financing the whole firm, some units or projects), 
timeframe, Amounts and proportions for financing the Family Firm?  
42 What collaterals would back up the expected resources? 
43 What Changes are expected to occur in the family, business and ownership subsystems 
after obtaining the resources? 
44 Should the family proceed in a hierarchical order in terms of financing the business 
(Pecking Order)? 
45 Is the cost of equity defined by a rather objective formula, or it is an expression of 
subjective family expectations? 
46 In order to streamline family investments and operational costs (mainly from non-core 
expenses) investors might demand reducing expenses. Would those measures affect 
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family cohesion, development, communication and key goals? How to prepare for that 
event? 
47 Are stakeholders willing to give up dividends or experience a substantial reduction as 
to get the requested leverage? 
48 Is it clear to all the incumbents the reasons behind seeking fresh sources of financing? 
49 Do the family members and stakeholders trust leaders regarding the decision of 
seeking external sources of financing the firm? 
50 What mechanisms use the Family Governing bodies to get stakeholders on board? 
51 If financing is not an option, what´s left, what other scenarios should be considered? 
52 Who is entitled to take the decision?  
53 Which family decision making paradigm mirrors best your firm: closed, random, 
open, synchronous? 
54 Is the family knowledgeable of the expected Requirements made from outsiders and 
lenders to finance the Family Firm? How are these demands pondered? 
55 Has the family prepared a due diligence document envisioning a prospective financing 
option? 
56 Has the Family Firm conducted an External analysis for this project? Is it necessary, 
timing? Are all conditions considered? 
57 What should be prepared before decisions are taken (grooming the firm)? 
58 In the case of ESOPs, what conditions had the firm in place as to share ownership with 
employees? 
59 What would be the process in order to have a well-grounded/informed decision? 
60 What would be the protocol for consultation among family members and 
stakeholders? 
61 Which other voices should be heard to document the decision making process? 
62 What indicators would signal consensus? 
63 What would be the role of the Board in decision making? 
64 An equity fund may require a change in the management and ownership structure of 
the family business. Is the family prepared to negotiate certain conditions to minimize 
agency costs or secure staff continuity? 
65 What´s the family perception of sharing/yielding control of Capital, Company, Top 
Management positions? 
66 What ownership structure would be acceptable to the FB to keep control and identity? 
67 Are there strategies in place and human capital to face a power battle, lose control and 
reaching agreements through negotiations if going public? 
68 Agency problems arise due to the separation of ownership and management. How is 
your organization going about it?  
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69 Implications of leveraging through ESOPs: is there real willingness to overcome 
information asymmetry with the employees. How? 
70 Was the negotiation to supplement resources respectful of family business 
differences? 
71 Were the investor´s demands acceptable? 
72 Did the sources contracted satisfy expectations in terms of costs and vision? 
73 What elements are not negotiable? 
74 Are there Transparency procedures in place to track the results? 
75 Does the organization have in place standardized reporting mechanisms and 
procedures that satisfy investors´ needs? 
76 What indicators would be set to gauge risk?  
77 What rules and protocols would help the firm prevent financing consumption by 
family members or to engage in non-profitable investment for stakeholders? 
78 How external stakeholders will keep an eye on the company? 
79 Is it acceptable to the family giving up or deferring new projects as to improve the 
company capital structure?  
   
 Sources&Family: Do sources of financing affect family dynamics? 
80 Which non-financial goals would the family have to relinquish if accepting certain 
external sources of financing? Which would be enhanced? 
81 What collaterals is the Business ready to offer to potential investors? Is there a 
consensus on the risks the family would shoulder, and is there a willingness to share 
this responsibility proportionally? 
82 Is losing face or damaging family reputation in case of failure a deterrent for acquiring 
debt? 
83 Aside of diminishing the bargaining power of financial institutions, what other 
advantages offer IPOs to the family firm? 
84 What non-financial goals will IPOs achieve for the family? 
85 Does IPO favor in any way management succession? 
86 What means of financing has the family traditionally used and what results and 
collateral effects has it experienced? 
87 If one of the purposes of the family firm is to maintain, promote and increase socio-
emotional wealth, how the decision of financing will directly or indirectly contribute 
to this purpose? 
88 How certain types of capital structures or sources of capital may harm family 
cohesion? 
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89 Are family members willing to reduce income in the present to have a more promising 
future through financing by debt or alliances? 
90 Is there any protocol in place in case of default of debt, failure or disagreements to 
secure family cohesion? 
91 How to keep the family together when becoming wealthy? 
92 What implications foresee for culture, cohesion, succession, altruism and reciprocity if 
adopting an external financing system? 
93 In the case of ESOPs, ¿are there family issues known by employees that could be used 
by the latter to press benefits? 
94 The combination of ownership and control is a key feature of family firms. Investors 
may see a higher chance of entrenchment. How would you change this vision? 
95 Were the Values, Mission and Vision affected? 
96 In case to resorting to debt, how would the company manage the underinvestment 
phenomena? 
97 How will Private Equity promote family business´ value and outcomes? 
98 How has the firm counteract Private Equity drives of short term actions and its 
implications in R&D, investment, managerial practices and employment? 
99 What changes has the firm experienced after implementing ESOP? (productivity, 
economic growth, performance, culture, information sharing, cooperation) 
